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SUMMARY 
Background: Adolescence is a developmental time span not only characterized by a profound 
improvement in cognitive and physical capacities, but also by an increase in affective turmoil such as 
emotional lability and impulsivity, and a marked increase in the prevalence of severe and chronic psy-
chiatric disorders such as mood and anxiety disorders. Recent findings from the field of Developmen-
tal Cognitive Neuroscience indicate that adolescent difficulties in affect regulation may in part result 
from maturational transitions in brain architecture and organization during this age span, leading to a 
temporary dysbalance between neural systems mediating regulatory-cognitive control and those me-
diating affective states. Moreover, findings from neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies suggest 
that this dysbalance in neural systems may in some instances transcend into adulthood, conferring 
risk for suffering from affective disorders beyond the time of adolescence. A better understanding of 
the interaction between cognition and affect during adolescence by neuroscience-based methods thus 
may further advance the understanding of normative adolescent behavior and possibly of the patho-
physiology of mood and anxiety disorders.  
Methods: Behaviorally, differences in the interplay of regulatory-cognitive and affective brain 
functions between healthy adolescents, adolescents with affective disorders and adults could be re-
flected in motivated behaviors and/or cognitive control processes such as attention allocation or inhibi-
tory control within reward-related contexts. To test this hypothesis, a new eye movement task, the 
reward saccade task (RST), was developed to assess the influence of three different incentive condi-
tions on eye movements of differing cognitive demand in 30 adults, 32 adolescents, 16 adolescents 
with an anxiety disorder, and 12 adolescents with major depressive disorder (MDD). Specifically, sub-
jects were asked to either look at a peripherally appearing target (prosaccade instruction) or away 
from it (antisaccade instruction), and depending on performance accuracy they could either win or not 
win a monetary reward, lose or avoid losing a monetary punishment, or were informed on task per-
formance without monetary implications. While prosaccades are simple, visually-guided eye move-
ments, antisaccades are internally-guided eye movements that involve several higher order cognitive 
processes such as response inhibition (suppress the reflex to look at the target) and attention alloca-
tion towards a location void of any visual cue. The investigation of saccadic eye movements is an apt 
neuroscience-based method since saccadic eye movements are easily measurable with high temporal 
resolution, can be integrated in different paradigms of differing cognitive demand such as the antisac-
cade and prosaccade paradigm, are sensitive to inventive manipulation and have been mapped in 
extensive animal and human research onto precise neural circuits and thus can inform about the func-
tional state of these circuits. 
For analysis, the influence of the three different incentive conditions was evaluated for global 
task performance measures (i.e. proportion of correct and erroneous responses per saccade type) and 
dynamic task performance measures (latency, peak velocity, duration and amplitude for each type of 
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saccadic response). Moreover, the influence of feedback notification on pupil diameter and fixation 
duration was analyzed. Performance was compared between age groups (developmental study) and 
between clinical states (clinical study). 
Results Developmental study: Adolescents had compared to adults more difficulty performing 
the task, i.e. they committed more errors on antisaccade trials and had longer latencies before per-
formance of a correct antisaccade. Incentives modulated global task performance in both age groups 
in a similar fashion; however, this influence differed between saccade types: While for antisaccades 
the prospect of winning money and threat of losing money both improved performance accuracy as 
compared to a non-incentive condition, for visually-guided saccades there was an improvement of 
performance only for the prospect of a monetary reward, but not of performance under the threat of 
monetary punishment, as compared to a non-incentive condition. For the adolescent, but not the adult 
group, the influence of incentives was also reflected in dynamic saccade measures for visually-guided 
saccades (correct prosaccades, antisaccade direction errors), but not internally-guided correct an-
tisaccades. Specifically, adolescents had increased latency and peak velocity for direction errors un-
der prospect of monetary reward and increased latency and peak velocity for prosaccades under the 
prospect of monetary punishment.  
Results Clinical study: Controls and patients did not differ in global and dynamic task perform-
ance parameters per se, but in the modulation of task parameters by incentives. While adolescents 
from the control group showed an improvement of task performance by incentives (i.e. by potential 
reward and threat of punishment) under high, but not low cognitive control, patients with MDD failed to 
optimize financial pay-off regardless of saccade type as evidenced by a lack of within-group improve-
ment of global accuracy by incentives. In terms of dynamic performance measures, patients with MDD 
contrary to controls exhibited an influence of incentives for internally-guided antisaccades, but not for 
visually-guided prosaccades and antisaccade direction errors. Finally, patients with MDD showed 
higher attentional engagement (i.e. longer fixation duration) for negative feedback, as compared to 
controls. Patients with an anxiety disorder showed an attentional bias for threats as indicated by 
shorter saccade latency for prosaccade trials and a higher proportion of corrected direction errors 
under the punishment condition. Overall, performance pattern of patients with anxiety indicated higher 
arousal as revealed by increased peak velocity regardless of incentive condition, as compared to con-
trols. 
Conclusions: The findings from this exploratory study employing a new eye movement task 
suggest that incentives modulate different aspects of cognitive control processes in adults, psychiatri-
cally healthy adolescents and adolescents with a mood and anxiety disorder. The overall pattern of 
incentive-related modulation across development indicates improvement of task performance by in-
centives under high cognitive control as was the case for adults and for correct antisaccades (i.e. bet-
ter global performance under incentives, but no influence of incentives on dynamic performance 
measures). In contrast, under low cognitive control as was the case for adolescents and for visually-
guided saccades, task performance was more strongly dominated by incentives, with deterioration of 
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performance where there was a conflict between motivational (i.e. approach a reward) and cognitive 
task demands (look away from a reward cue). For the clinical study, findings indicate that disease-
typic behaviors and cognitive biases reported for adults with mood and anxiety disorders can already 
be found in adolescents afflicted by these disorders on the RST. While the differences between anx-
ious and control adolescents in task performance may in part be due to different levels of arousal, the 
differences between depressed and control adolescents may reflect a perturbation in the neural circuit 
specifically underlying internally-guided saccades. These findings need to be replicated with greater 
patient samples; however, they suggest that the study of reward-related information processing in 
adolescent mood and anxiety disorders may contribute to a better understanding of the pathophysiol-
ogy of these disorders and that the RST can be used to probe reward-related information processing 
from a developmental and clinical perspective, preferably in combination with functional neuroimaging 
methods.  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Hintergrund: Die Adoleszenz ist derjenige Zeitabschnitt der menschlichen Entwicklung, in wel-
chem der Heranwachsende seine körperliche und geistige Reife erlangt. Bei vielen Adoleszenten ist 
dieser Reifungsprozess begleitet durch Schwierigkeiten in der Affektregulation, wie zum Beispiel ver-
mehrt auftretenden Stimmungsschwankungen, Impulsdurchbrüchen oder gar der Entwicklung einer ab 
diesem Lebensabschnitt markant häufiger zu beobachtenden affektiven Störung. Neuere Befunde aus 
dem Gebiet der Kognitiven Neurowissenschaften weisen darauf hin, dass diese für die Adoleszenz 
relativ typischen Störungen in der Affektregulation durch reifungsbedingte Entwicklungsprozesse im 
Gehirn mitverursacht werden können, die zu einem vorübergehenden Ungleichgewicht zwischen regu-
lativ-kognitiven und affektiven Hirnfunktionen führen. Ein ähnliches Ungleichgewicht zwischen regula-
tiv-kognitiven und affektiven Hirnfunktionen wurde mittels funktionaler Bildgebung und neuropsycholo-
gischen Studien auch für Erwachsene mit einer affektiven Störung berichtet. Die Erforschung des 
Zusammenspiels zwischen kognitiver Kontrolle und Affekt in der Adoleszenz mittels neurowissen-
schaftlichen Mitteln könnte somit zu einem besseren Verständnis der neurobiologischen Ursachen 
sowohl normativer adoleszenter Verhaltensweisen, als auch der Entstehung psychiatrischer Erkran-
kungen wie Depressionen und Angststörungen beitragen.  
Methoden: Unterschiede im Zusammenspiel von kognitiver Kontrolle und Affekt zwischen ge-
sunden Jugendlichen, solchen mit emotionalen Schwierigkeiten und gesunden Erwachsenen könnten 
sich im Appetenzverhalten und/oder der Aufmerksamkeitssteuerung unter Anreizen widerspiegeln. Um 
dies zu untersuchen, wurde eine neue Augenbewegungsaufgabe, die reward saccade task (RST) 
entwickelt, in welcher Augenbewegungen gemessen wurden unter verschiedenen kognitiven Schwie-
rigkeitsgraden und unter drei verschiedenen finanziellen Anreizbedingungen bei 30 Erwachsenen, 32 
Jugendlichen, 16 Jugendlichen mit einer Angststörung und 12 Jugendlichen mit einer majoren de-
pressiven Erkrankung (MDD). Konkret wurden die Versuchspersonen gebeten, entweder auf einen in 
der visuellen Peripherie erscheinenden Reiz zu blicken (Prosakkaden-Instruktion) oder in dessen ge-
genüberliegende Richtung (Antisakkaden-Instruktion), und wurden je nach Richtigkeit der Bewegung 
finanziell belohnt oder nicht belohnt, finanziell bestraft oder nicht bestraft, oder erhielten Rückmeldung 
über ihre Leistung ohne finanzielle Folgen. Während Prosakkaden einfache, visuell-geführte Augen-
bewegungen sind, handelt es sich bei Antisakkaden um intern-gesteuerte Augenbewegungen, welche 
verschiedene Prozesse kognitiver Kontrolle beanspruchen wie z.B. die Unterdrückung des Reflexes, 
auf einen peripheren Reiz zu blicken, und die Ausrichtung der visuellen Aufmerksamkeit auf einen Ort 
in der Peripherie ohne visuelles Ziel. Sakkaden eignen sich als neurowissenschaftliche Methode, weil 
sie einfach und genau zu messen sind, in kognitiv verschieden anspruchsvolle Paradigma wie z.B. der 
Pro- oder Antisakkaden-Instruktion eingebettet werden können, sensibel auf Anreize reagieren und 
weil ihre neurobiologischen Grundlagen durch frühere Untersuchungen an Menschen und Primaten 
genau bekannt sind. Letzteres erlaubt es, Rückschlüsse von der Ausprägung einzelner Sakkadenpa-
rameter auf die Funktion bestimmter neuronaler Regionen und Systeme zu ziehen.  
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Statistisch analysiert wurde, wie sich die drei verschiedenen Anreizbedingungen auf die glo-
bale Leistung in der RST (Anteil an korrekten und inkorrekten Augenbewegungen pro Sakkaden-
Instruktion), als auch auf dynamische Indikatoren der einzelnen Augenbewegungen auswirken (La-
tenz, Geschwindigkeit, Dauer und Grösse der Augenbewegung). Zudem wurde die Auswirkung der 
Rückmeldung über die Richtigkeit einzelner Aufgabendurchgänge auf die Pupillengrösse und die 
Dauer des ruhenden Blickes auf diese Rückmeldung bestimmt. Die Ergebnisse wurden verglichen 
zwischen den beiden gesunden Altersgruppen (Entwicklungsstudie) sowie zwischen den drei adoles-
zenten Gruppen (klinische Studie).  
Ergebnisse der Entwicklungsstudie: Jugendliche hatten im Vergleich zu Erwachsenen grösse-
re Schwierigkeiten in der RST, d.h. sie begingen mehr Fehler während der Antisakkaden-Instruktion 
und führten korrekte Antisakkaden mit grösserer Latenz aus als Erwachsene. Anreize beeinflussten 
die globale Leistung in beiden Altersgruppen auf ähnliche Weise, ihr Einfluss variierte jedoch zwischen 
den beiden Sakkaden-Typen: Während für die Antisakkaden-Instruktion mehr richtige Augenbewe-
gungen unter Erwartung finanzieller Belohnung bzw. unter Androhung finanzieller Bestrafung erfolgten 
als unter der finanziell neutralen Bedingung, war die globale Leistung in der Prosakkaden-Instruktion 
im Vergleich zur neutralen Bedingung nur unter Erwartung finanzieller Belohnung, nicht aber unter 
Androhung finanzieller Bestrafung erhöht. Die dynamischen Parameter der einzelnen Sakkaden un-
terschieden sich bei Erwachsenen nicht zwischen den verschiedenen Anreizbedingungen. Bei Ju-
gendlichen variierte die Ausprägung der dynamischen Parameter zwischen den verschiedenen An-
reizbedingungen in Abhängigkeit der kognitiven Kontrolle, d.h. sie war nur zu beobachten für visuell-
geführte Augenbewegungen (d.h. für korrekt ausgeführte Prosakkaden und für Richtungsfehler bei der 
Antisakkaden-Instruktion), nicht aber für intern-gesteuerte Augenbewegungen (d.h. für korrekte Anti-
sakkaden). Konkret initiierten Jugendliche Prosakkaden langsamer und mit höherer Geschwindigkeit 
unter Androhung einer finanziellen Bestrafung und Antisakkaden-Richtungsfehler langsamer und mit 
höherer Geschwindigkeit unter Erwartung einer finanziellen Belohnung.  
Ergebnisse der klinischen Studie: Die Jugendlichen der drei Gruppen zeigten deutliche Unter-
schiede im Einfluss von Anreizen auf die Leistung in der RST. Während Jugendliche aus der Kontroll-
gruppe eine verbesserte Leistung unter finanziellen Anreizen aufwiesen, insbesondere bei hoher kog-
nitiver Kontrolle (d.h. für korrekte Antisakkaden), konnten Patienten mit einer MDD den finanziellen 
Ertrag nicht optimieren, d.h. sie zeigten keine Verbesserung der globalen Leistung unter finanziellen 
Anreizen unabhängig vom Sakkadentyp. Bei dynamischen Parametern zeigten Patienten mit einer 
MDD im Gegensatz zu gesunden Kontrollpersonen einen Einfluss der verschiedenen Anreizbedin-
gungen auf intern-gesteuerte, nicht aber visuell-geführte Augenbewegungen (d.h. für korrekte Anti-
sakkaden, nicht aber für Prosakkaden oder Richtungsfehler). Schliesslich unterschieden sich Patien-
ten mit einer MDD von gesunden Kontrollpersonen durch ihre Reaktion auf negative Rückmeldungen 
(d.h. Rückmeldung über finanziellen Verlust), welche sie länger anblickten. Patienten mit Angststörun-
gen lenkten ihre Aufmerksamkeit vermehrt auf negative Reize, d.h. sie hatten kürzere Reaktionszeiten 
für Prosakkaden, und korrigierten mehr Richtungsfehler bei Androhung auf finanzielle Bestrafung im 
Vergleich zu den gesunden Kontrollpersonen. Zudem führten sie verglichen mit Kontrollpersonen kor-
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rekte Augenbewegungen unabhängig von der Anreizbedingung schneller aus, was auf eine allgemein 
erhöhte Erregung hinweist. 
Schlussfolgerung: Die Befunde dieser explorativen Studie mit einer neuen Augenbewegungs-
aufgabe weisen darauf hin, dass Anreize verschiedene Aspekte der kognitiven Kontrolle bei Erwach-
senen, gesunden Jugendlichen, und Jugendlichen mit einer Angst- oder depressiven Erkrankung be-
einflussen. Die Befunde der Entwicklungsstudie zeigen, dass bei hoher kognitiver Kontrolle wie sie bei 
Erwachsenen und für korrekte Antisakkaden gegeben war, die Leistung in der RST durch Anreize 
unterstützt wird (mehr korrekte Bewegungen, aber geringerer Einfluss von Anreizen auf dynamische 
Augenbewegungsparameter). Bei geringer kognitiver Kontrolle, wie sie bei Jugendlichen und bei Pro-
sakkaden und Richtungsfehlern auftritt, üben Anreize hingegen einen stärker dominierenden Einfluss 
auf die Ausübung der RST aus wie bei hoher kognitiver Kontrolle, und verschlechtern die Leistung 
dort, wo ein Konflikt zwischen motivationalen Bedürfnissen (z.B. einen appetitiven Reiz anblicken) und 
kognitiven Ansprüchen (in die entgegengesetzte Richtung eines appetitiven Reizes blicken) in der 
Aufgabe besteht. Die Befunde der klinischen Studie zeigen, dass kognitive Verzerrungen und Verhal-
tensweisen, wie sie bei Erwachsenen mit Angst- und affektiven Störungen im Zusammenhang mit 
affektiven Reizen berichtet wurden, bereits bei Jugendlichen mit diesen Störungen in der RST zu beo-
bachten sind. Die Unterschiede zu den Kontrollpersonen scheinen bei Jugendlichen mit einer Angst-
störung massgeblich durch ein erhöhtes Erregungsniveau hervorgerufen worden zu sein. Bei Jugend-
lichen mit einer MDD weisen die Befunde hingegen auf eine Dysfunktion im neuronalen Schaltkreis 
hin, welcher intern-gesteuerten Sakkaden zugrunde liegt. Diese Befunde müssen in grösseren Patien-
ten-Stichproben repliziert werden, untermauern soweit aber den Nutzen der Untersuchung von Anrei-
zen auf die kognitive Kontrolle für die Erforschung der Pathophysiologie von affektiven Störungen 
sowie die Eignung der RST als Paradigma zur Messung solcher Einflüsse, vorzugsweise in Kombina-
tion mit funktionaler Bildgebung.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last couple of years, the meanders of adolescents have gained wide resonance in the 
public media attention and in political discussions. In particular youth delinquency – i.e. violent attacks 
against passers-by, sexual assaults towards girls, reckless driving - but also an increase in consump-
tion-oriented behaviors without regard for the long-term consequences - i.e. skyrocketing mobile 
phone costs, peer pressure to dress in certain expensive fashion trends, an increase in prevalence of 
binge drinking to mention just a few examples – have become widely discussed topics. Similarly, coun-
teractive measures are hotly debated and an apt platform for politicians to take up a position on family 
and general social policies in a postmodern society. Another, similarly disturbing and increasingly rec-
ognized characteristic of adolescent behavioral propensities besides impulsivity is the emotional tur-
moil at this age span, beginning from frequent mood swings to a stark increase in the prevalence of 
clinically relevant negative mood states such as depression and anxiety. While for most adolescents 
these mood swings are transitory, for some it is the beginning of a lifelong battle with affective disor-
ders. 
Yet, although the “storm and stress” of adolescence currently is receiving increased attention, 
it is not at all a new phenomenon. As reviewed by Arnett (1999, pg. 317) already Aristotle noted that 
“youth are heated by nature as drunken men by wine”, and Socrates characterized youth as inclined 
“to contradict their parents” and “tyrannize their teachers”. Shakespeare not randomly put the age of 
Juliet of his play Romeo and Juliet to a fragile 13 years old. And also Goethe addressed adolescent 
storm and stress in his novel The Sorrows of Young Werther in which a young man commits suicide in 
despair over an unfulfilled love. Moreover, risk- and sensation-seeking behavior is not limited to hu-
man adolescents, but indeed to adolescents in many species, presumably to serve the evolutionary 
purpose of preventing incest and acquire new territories and behaviors (Spear, 2000). An excerpt from 
a recent interview with three teenage girls aged 16 published on the 25th of June 2008 by the Swiss 
News Magazine “Weltwoche” nicely underscores this notion. Asked on the differences between teen-
agers and adults, one girl replied: “I don’t want to plan everything. Moreover, we rarely expect the 
worst. To do so, we lack the experience. This is also the reason, why we are more risk-seeking than 
older people. I think we have to make our own experiences. Otherwise we will never learn.” So, con-
sidering these facts, there seems to be a normative/adaptive reason for adolescent behavioral pro-
pensities that, however, in conjunction with the temptations available in a postmodern world imposes 
unprecedented dangers.  
But besides ever changing socio-environmental influences, what is it in the adolescent biologi-
cal make-up that predisposes our youth since the beginning of human tradition to challenge theirs and 
others boundaries? In the last decade through the immense advance of brain imaging technology 
enabling the in-vivo investigation of neural structures and functional properties, it has become possible 
to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying adolescent behavioral propensities. This research 
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has documented unexpectedly large structural and functional maturational transitions in the brain dur-
ing the second decade of life, in particular in evolutionary young brain areas responsible for the inte-
gration of information from the whole brain including brain areas mediating affective states and im-
pulses to guide behavioral output in adaptive ways. Immaturity of this neural system presumably in 
conjunction with a rise in steroids at the beginning of puberty has been proposed by developmental 
neuroscientists to be reflected in difficulties in affect regulation. Thus, while adolescents may be very 
well able to cognitively reflect on the hypothetical consequences of risky actions, they fail (at least 
more so than adults) to implement this knowledge when faced with a situation in which emotions sky-
rock such as an intimate encounter with an attractive peer, when faced with a shiny new mobile 
phone, or when challenged in a dispute with parents about the time at which to be home at night. And 
when adolescents experience adverse feelings such as sadness, they will have more difficulties than 
adults to regulate these affective states by means of cognitive strategies.  
Now, despite the increasing knowledge and interest in brain maturation during adolescence, 
little research to date has directly examined the influence of motivationally challenging stimuli on cog-
nitive control in healthy adolescents and adolescents with mood and anxiety disorders employing ba-
sic neuroscience measures apart from functional resonance imaging with its known limitations in tem-
poral resolution. The research presented in the current thesis aimed to address this gap by investigat-
ing cognitive control in healthy adolescents and adolescents with mood and anxiety disorders using a 
saccadic eye movement task in which cognitive and motivational task demands were systematically 
varied. Specifically, subjects had to either look at a target (prosaccade) or away from it (antisaccade), 
and depending on performance could either win or not win a monetary reward, lose or not lose a 
monetary punishment, or perform the task without monetary implications. Saccadic eye movements 
were chosen as a research tool because they are non-invasive, can be integrated in paradigms testing 
executive cognitive processes, are sensitive to incentive manipulation, and finally provide quantitative 
and easily measurable information on the temporal characteristics of information processing which can 
be mapped onto neural circuits well delineated from extensive research in non-human primates.  
This thesis is divided into a theoretical part consisting of chapters 1 to 4, and an empirical part 
consisting of chapter 5 to 7. In chapter 1 the phenomenology of adolescent behavioral propensities 
and mood and anxiety disorders is presented. In chapter 2, findings about structural and functional 
brain maturation during adolescence and models trying to link these maturational events with adoles-
cent behavioral propensities will be outlined with the respective research in support of each model. In 
chapter 3, saccadic eye movements as a research tool will be introduced and findings of their use in 
adolescence and investigation of reward-related information processing will be presented. Chapter 4 
outlines the hypotheses that will be addressed in the second part of this thesis, which starts with the 
presentation of the experimental procedures in chapter 5 used to address the proposed hypotheses. 
In chapter 6 and 7, the results concerning cognitive control under incentives in healthy adolescents as 
compared to adults and as compared to adolescents with major depressive disorder and with an anxi-
ety disorder will be presented and discussed. 
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II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
1.  Adolescence – A Time of Storm and Stress 
Adolescence refers to the stage of human development in which a child matures into an adult, 
thereby passing through many physiological, psychological and sociobehavioral transitions. No single 
event signals the on- and offset of adolescence (Spear, 2000), and thus time margins of the adoles-
cent age range vary from 10 - 14 at its lower end up to 18 - 25 years, depending on culture, gender, 
and transition at focus. The World Health Organization (WHO) for example defines adolescence as the 
period of life between 10 and 19 years of age. The NIMH supported interdisciplinary research network 
ADAPT (Adolescent Development Affect-Regulation and the Pubertal Transition Network) defines 
adolescence as the time span between sexual maturation (puberty onset) and attainment of adult 
roles and responsibilities (Dahl, 2004a). 
In almost every measurable physical domain, adolescence is a developmental period of 
strength and resilience. Yet, despite the abundance of resources, the mortality rate almost doubles 
between childhood and adolescence and the prevalence of emotional disturbances as well as of se-
vere psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, mood and anxiety disorders rises substantially 
(Dahl, 2004). Accordingly, many philosophers, scientists and writers such as Aristotle and Shake-
speare (see also Introduction) have referred to adolescence as a life stage of heightened storm and 
stress. Below, behavioral and affective propensities during adolescence (chapter 1.1) as well as the 
prevalence and phenomenology of mood (chapter 1.2) and anxiety (chapter 1.3) disorders during ado-
lescence will be addressed. 
 
1.1 Characteristics of normative Adolescence 
An important goal of adolescence among many species is to achieve independence from pri-
mary caregivers; and many behavioral features characteristic of this age span seem to serve this pur-
pose (Spear, 2000). For example, during early and mid-adolescence, there is a marked increase in 
peer-directed social interactions (Csikszentmihalyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977), a decline in time spent 
with parents (Larson & Richards, 1991), and an increase in number and intensity of conflicts with par-
ents (Laursen, Coy, & Collins, 1998; Paikoff & Brooks-Gunn, 1991; Smetana, 1989). During middle 
and late adolescence, there is a substantial increase in impulsivity and sensation-seeking, with risk 
behaviors such as substance abuse, reckless driving, unsafe sexual behaviors and rates of crime 
peaking in prevalence (Arnett, 1992; Moffitt, 1993). In parallel, there is a stark increase in morbidity 
and in mortality rate of 200% from childhood to adolescence (Dahl, 2004a), with mainly preventable 
causes such as accidents, homicides and suicides collectively accounting for more than 85% of 
deaths (Irwin, 1989). Thus, while adolescent behavioral propensities such as stronger orientation to-
wards peers, risk-taking and sensation-seeking might help adolescents to explore new situations, ac-
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quire new behaviors and adult reinforcers, they bear substantial risks for long-lasting negative conse-
quences.  
At a more subjective level, the pervasive transitions in physical, psychological and social do-
mains during adolescence bear the potential to overwhelm the adolescent and lead to significant 
stress (Spear, 2000). The relative stressfulness of the adolescent life period is reflected in assess-
ments of affective behavior at this age. For example, the proportion of time experienced as “very 
happy”, “proud”, “great” or “in control” declines by as much as 50% between preadolescence and ado-
lescence, while reports of depressed mood and negative affect (i.e. feeling “embarrassed”, “awkward”, 
“lonely”, “nervous”, “ignored”) as well as reports of greater mood extremes (positive and negative) and 
frequent mood changes increase compared to preadolescents and adults, even in response to the 
same or similar events (Larson, Moneta, Richards, & Wilson, 2002; Larson & Richards, 1994; see also 
Whalen, Jamner, Henker, & Delfino, 2001). In addition to this emotional lability, anxiety and self-
consciousness appear to peak during adolescence. These seemingly contradictory adolescent pro-
pensities – risk-taking and negative mood states – are according to Spear (2000, pg. 429) compatible 
from an evolutionary standpoint, since “greater anxiety and emotional reactivity in the face of consid-
erable risk-taking could have proved adaptive for our adolescent ancestral predecessors by serving to 
increase their vigilance to potential predators during the considerable risks of emigrating from natal 
territories”.  
 
1.2 Major Depression in Youth 
In the past two decades, two leading misconceptions on child and adolescent mood disorders, 
namely that mood disorders are rare before adulthood (Anthony & Scott, 1960) and that they repre-
sent a normative and self-limiting aspect of child and adolescent development (Douvan & Adelson, 
1966), have been clearly rejected (Kessler, Avenevoli, & Ries, 2001). Beginning with studies in the 
1970’s, developmental researchers demonstrated that the diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder 
(MDD) can be made reliably in children and adolescents and documented the large prevalence, conti-
nuity into adulthood and negative impact of this disease on (future) psychosocial functioning. 
 
1.2.1 Diagnosis and Phenomenology 
Depressive disorders in youth are diagnosed with the same diagnostic criteria and thresholds 
than in adulthood, with the possible exception that children and adolescents are more likely to present 
with irritability without clear sadness. According to current diagnostic systems such as the DSM-IV, the 
diagnosis of major depression requires depressed (or in youth irritable) mood and/or loss of interest 
along with at least five other symptoms such as significant changes in appetite and sleep, psychomo-
tor retardation or agitation, fatigue or loss of energy, feelings of worthlessness or guilt, diminished 
ability to think, concentrate or indecisiveness, and suicidal ideation (American Psychiatric Association, 
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1994). The symptoms need to be present nearly every day most of the day for a period of at least two 
weeks and need to cause significant distress or impairment in functioning.  
Empirical studies largely support the similar symptom phenomenology among adolescents 
and adults (e.g. Carlson & Kashani, 1988; Kovacs et al., 1984; R. E. Roberts, Lewinsohn, & Seeley, 
1995; Strober, Green, & Carlson, 1981), but they also point out some age-specific changes in symp-
tom frequency. For example, Carlson and Kashani (1988) found similar rates of depressed mood, 
diminished concentration, insomnia and suicidal ideation between preschool children (age 2.5-6), pre-
pubertal children (mean age 9.6 years), adolescents (mean age 14.7 years) and adults (mean age 
45.9 years) diagnosed with MDD. In contrast, anhedonia, diurnal variation, hopelessness, psychomo-
tor retardation, and delusions increased with age; and depressed appearance, low self-esteem, and 
somatic complaints decreased with age. 
 
1.2.2 Prevalence 
While the diagnosis of MDD is rare before age 13 (e.g. Costello, Mustillo, Erkanli, Keeler, & 
Angold, 2003; Kessler et al., 2001; Lewinsohn, Rohde, Klein, & Seeley, 1999; Oldehinkel et al., 1999), 
it occurs in older adolescents at levels comparable with those in adults. Point prevalence rates based 
on diagnostic interviews generally range between 1% (McGee & Williams, 1988) and 6% (Kessler & 
Walters, 1998) and lifetime prevalence between 4% (Whitaker et al., 1990) and 24% (Lewinsohn, 
Rohde, & Seeley, 1998) by the end of adolescence (for review see Kessler et al., 2001; Zalsman, 
Brent, & Weersing, 2006). For example, in a representative, prospective community-based study on 
incidence, prevalence and outcome of depressive disorders in a sample of 1228 German adolescents, 
Oldehinkel et al. (1999) found a lifetime prevalence for MDD of 5.4% for males and 8.0% for females 
aged 14-17, steeply increasing to 9.1% in males and 15.4% in females at follow up 20 months later 
(see Figure 1-1). This gender difference in prevalence with females being stronger affected than males 
emerged after puberty onset and increased with age, a finding largely supported by other studies (e.g. 
Costello et al., 2003; Lewinsohn et al., 1999). 
The overall variation in prevalence rates among different studies is likely to be due to differ-
ences in assessment (e.g. choice of diagnostic interview), sampling (e.g. clinical or community-based 
sample, age of probands), design (e.g. prospective – retrospective), and to the time the study was 
conducted with respect to change in diagnostic criteria and impairment thresholds from DSM-III to 
DSM-IV (Kovacs & Gatsonis, 1994; Oldehinkel et al., 1999). Similar fluctuations have been observed 
in estimates for lifetime prevalence of MDD in adults ranging from 4.4% to 18.0% (Bland, 1997; Wit-
tchen, Knauper, & Kessler, 1994). Of note, there is growing evidence not only for an earlier onset of 
depression but also a general increase in prevalence in cohorts born after World War II (Bland, 1997; 
Cross-National Collaborative Group, 1992). 
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Figure 1-1: Age of onset curves (cumulative hazards by means of Kaplan-Meyer estimates) of major de-
pressive disorder, by gender (ë male;  female), baseline (—) and follow-up (….) estimates. Adapted 
from Oldehinkel et al. (1999). 
 
1.2.3 Comorbidity 
Adolescents with MDD frequently present with comorbid psychiatric disorders, especially with 
anxiety disorders, disruptive behavior disorders such as oppositional defiant disorder, and substance 
abuse disorder. Costello, Mustillo, Erkanli, Keeler, and Angold (2003) for example demonstrated in a 
sample of 9-16 year old adolescents significant concurrent comorbidity (i.e. the co-occurrence of 2 or 
more diagnoses at the time of measurement) between any depressive disorder and any anxiety disor-
der (OR = 28.9), Oppositional Defiant Disorder (OR = 16.7), and Substance Abuse Disorder (OR = 
10.4). According to Kessler et al. (2001) up to three fourths of depressed adolescents have a history of 
at least one anxiety disorder. Frequently, the anxiety disorder antecedents the depressive disorder 
(Pine, Cohen, & Brook, 2001; Zalsman et al., 2006), however, it is unclear if presence of an anxiety 
disorder is a risk factor or a risk marker of depression, or if it arises due to some shared risk factors 
that are common to both conditions (Kessler et al., 2001).  
 
1.2.4 Course and outcome 
Longitudinal studies in clinical (e.g. Harrington, Fudge, Rutter, Pickles, & Hill, 1990; Kovacs et 
al., 1984; Rao et al., 1995; Weissman et al., 1999) as well as community settings (e.g. Lewinsohn et 
al., 1999; Pine, Cohen, Gurley, Brook, & Ma, 1998) suggest a high recurrence rate, continuity and 
specificity of adolescent-onset MDD into adulthood and outline its negative impact on psychosocial 
functioning.  
In terms of recurrence, longitudinal studies document that 70% of adolescents with MDD ex-
perience another depressive episode until young adulthood, a rate comparable to the recurrence rate 
of adults with unipolar depression (Coryell et al., 1989). Overall, rates seem higher in clinical as com-
pared to community-based samples. For example, in clinically referred samples, Kovacs et al. (1984) 
found a recurrence rate of 72% within five years in 41 adolescents with MDD with or without comorbid 
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dysthymia, and Rao et al. (1995) found a recurrence rate of 69.2% in 26 adolescents with MDD at 
follow-up seven years later (see Figure 1-2). In a community-based prospective study Lewinsohn et al. 
(1999) reported that 45% of 238 subjects with adolescent MDD relapsed between age 19 and age 24. 
Pine et al. (1998) found that 23 adolescents with MDD with a mean age of 13.7 years from a commu-
nity survey had a 4-fold increased risk of MDD until age 22 (OR = 4.36, 95% CI = 1.65-11.57). Finally, 
40% of adults with MDD retrospectively report to have had onset of the disease before age 20 (Bland, 
1997).  
 
 
Figure 1-2: Survival from depression during follow-up interval in the subjects with MDD at initial as-
sessment (mean age 15.4 years) and normal controls. From Rao et al. (1995). 
 
In terms of specificity, several studies document that adolescents with MDD have an in-
creased risk for every type of affective disorder in adulthood. For example, in the above mentioned 
study by Rao et al. (1995), adolescent-onset MDD subjects had compared to matched controls an 
increased risk for developing MDD (69.2% vs. 18.2%), but also dysthymia (26.9% vs. 0%) and bipolar 
disorder (19.2% vs. 0%). Costello et al. (2003) found an increased risk for developing an anxiety dis-
order by age 16 for girls with any depressive disorder. However, adolescents with MDD do not have a 
higher risk for other psychiatric disorders in adulthood, unless they presented already in adolescence 
with a comorbid non-depressive disorder (e.g. Harrington et al., 1990; Lewinsohn et al., 1999; Weiss-
man et al., 1999).  
In terms of outcome, adolescent-onset MDD has great negative impact on social development 
and life course role transitions (Kessler et al., 2001). For example, adolescents with recurrent MDD 
compared to adolescents with only one episode of MDD and compared with non-affected individuals 
achieve lower educational status, have increased rates of psychiatric and medical hospitalizations, 
exert more risky behaviors such as smoking, drinking or bingeing and become earlier parents than 
non-affected individuals (e.g. Glied & Pine, 2002; Harrington et al., 1990; Lewinsohn, Rohde, Seeley, 
Klein, & Gotlib, 2000; Oldehinkel et al., 1999; Rao et al., 1995; Weissman et al., 1999). These associa-
tions also persist when controlling for low socioeconomic status, which is a risk factor for both, adoles-
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cent-onset MDD and risky behaviors such as drinking or smoking (Glied & Pine, 2002; Rao et al., 
1995). In addition, many of the negative consequences of adolescent depression such as teenage 
pregnancy or low educational achievement result in low socioeconomic status and themselves in-
crease the risk for recurring with depression. Not surprisingly, clinical depression is currently the lead-
ing cause of disability in many industrialized countries, and according to the World Health Organization 
is expected to become the second leading cause of disability worldwide (after heart disease) by the 
year 2020 (Murray & Lopez, 1997). The most serious consequences of depressive disorders are suici-
dal ideation and behavior. Depression is the strongest psychiatric correlate of suicide and suicide at-
tempts in the adolescent age group (Brent et al., 1993; Foley, Goldston, Costello, & Angold, 2006). For 
example, in the study of Weissman et al. (1999), 7.7% of 91 subjects with adolescent-onset MDD 
committed suicide, 50.6% of 73 of these subjects made a suicide attempt, and 23% multiple suicide 
attempts over their lifetime until follow-up at age 26. Compared with the healthy control group, subjects 
with adolescent-onset MDD had a more than 14-fold increased risk for a first suicide attempt over their 
lifetime until follow-up at age 26 years.  
 
1.2.5 Risk factors for o- and recurrence 
Genetic and adverse environmental factors and their interactions – from a background of pro-
found maturational changes in brain structure and function as reviewed in chapter 2 - increase the risk 
for developing depression in adolescence. The strongest predictors for the emergence of child and 
adolescent depression is parental psychopathology (e.g. parent suffering from depression) and low 
socioeconomic status with some of its correlates such as family violence, neglect, sexual abuse, par-
ent loss, growing up in a single-parent household (for review see Kessler et al., 2001; Zalsman et al., 
2006). For example, in a study by Glied and Pine (2002), almost one fourth of girls with history of ei-
ther physical or sexual abuse met criteria for depression, and adolescents who had experienced se-
vere life stresses in the year before the assessment were much more likely to meet criteria for depres-
sion than were those whose lives had been less stressful. However, some of these predictors are not 
only predicting subsequent depression, but a wide range of common mental disorders (Kessler, 1997). 
In general, childhood onset MDD seems to be the response to a chaotic environment and is less 
closely associated with recurrence than adolescent-onset MDD, which has a greater genetic compo-
nent (Scourfield et al., 2003). 
In light of the high negative impact of recurrent adolescent MDD on psychosocial functioning, 
several researchers attempted to find factors that predispose affected individuals for recurrence of the 
disorder (Kovacs et al., 1984; Lewinsohn et al., 2000; Rao et al., 1995). So far, the results of these 
studies are inconsistent. In sum, there is some evidence for an association between risk for recurrence 
and low socioeconomic background, comorbidity with dysthymia, presence of Borderline personality 
disorder symptoms, previous history of recurrence and a family history of (recurrent) MDD.  
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1.3 Anxiety Disorders in Youth 
In contrast to research on MDD, there is little research on childhood and adolescent anxiety 
disorders, and findings from this research have been inconsistent (Pine, 1997). Reasons are uncer-
tainty regarding boundaries for the various anxiety disorders, difficulties in defining impairment thresh-
olds and lack of instruments measuring distinct childhood anxiety disorders with acceptable psycho-
metric properties (Greenhill, Pine, March, Birmaher, & Riddle, 1998). 
 
1.3.1 Diagnosis 
There are 10 clinical anxiety disorders that affect children as defined in the DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994): Panic disorder with or without agoraphobia (PD), agoraphobia without 
panic disorder (AgP), specific phobia (SpP), social phobia (SoP), obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD), post-traumatic stress-disorder (PTSD), acute stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder 
(GAD), and separation anxiety disorder (SAD). Of note, the DSM-III-R Overanxious Disorder (OAD) 
has been subsumed in DSM-IV under Generalized Anxiety Disorder.  
There are several difficulties in reliably diagnosing an anxiety disorder in youth. For example, 
since anxiety is a normative and adaptive emotion linked to specific developmental stages, the distinc-
tion between “normal” and “clinical” anxiety is not always straightforward. Separation anxiety disorder 
for example resembles the normal phase of separation anxiety in toddlers (R. G. Klein, 1995), and 
some phobias resemble developmentally appropriate phases of shyness, fears of the dark, or small 
animals (Marks, 1987). Therefore, for reliably diagnosing an anxiety disorder, a significant impairment 
in functioning and distress is required, and the anxiety should be inappropriate for the actual develop-
mental stage of the child (i.e. separation anxiety in a 10-year old) (Pine, 1997). Further complicating 
diagnosis is the extensive symptom overlap among the different anxiety disorders as well as between 
some anxiety and depressive disorders (Costello, Egger, & Angold, 2005; Labellarte, Ginsburg, 
Walkup, & Riddle, 1999). For example, school refusal may be an anxiety-related symptom associated 
with separation anxiety disorder, social phobia, generalized anxiety disorder or major depression (Last 
& Strauss, 1990). Finally, because children can only provide limited valid information about anxiety, 
the diagnosis of childhood anxiety requires assessment and integration of symptoms from both, par-
ents and children (Pine, 1997). 
 
1.3.2 Prevalence 
In an extensive review of all published epidemiologic studies between 1993 and 2004 on 
prevalence of anxiety disorders in children and adolescents aged 4 - 21 years employing DSM-III-R or 
DSM-IV, Costello et al. (2005) report 6-month prevalence estimates between 5.5% and 17.7%, and 
lifetime estimates between 8.3% and 27.0%. Particularly high prevalence estimates are reported for 
OAD with a 6-month prevalence rate between 1.9% and 7.1%; social phobia with a 6-month preva-
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lence rate between 2.0% and 9.2%, and specific phobias with a 6-month prevalence rate between 
2.6% and 12.9%. Panic disorder, GAD and OCD in contrast are infrequent in youth (Merikangas, 
2005). Thus, anxiety disorders are among the most prevalent conditions afflicting children, however, 
prevalence rates vary substantially, presumably due to varying impairment thresholds employed 
(Costello et al., 2005; Pine et al., 1998; Wittchen & Fehm, 2003).  
Just as stranger anxiety and separation anxiety symptoms emerge during specific stages of 
normal development, anxiety disorders also have different peak onset times. For example, the median 
age at onset for specific phobias and separation anxiety disorder is age 7, followed by social phobia at 
age 13, OCD at age 19, agoraphobia at age 20, PTSD at age 23, panic disorder at age 24 and GAD 
with a median onset age of 31 years (Kessler et al., 2005) (see also Figure 1-3). Across all develop-
mental stages and all subtypes of anxiety disorder, the prevalence is higher in girls than in boys (for 
review see Merikangas, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 1-3: Median age at onset of anxiety disorders in the United States general population (N = 9282). 
Black, 25th percentile, dark grey, 50th percentile; white, 75th percentile, light grey, 99th percentile. From 
Merikangas (2005). SAD: Separation Anxiety Disorder; OCD: Obsessive Compulsive Disorder; PTSD: 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder; GAD: Generalized Anxiety Disorder. 
 
1.3.3 Comorbidity 
Among anxiety disorders, only phobias (i.e. specific, social and agoraphobia) are highly co-
morbid with each other (Costello et al., 2005). In addition, there is large comorbidity between anxiety 
disorders and depression. For example, a review of available studies on comorbidity published 1999 
by Angold, Costello, and Erkanli (1999) showed that, controlling for other comorbid disorders, children 
with anxiety disorders were 8.2 times more likely to suffer from depression than controls (OR = 8.2), 
and 3 times more likely to suffer from a comorbid behavioral disorder (OR for conduct disorder = 3.1, 
OR for ADHD = 3.0). Costello et al. (2003) found significant concurrent comorbidity in a sample of 9-
16 year old adolescents between any anxiety disorder and any depressive disorder (OR = 27.9) or 
ADHD (OR = 3.4).  
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1.3.4 Course and outcome 
There is evidence for continuity into adulthood, i.e. children and adolescents with anxiety dis-
orders have an increased risk to have an anxiety disorder also in adulthood. Pine (Pine, 1999; Pine et 
al., 1998) for example reported in a prospective epidemiological study that adolescents with a history 
of social phobia, generalized anxiety disorder or major depression face a 45% chance of suffering 
from these disorders six years later compared to 5% in healthy controls. These data are consistent 
with retrospective reports of adults with anxiety disorders suggesting that the onset of anxiety disor-
ders generally occurs in childhood or adolescence (Merikangas, 2005; Otto et al., 2001).  
In terms of specificity, there is evidence for a high homotypic continuity of all anxiety disorders 
except for specific phobias (Costello et al., 2003). In terms of heterotypic continuity, there is evidence 
that separation anxiety disorder predicts panic disorder and agoraphobia (Gittelman & Klein, 1984; but 
see Otto et al., 2001). Moreover, in a study by Bittner et al. (2004), all adolescents with comorbid anxi-
ety disorders and anxiety disorders characterized by severe impairment were at increased risk for later 
developing MDD. 
In terms of impairment, some studies document a high degree of internal stress engendered 
by childhood anxiety disorders (Benjamin, Costello, & Warren, 1990; Ialongo, Edelsohn, Werthamer-
Larsson, Crockett, & Kellam, 1995). Moreover, early onset of anxiety disorders is associated with 
greater severity and with comorbidity of the disorder with depression in adults (Otto et al., 2001). In 
addition, anxiety disorders affect functioning by complicating the expression of other comorbid disor-
ders. For example, when comorbid with depression, anxiety disorders substantially increase the risk 
for suicide (Foley et al., 2006), and when comorbid with ADHD may be less responsive to psy-
chostimulant medication (Tannock, Ickowicz, & Schachar, 1995). In an epidemiologic study by Ezpe-
leta, Keeler, Erkanli, Costello, and Angold (2001), anxiety disorders were as likely to result in disability 
as depressive disorders also when controlling for comorbidity with other psychiatric disorders. How-
ever, level of impairment depends on the type of anxiety disorder; for example, OCD and social phobia 
are more impairing than specific phobias. 
 
1.3.5 Risk factors for developing an anxiety disorder in youth 
As reviewed by Merikangas (2005) and Pine (1997) several behavioral and physiological risk 
factors for developing an anxiety disorder have been identified, such as behavioral inhibition (i.e. in-
creased physiologic reactivity and behavioral withdrawal in face of novel or challenging situations), 
increased anxiety sensitivity (i.e. belief that anxiety sensations are dangerous), increased vigilance to 
threat cues and stressful stimuli (see also chapter 2.2.3.1.3), enhanced autonomic reactivity, poor 
immune system, enhanced respiratory sensitivity, and various neurobiologic and neuroendocrine fac-
tors. Environmental risk factor for developing an anxiety disorder are infections and especially high 
fever during the first year of life, head injury, overprotective, less caring or anxious parents, low socio-
economic status, severe childhood traumas (required for diagnosis of PTSD). As with depression, a 
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major risk factor for developing an anxiety disorder is parent psychopathology. Family studies for ex-
ample indicate a three-to fivefold increased risk of anxiety disorders among first-degree relatives of 
affected subjects compared with controls, twin-studies indicate higher rates of anxiety disorder for 
monozygotic compared with dizygotic twins, and high-risk studies show on average a 3.5-fold in-
creased risk for developing an anxiety disorder in children from parents with an anxiety disorder com-
pared with offspring from controls. However, offspring of parents with an anxiety disorder also face an 
increased risk for developing depression compared to offspring from controls. Moreover, linkage stud-
ies failed to identify specific genes conferring increased risk of anxiety disorder. Therefore, most theo-
ries assume a broader underlying genetic predisposition for the development of anxiety and other 
psychiatric expressions such as persistent worrying or depression, depending on internal and envi-
ronmental factors affecting brain maturation (R. J. Davidson, 1998; Grillon, Dierker, & Merikangas, 
1997).  
 
1.4 Synopsis chapter 1 
Adolescence is a time of “storm and stress”, characterized by three central features of turmoil: 
mood disruptions, risk behaviors, and conflict with parents (Arnett, 1999). In addition, there is a 
marked increase in prevalence of mood and anxiety disorders during adolescence. However, contrary 
to earlier conceptions, adolescent mood and anxiety disorders are not just extreme reflections of the 
general and transient emotional turmoil experienced by adolescents during the passage through this 
challenging developmental age span. In contrast, early-onset mood and anxiety disorders exhibit all 
clinical features of adult mood and anxiety disorders, represent a major risk factor for suffering from 
recurrent severe episodes of illness in adulthood, and through their presence at a time where the 
course is set for later psychosocial functioning may have severe implications for later academic and 
social achievement.  
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2.  Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 
With the great technological and methodological advances in the neurosciences within the 
past two decades it has increasingly become possible to investigate structural and functional brain 
maturation in pediatric populations and its influence on behavior and cognition (for review see Muna-
kata, Casey, & Diamond, 2004; Paus, 2005). Evidence from this new scientific approach, also referred 
to as developmental cognitive neuroscience, suggests that adolescent behavioral propensities such as 
impulsivity and emotional turmoil in part result from the ongoing maturation of brain circuits underlying 
the cognitive and affective control of behavior (Giedd, 2004; Luna & Sweeney, 2004). Moreover, these 
maturational transitions in brain organization have been proposed to increase the vulnerability for de-
veloping a psychiatric disorder such as substance abuse, schizophrenia, or mood and anxiety disor-
ders (Pechmann, Levine, Loughlin, & Frances, 2005; Steinberg, 2005), conditions rising substantially 
in prevalence at this age. Thus, understanding neurodevelopment during the adolescent period may 
not only help understand adolescent behavior, but may also contribute to our understanding of the 
pathophysiology of severe psychiatric disorders (Luna & Sweeney, 2004). Below, the structural, func-
tional, and hormonal processes underlying brain maturation during adolescence will be addressed 
(see chapter 2.1). Subsequently, different developmental cognitive neuroscience models on specific 
adolescent behavioral propensities, impulsivity and negative mood states such as anhedonia and 
anxiety, will be outlined in more detail (see chapter 2.2). 
 
2.1 Brain development during Adolescence 
The conventional view of structural brain maturation has been that most of it occurs in utero 
and is concluded by middle-to-late childhood. First insights indicating maturational changes in the 
brain beyond childhood emerged in the late 1960’s and 1970’s with post-mortem examinations of ado-
lescent brains (Huttenlocher, 1979; Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967). This knowledge was further advanced 
in the 1990’s with the advent of structural and functional imaging methods, enabling developmental 
neuroscientists to investigate structural and functional maturation of the brain non-invasively and in 
vivo in pediatric populations. Today, it is well established that the adolescent brain is a brain in flux, 
undergoing numerous pro- and regressive changes, resulting in a highly efficient multimodal process-
ing system by early adulthood.  
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2.1.1 Structural brain maturation 
In terms of size, weight, folding and regional functional specialization the brain is largely in its 
adult form by early childhood (Casey, Galvan, & Hare, 2005; Giedd, 2004). Subsequent maturational 
changes are structurally more subtle, but nonetheless crucial in terms of their functional significance. 
Most striking are a steady increase in white matter volume, and an initial increase followed by a sub-
sequent decrease in gray matter throughout the cortex and related subcortical structures such as the 
basal ganglia, amygdala and hippocampus (for review see Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; Casey, 
Tottenham et al., 2005; Giedd, 2004; Paus, 2005) (see Figure 2-1).  
The increase in white matter results from the progressing isolation of neuronal fibers with mye-
lin, a phospolipid layer which appears white on fresh brain sections. Myelin acts as an insulator and 
leads to increased speed (up to 100 fold) of electrical signals between neurons. The increase in gray 
matter results from the continuous dendritic arborization of neurons and the growth of synapses (i.e. 
connection points) between them. The subsequent loss of gray matter may be due to intra-cortical 
myelination and/or to the elimination (so-called pruning) of redundant synapses (Blakemore & Choud-
hury, 2006; Paus, 2005). Synaptic pruning has been proposed to be experience-dependent, i.e. only 
active synaptic connections survive, while unused ones die. The functional significance of experience-
dependant synaptic pruning is according to Luna and Sweeney (2004) to enhance the computational 
capacity of local neural circuits and according to Casey et al. (2005) to sculpt the brain on the basis of 
experience to effectively accommodate to environmental needs. Parallel to synaptogenesis and syn-
aptic pruning, there is an increase followed by a decline in brain activity between childhood and ado-
lescence as indexed for example by measurement of glucose metabolism (Chugani, 1998; Chugani, 
Phelps, & Mazziotta, 1987).  
 
 
Figure 2-1: Developmental course of human brain development. Proliferation and migration of neurons largely oc-
curs during fetal development, regional changes in synaptic density occur during postnatal development following 
a U-shaped developmental course, and myelination lasts well into adulthood. From Casey et al. (2005). 
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On a regional level, there are important differences in course and timing of white and gray 
matter maturation. For example, while white matter volume increases linearly until adulthood with simi-
lar slope of increase in the four major lobes of the brain (frontal, parietal, temporal, occipital), gray 
matter not only follows an inverted U-shape developmental course but also exhibits large regional 
variations in extent and time course (see Figure 2-1). In general, evolutionarily older regions associ-
ated with more basic functions such as the sensorimotor cortices mature before evolutionarily younger 
regions involved in more complex and integrative tasks such as the higher order association cortices 
(Gogtay et al., 2004). One of the last regions to mature is the prefrontal cortex (PFC), reaching adult 
dimensions not before the early 20’s (Giedd, 2004; Giedd et al., 2006). Subcortically, changes in gray 
matter are observed in the forebrain, in particular the basal ganglia, a structure that is highly intercon-
nected with the PFC (Giedd et al., 2006; Sowell, Thompson, Holmes, Jernigan, & Toga, 1999), in the 
amygdala in males and in the hippocampus in females (Giedd et al., 1996) (see Figure 2-2). 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Three-dimensional picture of gray matter density reductions observed between 
adolescents (mean age 13.8 years) and adults (mean age 25.6 years). Clusters are color-
coded based on location: Frontal lobes (purple), parietal lobe (red), occipital lobe (yellow), 
temporal lobe (blue), subcortical (green). From Sowell et al. (1999).  
 
2.1.2 Functional brain maturation 
Concurrent with structural brain maturation, adolescents show continuous improvements in 
cognitive abilities underlying the cognitive or executive control of behavior such as working memory 
(the ability to maintain and manipulate information online), selective attention (the ability to ignore ir-
relevant and focus on relevant information), inhibitory control (the ability to inhibit context inappropriate 
but prepotent response tendencies), cognitive flexibility (i.e. shifting attention between rules), and stra-
tegic planning (e.g. Bunge, Dudukovic, Thomason, Vaidya, & Gabrieli, 2002; Carver, Livesey, & 
Charles, 2001; Cepeda, Kramer, & Gonzalez de Sather, 2001; Crone, Ridderinkhof, Worm, Somsen, & 
van der Molen, 2004; De Luca et al., 2003; Durston et al., 2002; Fischer, Biscaldi et al., 1997; Gather-
cole, Pickering, Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004; Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006; Leon-Carrion, 
Garcia-Orza, & Perez-Santamaria, 2004; Luciana, Conklin, Hooper, & Yarger, 2005; Luna & Sweeney, 
2004; B. R. Williams, Ponesse, Schachar, Logan, & Tannock, 1999) 
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Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, investigating the neural activity during 
performance of such higher order cognitive functions, indicate that these improvements are paralleled 
by the continuous integration of neural networks orchestrated by the PFC. For example, while children 
and young adolescents show diffuse patterns of brain activation in task-specific (i.e. activity is corre-
lated with task-performance) as well as task-irrelevant (activity is not correlated with task-performance) 
cortical and subcortical brain areas, older adolescents and adults recruit only focal, task-specific brain 
areas (e.g. Adleman et al., 2002; Bunge et al., 2002; Crone, Wendelken, Donohue, van Leijenhorst, & 
Bunge, 2006; Durston et al., 2002; Klingberg, Forssberg, & Westerberg, 2002; Kwon, Reiss, & Menon, 
2002; Luna et al., 2001; Rubia et al., 2000; Rubia et al., 2006; Tamm, Menon, & Reiss, 2002). More-
over, with increasing age, there is an increase in activity in task-specific prefrontal areas during per-
formance of cognitive functions (Casey, Tottenham et al., 2005) (see Figure 2-3), and a decrease of 
activity in subcortical regions (Casey et al., 2004; Casey, Thomas, Davidson, Kunz, & Franzen, 2002; 
Luna et al., 2001; Monk, McClure et al., 2003; Thomas et al., 2004).  
 
 
Figure 2-3: Collectively, developmental neuroimaging studies of cognitive control processes suggest a general pattern of in-
creased recruitment of slow maturing prefrontal cortex, especially dorsolateral and ventral prefrontal cortex, and decreased 
activation of lower level sensory regions, including extrastriate and fusiform cortex and posterior parietal cortex areas. Of note, 
activations vary with task demands, for example working memory tasks recruit different areas (within PFC and within overall 
neocortex) from response inhibition tasks. This pattern of activity suggests that higher cognitive abilities supported by associa-
tion cortex become more focal and fine-tuned with development, whereas other regions not specifically correlated with that 
specific cognitive ability become attenuated.  = Increasing activation with age;  = Decreasing activation with age; colors 
correspond to single studies, A = anterior, P = posterior. Adapted from Casey et al. (2005). 
 
The exact neural processes mediating the cognitive improvements during adolescence cannot 
be determined with the current spatial resolution of fMRI, however, it seems likely that they result from 
the fine-tuning and myelination of neural projections within the PFC and/or between the PFC and its 
cortical and subcortical projections sites - setting the stage for decreased susceptibility to interference 
of signal transmission (Nagy, Westerberg, & Klingberg, 2004) and increased PFC “top-down” control 
of behavior (Luna & Sweeney, 2004). In support for this hypothesis, in two studies employing diffusion 
tensor imaging (DTI), a relatively new MR technique revealing microstructural properties of white mat-
ter (Watts, Liston, Niogi, & Ulug, 2003), working memory capacity during development was positively 
correlated with prefrontal-parietal connectivity (Nagy et al., 2004; Olesen, Nagy, Westerberg, & Kling-
berg, 2003) and inhibitory control with fronto-striatal connectivity (Liston et al., 2006). 
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2.1.3 Puberty and brain maturation 
Puberty refers to the re-activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal (HPG) axis at the end 
of childhood that initiates gonadarche (i.e. growth of ovaries in girls and testes in boys and an up to 
26-fold increase in production of sex steroids such as testosterone and estradiol (Ducharme & Forest, 
1993)) and culminates in gonadal maturation and expression of secondary sexual characteristics (for 
review see Buchanan, Eccles, & Becker, 1992; Cameron, 2004; Dahl, 2004a; Sisk & Foster, 2004). 
The process begins in girls approximately at age 8, in boys at age 10 (Strauch, 2004). Other hormonal 
changes occurring at around puberty are an increase in androgen secretion by activation of the hypo-
thalamus-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis (adrenarche) and an increase in hormones controlling body 
growth.  
In most mammals, the HPG axis is transiently active already during late prenatal and/or early 
postnatal life. Traditionally, it was believed that this first short peak in gonadal steroid production 
serves the sexual differentiation of neural circuits involved in reproductive behavior (so-called organ-
izational effects of steroids), and that the pubertal re-awakening of the HPG-axis and gonadal steroid 
production serves the activation of those circuits (so-called activational effects of steroids) (for review 
see Arnold & Breedlove, 1985; Romeo, 2003; Sisk & Foster, 2004). However, recent evidence sug-
gests that gonadal steroids may organize neural circuits also during puberty (for review see Giedd et 
al., 2006; Romeo, 2003; Schulz & Sisk, 2006; Sisk & Foster, 2004) (see Figure 2-4). For example, 
rodents exhibit adult steroid-sensitive behaviors such as mating or territorial scent marking appropri-
ately only if they were exposed to steroids during puberty. 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Two stage model of the development of sex-typical social behaviors proposed by Schulz and Sisk 
(2006): Perinatal hormone secretions sexually differentiate behavioral neural circuits and pubertal hormone secre-
tions refine and “finish” these processes during adolescence to allow for the display of sex-typic social behaviors 
in adulthood. 
 
In addition, the organizational effects of hormones may not only afflict on brain regions in-
volved in sexual performance, but on a wide network of brain regions that mediate the sensory, motor, 
and affective responses enabling sexual behavior (Becker, 1999; Cameron, 2004; Sisk & Foster, 
2004) (see Figure 2-5). For example, receptors for steroids have been found in several limbic brain 
regions such as the amygdala, lateral septum, bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, and Nucleus ac-
cumbens (for references see Cameron, 2004; Stevens, 2002) (see Figure 2-6). The limbic system has 
been attributed an important role in mediating affective states in the brain (see also chapter 2.2.2). 
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 Figure 2-5: Reproductive behavior requires neural circuits 
involved in salience of sexual stimuli and sensory associa-
tion, sexual motivation and sexual performance. From Sisk 
and Foster (2004). 
 
 
Figure 2-6: Receptors for gonadal steroids in basal 
forebrain sites. From Stevens (2002). 
 
 
The immense surge of steroids at puberty with their influence on many brain areas raises the 
question about their effect on adolescent behavioral propensities. Indeed, while cognitive development 
seems to proceed independently of hormonal maturation as evident from case studies of adolescents 
with delayed or premature puberty (for review see Dahl, 2004a), some studies do document associa-
tions between pubertal developmental stage and some affective measures such as increases in sex-
ual motivation, romantic interest, emotional intensity, sensation seeking and risk-taking behavior (Dahl, 
2004a; Martin et al., 2002; Steinberg, 2005). Yet to date there is inconsistent evidence causally linking 
levels of specific hormones to adolescent behavioral propensities, suggesting that other bio-psycho-
social factors such as state of brain maturation, environmental stress, genetic predisposition, or inter-
actions between different hormones may mediate the influence of steroids on adolescent behavior (for 
review see Buchanan et al., 1992; Spear, 2000; Walker, Sabuwalla, & Huot, 2004). 
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2.2 Neuroscience models of adolescent behavioral propensities: Starting the en-
gines with an unskilled driver? 
The different time courses along which the specific brain systems during adolescence mature 
have provided the backbone against which most developmental neuroscience models of adolescent 
emotional and behavioral propensities have been placed (e.g. Chambers & Potenza, 2003; Chambers 
et al., 2003; Dahl, 2004a; Ernst et al., 2006; Luna & Sweeney, 2004; Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & 
Pine, 2005; Spear, 2000; Steinberg, 2004). Specifically, these models suggest that the slow, age and 
experience-dependant maturation of the PFC during adolescence results in diminished regulatory 
cognitive control over earlier maturing, puberty-sensitive brain circuits mediating affective states and 
arousal, biasing adolescent behavior towards more impulsive, affect-steered patterns (see Figure 2-7). 
Accordingly, Ronald Dahl from the NIMH interdisciplinary research network ADAPT (Adolescent De-
velopment Affect-Regulation and the Pubertal Transition Network) has compared adolescence to 
“starting the engines with an unskilled driver” (Dahl, 2004b, pg. 17).  
Thus, form a developmental neuroscience perspective, an important challenge of adolescence 
is the functional integration of brain structures mediating regulatory cognitive control with those medi-
ating affect and arousal (Luna & Sweeney, 2004). Behaviorally, the successful passage through this 
“critical or sensitive period for a reorganization of regulatory systems” (Steinberg, 2005, pg. 69) is par-
alleled by the increasing use of effective impulse control and emotion regulation skills, enabling the 
adolescent to navigate and control his or her impulses and emotions in service to long-term adaptive 
goals (Dahl, 2003, 2004a).  
 
 
Figure 2-7: Neural models of adolescent behavior suggest that the impact of puberty on arousal and moti-
vation occurs before maturation of the frontal lobes is complete. This gap may create a period of vulner-
ability to problems in the regulation of affect and behavior. From Steinberg (2005). 
 
In this section, first neuroscience-based models on the neural mechanisms underlying affect, 
and its regulation, will be outlined in more detail (chapter 2.2.1). Subsequently, two adolescent pro-
pensities which have been proposed to result from the maturational disjunction between developing 
brain, regulatory and behavioral/affective systems will be addressed from a developmental cognitive 
neuroscience perspective: Impulsive behaviors such as risk-taking (chapter 2.2.2), and increase in 
negative affective states such as anhedonia, depressed mood and anxiety (chapter 2.2.3).  
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2.2.1 Affect and its regulation in Cognitive Neuroscience 
At present, there is no generally accepted theoretical framework in cognitive neuroscience for 
human affect and its regulation, neither is there a common understanding of their underlying neurobio-
logical basis (Dalgleish, 2004; Lang & Davis, 2006; Phillips et al., 2003a). Subsequently, prominent 
experimental paradigms on affect (chapter 2.2.1.1) and its regulation (chapter 2.2.1.2) will be outlined. 
Of note, following Scherer (1984) and Gross (1998), affect in this thesis is the superordinate category 
for all valenced states including emotions and moods – emotions being more strongly object-related 
and temporarily restricted than moods. 
 
2.2.1.1 Cognitive Neuroscience models on affect 
The currently reigning experimental paradigm in cognitive neuroscience assumes that humans 
are endowed with a limited set of discrete, mutually independent emotions such as happiness, sad-
ness, fear, each characterized by specific psychological, physiological and behavioral characteristics, 
and subserved by specific neural structures and pathways (Ekman, 1992, 1993; Panksepp, 1998a; 
Tomkins, 1962, 1963). However, attempts in localizing the neural substrates of specific emotions have 
rendered inconsistent results to date, with at times one and the same neural area being active in the 
processing of different emotions, and disparate basic emotions provoking similar physiological re-
sponses (for review see Dalgleish, 2004; Posner et al., 2005).  
Alternatively, dimensional models of affect posit that emotions are presented in common neu-
rophysiological systems. The circumplex model (Russell, 1980) as adapted by Posner (2005) for ex-
ample proposes that emotions result from the cognitive appraisal of affective states, which arise from 
the linear combination of activity in two independent neurophysiological systems, one coding for va-
lence and one for arousal (see Figure 2-8) (for a review on similar conceptualizations see Lang, 1995; 
Lang & Davis, 2006). Other such neurophysiologically-based dual-system models on affect break 
emotions down into approach and withdrawal components, behavioral activation or inhibition, appeti-
tive versus aversive systems, or states elicited by the cognitive appraisal of two classes of reinforcing 
stimuli, rewards and punishments (e.g. Cloninger, 1987; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990; Ressler, 
2004; Rolls, 2000) (see Figure 2-9). In all of these dimensional accounts, emotions are closely associ-
ated with the concept of rewards and punishments and the brain mechanisms supporting the behav-
iors associated with it - i.e. rewards being anything for which an individual will do work to obtain (i.e. 
approach), and a punishment anything for which it will do work to avoid or escape (i.e. withdraw) 
(Rolls, 2000). 
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Figure 2-8: Graphical representation of the circumplex model 
of affect with the horizontal axis representing the valence 
dimension and the vertical axis representing the arousal 
dimension. From Posner et al. (2000). 
 
Figure 2-9: Emotions associated with different reinforce-
ment contingencies. Intensity increases away from the 
centre of the diagram. S+/S- = presentation of a posi-
tive/negative reinforcer, S+/S- = omission of a posi-
tive/negative reinforcer, S+!/S-! = termination of a posi-
tive/negative reinforcer. From Rolls (2000). 
 
Human and translational animal research has consistently identified components of the meso-
corticolimbic system in the identification and appraisal of the valence of a stimulus and the generation 
of an affective state and behavior in response to it. The mesocorticolimbic system encompasses a 
neural network consisting of dopaminergic neurons originating from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) 
of the midbrain, and their major projection sites in the limbic system (nucleus accumbens (NAcc), 
amygdala, hippocampus), and various regions within the prefrontal cortex (orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), 
medial PFC, Anterior Cingulate cortex (ACC)) (for review see Kelley & Berridge, 2002; Laviolette, 
2007) (see Figure 2-10)  
Midbrain dopaminergic neurons adjust dopamine release in response to anticipation or notifi-
cation of emotionally salient events such as novel stimuli, natural (i.e. drugs, food or sex) as well as 
conditioned rewards, and aversive, punishing events (for review see Schultz, 2002). Dopamine re-
lease is initiated by glutamatergic inputs to the VTA from some of its major projection sites (i.e. NAcc, 
amygdala, PFC, and ACC). At the level of OFC, amygdala, and ACC dopamine may influence asso-
ciative learning (i.e. associating two types of events) by imprinting stimulus-reward and response-
reward associations (for review see Baxter & Murray, 2002; Holland & Gallagher, 2004; Laviolette, 
2007; Rolls, 2004; Rushworth, Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004). The OFC in addition has 
been implicated in coding for the hedonic value of a stimulus (Rolls, 2004), the ACC in error detection 
and conflict monitoring (for review see Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Paus, 2001), and the amygdala in 
coding for the intensity/salience of sensory and social events and influencing arousal, presumably 
through its projections to brainstem nuclei, the hypothalamus, and/or the NAcc (for review see Ander-
son & Sobel, 2003; Dalgleish, 2004; Lang & Davis, 2006; Posner et al., 2005). At the level of the 
NAcc, dopamine may modulate inputs from other brain areas (e.g. the amygdala) and act as a “Go-
Signal” for the initiation of motivated behavior such as appetitive, approach-related behavior or active 
avoidance behavior (for review see Panksepp, 1998b; Rolls, 2000). Motor output is influenced by 
GABAergic projections from the NAcc to downstream motor brain systems (i.e. thalamic nuclei, motor 
cortex).  
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Figure 2-10: Schematic representation of the mesocorticolimbic system. Dopaminergic neurons from 
the ventral tegmental area (VTA) project to various subcortical regions (Nucleus Accumbens (NAcc), 
amygdala, hippocampus) and to the prefrontal cortex (PFC). The NAcc is a main component of this 
network, receiving reward-related information from the other regions to which the VTA projects. The 
VTa and NAcc in addition are influenced by 5-HT systems originating from the dorsal raphé nucleus 
in them midbrain. Serotonin from the dorsal rahpé nucleus acts to inhibit dopaminergically mediated 
effects. The major output pathway of the NAcc are GABAergic projections to the globus pallidus, in-
fluencing downstream motor regions and thus goal-related behavior. From Davey et al. (2008). 
 
Several components of the mesocorticolimbic brain system undergo vast changes during ado-
lescence  (Chambers et al., 2003; Spear, 2000) (see also chapter 2.1.1). In addition, as illustrated in 
chapter 2.1.3, many contain steroid receptors and therefore likely are sensitive to the activating and/or 
organizational effects of hormones at puberty.  
 
2.2.1.2 Cognitive Neuroscience models on affect regulation 
A heuristic experimental paradigm in cognitive neuroscience that specifies the neural sub-
strates underlying different steps of affect regulation based on a thorough review of the existing data 
has been proposed by Phillips, Drevets, Rauch, and Lane (2003a) (see Figure 2-11). According to this 
model, the appraisal and identification of the emotional significance (i.e. valence) of a stimulus, the 
production of an affective state in response to it - including autonomic, neuroendocrine, somatomotor 
(facial expression, tone, voice, verbalizations, or actions) responses and conscious emotional feeling - 
and the automatic regulation of these responses depend on a “ventral neural system”, consisting of 
several components of the mesocorticolimbic reward system. Further, the model proposes that effort-
ful emotion regulation occurs by inhibiting or modifying activity in the ventral system by a “dorsal neu-
ral system” consisting of the hippocampus, dorsal regions of the ACC and PFC “so that the affective 
state and behavior produced are contextually appropriate” (Phillips et al., 2003a, pg. 504). According 
to Gross (1998) effortful emotion regulation may take place at all points of the emotion generative 
process, at the level of the stimulus (i.e. situation selection, modification), its cognitive appraisal (i.e. 
change of cognitions, deployment of attention), and emotion expression (i.e. modulation of re-
sponses).  
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Figure 2-11: Left-hand side diagram: Relationships of the three stages of emotion processing. Right-hand 
side diagram: Neural structures implicated in emotion processing, and their putative functional relation-
ships: A ventral system serves the identification of the emotional significance of a stimulus, the production 
of an affective state in response to it, and its automatic regulation (depicted in dark grey), whereas a pre-
dominantly dorsal system (depicted in pale grey) may regulate affective states and influence appraisals ef-
fortful. VLPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; DMPFC, dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex; ACG, anterior cingulated gyrus. From Phillips et al. (2003a). 
 
The adaptive nature of emotion regulation is also accounted for in other neuroscientist’s defini-
tions. Dahl (2003, pg. 184) for example defines emotion regulation as “the subset of processes in-
volved in the control of feelings – particularly the strategic control of feelings in the service of a goal or 
purpose … in adaptive ways. Typically, this modulation involves inhibition, delay, or altering emotional 
expression/behavior in ways that incorporate social rules, long-term goals, or avoiding future negative 
consequences.” Thompson (1994, pg. 27-28) defines emotion regulation as consisting “of the extrinsic 
and intrinsic processes responsible for monitoring, evaluating, and modifying emotional reactions, 
especially their intensive and temporal features, to accomplish one’s goals”. For a more detailed re-
view on emotion regulation, see Gross (1998). 
 
2.2.2 Impulsivity and heightened-risk taking during adolescence 
According to Moeller, Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz, and Swann (2001, pg 1784), impulsivity 
may be defined as “a predisposition toward rapid, unplanned reactions to internal or external stimuli 
without regard to the negative consequences of these reactions to the impulsive individual or to oth-
ers”. Similarly, Chambers, Taylor et al. (2003, pg. 1042) conceptualize impulsivity as a “goal-directed 
behavior characterized by poor judgment in the attainment of rewards”. Experimental paradigms ex-
amining impulsivity operationalize it either as the perseverance of a response that is unrewarded or 
punished, suboptimal decision-making characterized by the preference of a small immediate reward 
over a greater delayed reward, making premature responses, or inability to withheld responses (for 
review see Moeller et al., 2001). Thus, following these definitions and operationalizations, impulsive 
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behavior may be viewed as one behavioral expression of insufficient affect regulation – the strategic 
control of feelings and impulses in service of long-term adaptive goals (see chapter above).  
In terms of the neural mechanisms underlying impulsivity during adolescence, most develop-
mental cognitive neuroscientists concur with the notion that maturational transitions in the brain affect-
ing cognitive-regulatory and/or affective neural systems may predispose adolescents to impulsive 
behavior; however, there is less agreement on which specific neural substrates and mechanisms are 
in fact at work, giving rise to different theoretical conceptualizations. While some neuroscientists focus 
on “top-down” control of behavior, for example suggesting that the late maturation and functional inte-
gration of parts of the PFC lead to impaired inhibitory capacity or disregard of long-term consequences 
of an action (chapter 2.2.2.1), others emphasize more strongly “bottom-up” influences on behavioral 
output, suggesting that enhanced (chapter 2.2.2.2) or reduced activity at the level of the NAcc (chapter 
2.2.2.3), and/or reduced activity of the amygdala (chapter 2.2.2.4) may lead to increased impulsivity 
during adolescence. 
 
2.2.2.1 Maturing prefrontal cognitive control 
Adolescence is characterized by a steady improvement in several cognitive abilities such as 
working memory, strategic planning or inhibitory control that depend on integrative function of the PFC 
with other task-specific cortical and subcortical brain regions (see chapter 2.1.2). Two such steadily 
improving cognitive functions and their underlying neural substrates have been proposed by develop-
mental neuroscientists to be of particular relevance for impulsive behavior during adolescence, namely 
inhibitory control (i.e. the ability to inhibit context inappropriate but prepotent response tendencies), 
and the ability to link behaviors with their outcomes and consequences (i.e. one form of associative 
learning). Luna and Sweeney (2004, pg. 306) for example have suggested, that “the lack of efficient 
brain integration may account for some behavioral characteristics of adolescence, such as being 
driven by external stimuli that overcome the still unstable systems for the voluntary control of behavior 
(impulsivity).” Yurgelun-Todd (2007, pg. 255) states that “the maturation of  prefrontal networks plays a 
critical role in the cognitive and emotional behaviors displayed by adolescents.” Crone, Bunge, Laten-
stein, and van der Molen (2005) finally propose that adolescents engage in risky behaviors because 
the late development of the PFC, in particular its ventral and medial parts, would prevent them from 
anticipating the long-term outcomes of their actions, resulting in a “myopia for the future” (Crone et al., 
2005, pg. 261) and thus leading to a natural tendency to base decisions on short-term outcomes. As 
reviewed below, the few fMRI studies investigating differences between adolescents and adults during 
processing of emotionally evocative information indeed document developmental differences in PFC 
activation, with adolescents showing more diffuse activation patterns than adults (e.g. Galvan et al., 
2006; Levesque et al., 2004; Monk, Grillon et al., 2003).  
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2.2.2.2 Enhanced activity at the level of the NAcc 
Chambers and colleagues (Chambers & Potenza, 2003; Chambers et al., 2003) take a more 
bottom-up focus on adolescent impulsivity by proposing that during adolescence, robust dopaminergic 
activity at the level of the NAcc combined with insufficient inhibitory control from the PFC and 5-HT 
(serotonin) system results in a pro-motional motivated state that may facilitate approach behavior (see 
Figure 2-12).  
 
 
Figure 2-12: Neural model of adolescent behavioral propensities. From Chambers et al. (2003).  
Part A: Motivated behavior is subserved by a neural circuit composed of cortico-striatal-thalamo-cortical loops that can be influ-
enced at the level of the NAcc by affective, sensory or contextual memory information from surrounding brain areas such as the 
hippocampus and the amygdala.  
Part B: During adolescence, increased dopamine input into the NAcc (thickened red arrows) in conjunction with ongoing PFC 
maturation may increase firing patterns of NAcc neurons in response to cortical and limbic glutamatergic input - depicted as 
increases in local peak amplitudes – facilitating behavioral responses in downstream motor systems (ventral globus pallidus, 
thalamus and (sub)cortical centers of motor output) to novel or rewarding stimuli such as drugs, sex, food. 
 
This view of enhanced activity at the level of the NAcc during adolescence as compared to 
other age groups is supported by several fMRI studies investigating the neural substrates of reward 
processing in different age groups. Galvan et al. (2006) for example investigated brain activation in 16 
children (mean age 9.8 years), 13 adolescents (mean age 16 years), and 12 adults (mean age 25 
years) on a reward task. Subjects had to indicate the side of the screen on which one of three cues, 
each associated with a different amount of coins, was presented. Results showed that all subjects 
activated the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and NAcc during execution of correct trials to the highest re-
wards, however OFC activation was more diffuse in adolescents and children as compared to adults, 
and NAcc activation was significantly stronger in adolescents as compared to children or adults (see 
Figure 2-13). The authors interpreted these findings as that “NAcc development may precede that of 
OFC during adolescence” (Galvan et al., 2006, pg. 6889). Of note, not only neural activity, also reac-
tion time was modulated by reward, i.e. adults and, albeit to a smaller degree, adolescents, but not 
children, showed a modulation of reaction time depending on reward magnitude, with faster reaction 
time for higher rewards. Finally, NAcc activity was positively correlated with the likelihood of engaging 
in risky behavior as indexed by self-ratings in all age groups (Galvan, Hare, Voss, Glover, & Casey, 
2007).  
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Figure 2-13: Panels A and B: Magnitude of NAcc and OFC activity differs between age groups. A: In NAcc, adolescents showed 
significantly greater percent change in MR signal from baseline to the large reward condition than children and adults. B: In 
OFC, children had the greatest percent change in MR signal relative to adolescents and adults.  
Panels C and D: Extent of activity becomes more focal with age in both, NAcc and OFC. C: Children showed significantly larger 
volume of activity in the NAcc relative to adolescents and adults. D: Children showed significantly greater volume of activity in 
the OFC than adolescents who showed significantly greater volume of activity than adults. Error bars indicate SEM. * denote 
significant activation differences. From Galvan et al. (2006). 
 
Similar results have also been reported by Ernst, Nelson, Jazbec et al. (2005) and May et al. 
(2004). Ernst et al. (2005) investigated brain activation in 16 adolescents (mean age 13.3) and 14 
adults (mean age 26.7) after notification of winning or not winning a monetary reward. Results indi-
cated greater increase of activity in the left NAcc of adolescents as compared to adults when winning 
$4 and stronger reduction of activity when not winning $4. Moreover, adolescents reported greater 
intensity of positive feelings when winning than adults and these reports covaried significantly with 
reward-related activation in the right NAcc. In contrast, adults showed greater MRI signal intensity 
changes than adolescents when winning and not winning $4 in the left amygdala (see Figure 2-14).  
 
 
Figure 2-14: Mean (+SE) BOLD signal intensity changes between notification of winning respectively not winning 4$ relative to 
baseline for the left NAcc and for the left amygdala respectively. Each condition ([win $4 vs. fixation] in blue and [no win 4$ vs. 
fixation] in magenta) is represented separately for adults and adolescents. Adapted from Ernst et al. (2005). 
    
May et al. (2004) investigated neural responses to positive, negative or no monetary outcomes 
(winning 1$, losing 0.5$, or no money) in a simple guessing task in 12 healthy adolescents (mean age 
13.25). Subjects had to guess if a question mark (“?”) would turn into a number greater or smaller than 
5. Results revealed activation of the ventral striatum (including NAcc) and OFC during processing of 
reward-related information in adolescents, with larger responses to positive (winning money) than 
negative feedback (losing money). However, this study did not include other age groups, which pre-
cludes statements about developmental differences in reward processing.  
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2.2.2.3 Decreased activity at the level of the NAcc 
In contrast to the research groups around Chambers (Chambers & Potenza, 2003; Chambers 
et al., 2003) and Ernst (Ernst et al., 2005; Ernst et al., 2006), both of which endorse enhanced activity 
of the NAcc during adolescence, other authors such as Spear (2000) and Bjork et al. (2004) propose 
that NAcc activity is diminished during adolescence, based on rodent data indicating decreased do-
pamine transmission in the NAcc during adolescence. This may lead to a temporary “reward-
deficiency syndrome” (Spear, 2000, pg. 446), forcing adolescents to approach more robust incentives 
(such as risk taking or drug experimentation) to recruit this circuitry and thus attain positive arousal 
(Bjork et al., 2004; Spear, 2000). There is one fMRI study conducted by Bjork et al. (2004) supporting 
this notion. Specifically, the authors examined brain activation during anticipation and outcome notifi-
cation in a delayed response task in 12 adolescents (mean age 14.75 years) and 12 adults (mean age 
23.8 years). Subjects had to react to the appearance of a target cue within a specified time window in 
order to win or to avoid losing money (see Figure 2-15). Results indicated no difference in hit rate or 
reaction time between different monetary conditions or groups. Anticipation of responding for gain (all 
amounts collapsed) as compared to the non-incentive condition activated in both age groups the 
NAcc, albeit and in contrast to results obtained by Ernst et al. (2005) and Galvan et al. (2006) less so 
in adolescents than adults. Anticipation of responding to avoid loss as compared to the non-incentive 
condition did also activate the NAcc in both groups, especially in trials with high monetary stake such 
as avoiding losing $5, but overall activation was smaller than during anticipation of responding for 
potential gain. Notification of outcome activated the medial prefrontal cortex for gain and deactivated it 
for losses at similar levels in adults and adolescents.  
 
Figure 2-15: Schematic diagram of the Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task adapted from Juckel et al. 
(2006). 
1) One of 7 cues presented for 250ms indicates the stake of the trial: Three reward cues (circles with ei-
ther one, two or three lines) signal potential monetary reward (0.2$, 1$ or 5$); three punishment cues 
(squares with either one, two or three lines) signal potential monetary loss (0.2$, 1$ or 5$); and one control 
cue (triangle) signals a non-incentive trial.  
2) After a random time interval of 2000-2500ms,  
3) the target appears, a white small square prompting subjects to press as fast as possible a button in or-
der to obtain reward resp. avoid loss.  
4) Finally, feedback is provided indicating trial outcome and cumulative earnings.  
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2.2.2.4 Decreased activity of harm avoidant brain systems  
Ernst, Pine, and Hardin (2006) draw attention to the fact that risk-taking may not only result 
from enhanced responsiveness to rewarding or novel stimuli, but also of decreased aversiveness to 
potentially negative or punishing stimuli. In their “triadic model of the neurobiology of motivated behav-
ior” they propose that motivated behavior results from the balanced engagement of three behav-
ioral/neural systems: 1) A reward-seeking approach system, supported by a neural network encom-
passing the dorsolateral part of the prefrontal cortex, the ventral striatum including the NAcc and do-
pamine; 2) a harm avoidant system, supported by a neural network encompassing the amygdala, the 
temporal pole, and serotonin, and 3) a regulatory system, supported by the ventral/medial part of the 
prefrontal cortex, that balances the action of the approach-driven and harm-avoidant systems. During 
adolescence, Ernst et al. (2006) propose that the activity of the reward system prevails over that of the 
avoidant system while the still immature regulatory systems fails to adaptively balance these two be-
havioral controllers (see Figure 2-16). However, the model does not specify if the loci of maturational 
lag lay within these circuits, in their functional connectivity, or in both. In support of the triadic model, 
Ernst et al. (2005) found in their fMRI study (see chapter 2.2.2.2 above), less impact of negative out-
comes (not winning money) on amygdala activation in adolescents as compared to adults. 
 
 
Figure 2-16: Triadic model of adolescent behavioral propensities. The model proposes that 
the balance between reward-driven and harm-avoidant behavior is tilted toward reward-
driven in adolescents as compared to adults. This pattern may result from a stronger re-
ward-related system, weaker harm-avoidant system, and/or poor regulatory control. From 
Ernst et al. (2006). 
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2.2.3 Emotional distress and affective disorders during adolescence 
Analog to impulsivity, developmental neuroscientists explain negative affective states during 
adolescence as resulting from maturational changes in the adolescent brain affecting cognitive-
regulatory, and/or affective-arousal systems, and/or their integration. In Table 2-1 some affective ad-
justment problems are summarized that may arise during adolescence due to specific maturational 
transitions in the brain. Since this thesis is thematically based on the functional relationship of regula-
tory and affective brain systems during adolescence, models specifically involving affect will be out-
lined in more detail (see chapter 2.2.3.1.1), followed by a section addressing the factors that may ren-
der an individual vulnerable to the development of mood and anxiety disorders (see chapter 2.2.3.2). 
 
Table 2-1: Selected areas in which adjustment problems may arise during adolescence leading to negative mood states such as 
anhedonia, anxiety, dysphoria, embarrassment, and their hypothesized neural underpinnings, with respective references. 
 
Developmental area Possible maladjustment  Possible neural correlates Selected References 
Increasing capacity for 
abstract thinking  
Development of social 
cognition and mental-
izing abilities  
Adolescents may envision more 
future threats 
Increased capacity for rumination  
Increasing ability to envision other 
people’s mental states may lead to 
heightened self-awareness and 
embarrassment 
Maturation of the “social brain” in 
particular the medial PFC and 
superior temporal sulcus 
Larson and Ham (1993); Larson 
and Richards (1994); Rosso, 
Young, Femia, and Yurgelun-
Todd (2004); Moriguchi, Ohnishi, 
Mori, Matsuda, and Komaki 
(2007); Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, 
Wade, and Bohon (2007); Blake-
more (2008a; 2008b) 
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lop
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nt
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e d
eve
lop
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nt
Co
gn
itiv
e d
eve
lop
me
nt
Co
gn
itiv
e d
eve
lop
me
nt     
Pursuit of more 
abstract, long-term 
goals and rewards 
Abstract rewards are more tenuous 
and easily frustrated 
Integration of PFC with the dopa-
minergic reward system Davey, Yucel, and Allen (2008) 
“Reward-deficiency syndrome” Spear (2000) 
Reduced positive affect may lead to 
anhedonia, and depression Maturation of mesocorticolimbic 
brain system 
Forbes and Dahl (2005); Forbes, 
et al. (2006)  
Increased negative affect 
Attentional bias for negative and 
threatening information 
Functional developmental changes 
in PFC-amygdala circuitry 
Monk et al. (2003); Skuse, Morris, 
and Lawrence, (2003); Lonigan, 
Vasey, Phillips, and Hazen 
(2004); Pine, (2007) 
Heightened sensitivity to social 
stimuli 
“Affective neural node” matures 
before “regulatory neural node” 
Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, and 
Pine (2005) 
Aff
ect
 
Aff
ect
 
Aff
ect
 
Aff
ect
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gu
lati
on
reg
ula
tion
reg
ula
tion
reg
ula
tion
    
Affective systems 
dominate emotional 
state/ behavioral 
output 
Affect regulation skills 
increase slowly with 
age and experience 
Risk-Taking, Risk-Avoidance 
Regulatory system may not balance 
influence of appetitive and harm 
avoidant neural systems 
Ernst, Pine, and Hardin (2006) 
Pu
be
rty
Pu
be
rty
Pu
be
rty
Pu
be
rty
    
Enhanced stress 
sensitivity 
Negative life events may have more 
impact, overwhelm the adolescent 
HPA-hyperactivity at puberty onset, 
and its influence on affective neural 
systems 
Cameron (2004); Walker, Sabu-
walla, and Huot (2004); Young 
and Altemus (2004); Romeo and 
McEwen (2006) 
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2.2.3.1 Dysregulation of affective states during adolescence 
In developmental psychology and psychopathology attempts have become popular which ex-
plain the increased negative mood reported by adolescents as compared to adults and children (see 
chapter 1) as an expression of insufficient and/or derailed affect regulation (Forbes & Dahl, 2005). This 
approach is supported by behavioral data indicating less use of affect regulation strategies in adoles-
cents as compared to adults (Folkman et al., 1987; Gross et al., 1997) and an interrelation between 
emotional and behavioral problems during adolescence, and affect intensity and/or regulation (e.g. 
Graber & Brooks-Gunn, 1995; Larson, Raffaelli, Richards, Ham, & Jewell, 1990; Sheeber, Allen, 
Davis, & Sorensen, 2000; Silk, Steinberg, & Morris, 2003). Yet, many of these models lack specificity 
in terms of which aspects of affect may be dysregulated in what way (Forbes & Dahl, 2005; Pollak, 
2005) (for different aspects of affect that may be dysregulated, see Figure 2-17). Similarly, develop-
mental neuroscientists globally apply the framework of a maturational dysbalance between regulatory 
and affective neural systems to externalizing (i.e. impulsive, hyperactive, and aggressive behaviors, 
see chapter 2.2.2) and internalizing (i.e. withdrawn, anxious, and depressed, social withdrawal) prob-
lems during adolescence, often without specifying the particular aspects of affect that are being de-
regulated, their precise neural underpinnings, and often without distinguishing between transient ad-
justment problems and the expression of clinical disorders such as depression and anxiety disorders 
(e.g. Dahl, 2003, 2004a; Kelley, Schochet, & Landry, 2004; Steinberg, 2004, 2005).  
 
 
Figure 2-17: Different aspects of affect dysregulation that may be involved in adolescent depression and anxiety. In de-
pression, positive affective states may be decreased, and/or negative affective states such as sadness or irritability may 
be enhanced. In anxiety, negative affective states such as anxiety and fear may be increased, possibly leading to hy-
perarousal. For all affective states, the dysregulation may take place at the stimulus perception and/or response level. For 
example, there may be an elevated threshold to activate positive affect and/or a less intense or volatile response once 
positive affect is activated. In addition, or alternatively, there may be a lower threshold to activate negative affect, or a 
longer or more intense response once negative affect is activated. In anxiety, there may be a lower threshold to activate 
fear and/or a more intense or sustained response once fear is activated. 
 
In this chapter, first two integrative developmental neuroscience models on affect dysregula-
tion as a platform on which adolescent emotional turmoil may develop are outlined (see chapter 
2.2.3.1.1). Subsequently, two specific components of affect that may be dysregulated in adolescent 
mood and anxiety disorders that have recently drawn attention in cognitive developmental neurosci-
ence research will be presented, namely reduced positive affect, and increased attention allocation 
towards threatening or negative information (see chapters 2.2.3.1.2 and 2.2.3.1.3).  
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2.2.3.1.1 Integrative accounts 
Two integrative neuroscience-based models on affect regulation in adolescent negative mood 
have been proposed by Ernst et al. (2005) and Nelson et al. (2005).  
Nelson et al. (2005) propose that during adolescence, disjunction in the maturation of two 
nodes of a larger neural network involved in the processing of social information, namely a puberty-
sensitive “affective node” based on limbic brain structures and a late maturing “cognitive-regulatory 
node” based on the PFC, lead to a transition phase in which affective responses to individually-
relevant social events are enhanced, yet not tempered by regulatory mechanisms. This maturational 
mismatch is said to explain heightened emotional lability and reactivity during adolescence, with the 
quality of the social event determining the direction of the mood swing, i.e. pleasant social events will 
lead to strong positive, and negative events to strong negative feelings. Extreme activity within the 
affective node, for example brought about by distressing interpersonal experiences, may according to 
the model be particularly relevant for the development of maladjustment. Indeed, negative social 
events play a major role in the development of emotional difficulties during adolescence. For example, 
rejection by romantic partners and peers is one of the strongest predictors for the emergence of an 
initial depressive episode and suicide attempts (Hecht, Inderbitzen, & Bukowski, 1998; Monroe, 
Rohde, Seeley, & Lewinsohn, 1999; Prinstein & La Greca, 2004; e.g. Vernberg, 1990).  
Ernst et al. (2005) apply their “triadic model” (see chapter 2.2.2.4) also to adolescent negative 
mood states. Specifically, the authors propose that in adolescent depressed or anxious mood, activity 
of the approach system based on the NAcc may be reduced and/or activity within the harm avoidant 
system based on the amygdala increased, which may, given reduced modulatory control by the matur-
ing PFC, result in anhedonia, loss of energy, amotivation, and/or risk avoidance. In less severe condi-
tions, the authors suggest that the approach system may also become overactive, as an expression of 
hyperarousal (in anxiety) or in an attempt of short-term affect regulation. This notion is supported by 
research indicating that adolescents with emotional distress show a higher rate of short-term reward-
ing impulsive behaviors such as eating fatty foods or drug abuse than controls (for review see Pech-
mann et al., 2005; Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001) (see also chapter 1.2.4).  
Only few fMRI studies examined brain activation in adolescents while regulating distressing 
emotions. However, these studies do support the notion of reduced PFC regulatory control over (over-
active) neural systems involved in mediating affective states. Monk et al. (2003) for example showed 
that adolescents exhibit greater activity than adults in the amygdala, OFC, and ACC when viewing fear 
evoking faces. When asked to switch attention between an emotional property (“How afraid does it 
make you feel?”) and a non-emotional property of the face (“how wide is the nose?”), only adults, but 
not adolescents were able to selectively engage and disengage the OFC. The authors suggest that 
these results indicate greater bottom-up influence on information processing in adolescents as com-
pared to adults. In a study by Lévesque et al. (Levesque et al., 2003; Levesque et al., 2004), voluntary 
suppression of sadness activated more prefrontal cortical areas in girls (mean age 9.9 years) than 
women, according to the authors reflecting immaturity of the prefronto-limbic connections in childhood. 
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2.2.3.1.2 Decreased positive affect 
In contrast to Ernst et al. (2005) and Nelson et al. (2005), Forbes and Dahl (Forbes et al., 
2006; 2005; Forbes, Shaw, & Dahl, 2007) take a more specific approach by focusing on one aspect of 
affect that a) may be dysregulated in adolescent mood and anxiety disorders and b) can be mapped 
onto a specific neural substrate. Specifically, they suggest that depressive states during adolescence 
reflect a reduction in positive affect. Adhering to the cognitive neuroscience perspective on affect and 
its regulation (see chapter 2.2.1), positive affect in this concept is a construct related to reward-
processing, encompassing subjective affective experiences (enjoyment of rewards), affective behav-
iors (work to obtain anticipated rewards), and accompanying physiological responses.  
The notion of reduced positive affect in depression is not a new one. For example, several af-
fective models on adult depression propose that depressed individuals experience diminished positive 
affect ("tripartite modely" by Clark & Watson, 1991), less positive social reinforcement (Lewinsohn, 
Hoberman, Teri, & Hautzinger, 1985), and exhibit reduced appetitive activity (Depue & Collins, 1999; 
Depue & Iacono, 1989; e.g. Fowles, 1988). Indeed, several symptoms considered typical for depres-
sion can be conceptualized within a low positive affect framework: While anhedonia signifies the re-
duced capacity to experience enjoyment, other symptoms such as social withdrawal, loss of libido, 
loss of appetite, and/or general fatigue may reflect diminished motivation to pursue natural or condi-
tioned rewards (Forbes & Dahl, 2005). 
Empirically, diminished positive affect is documented in self-reports of depressed adults (e.g. 
Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988; Watson et al., 1995) and adolescents (Chorpita, 2002; Forbes, Wil-
liamson, Ryan, & Dahl, 2004; e.g. Joiner, Catanzaro, & Laurent, 1996; Joiner & Lonigan, 2000). Be-
haviorally, there is evidence for reduced physiologic responses to rewarding stimuli (Rottenberg, 
Kasch, Gross, & Gotlib, 2002; Sloan, Bradley, Dimoulas, & Lang, 2002; Sloan, Strauss, Quirk, & Saja-
tovic, 1997; Sloan, Strauss, & Wisner, 2001), and failure to exhibit a response bias for monetary re-
wards in adults with depression or low mood scores (Henriques & Davidson, 2000; Henriques, 
Glowacki, & Davidson, 1994; Hughes, Pleasants, & Pickens, 1985; Pizzagalli, Iosifescu, Hallett, Rat-
ner, & Fava, 2008; Pizzagalli, Jahn, & O'Shea, 2005). In depressed and anxious youth, to my knowl-
edge, prior to the data presented in this thesis (Jazbec, McClure, Hardin, Pine, & Ernst, 2005), no 
study explicitly investigated reward-related behavior. However, one study showed that selective atten-
tion of healthy, but not of depressed or anxious adolescents is disrupted by positive stimuli, which 
according to the authors suggests “that a common underlying feature of pediatric affective disorders 
such as anxiety and depression may be alterations associated with processing positive emotional 
information” (Ladouceur et al., 2005, pg. 174). A recently published study (Forbes et al., 2007) investi-
gated reward-related decision-making in 221 11-year old-boys, 25 of whom had a depressive disorder 
and 38 an anxiety disorder. Results indicated that the depressed but not the anxious boys showed 
peculiarities in reward-processing; specifically they failed to choose options with high probability of 
yielding a high magnitude reward. Moreover, this lack of responding for gains predicted diagnosis of 
depressive symptoms, and depressive disorders with and without comorbid anxiety disorders one year 
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later. The authors interpreted the findings as either indicating diminished motivation to obtain future 
reward in the depressed boys, or as poor flexibility in shifting behavior when contingencies change, 
since choosing the low gain option was advantageous on trials with a low probability of winning 
(Forbes et al., 2007).  
In terms of the neural substrates underlying reduced positive affect in adolescent depression, 
Forbes and Dahl (2005) suggest dysfunction in the brain’s mesocorticolimbic reward system (for re-
view on the mesocorticolimbic system see chapter 2.2.1.1), such as decreased levels of activation in 
reward-related brain regions during anticipation or after receipt of reward, lack of differentiation be-
tween large and small rewards, and/or impairments in dopamine function (for similar hypotheses on 
adolescent anhedonia, see Ernst et al., 2006; Spear, 2000). fMRI studies offer support for this notion. 
Forbes et al. (2006) for example investigated neural activity during a reward-related decision-making 
task in depressed adolescents, many with comorbid anxiety disorders, adolescents with an anxiety 
disorder, and controls. In comparison with controls, depressed adolescents exhibited diminished activ-
ity in the ACC, ventral OFC, and striatum (bilateral caudate nucleus) and increased activity in the dor-
sal OFC during anticipation for responding for reward. Interestingly, also the anxious adolescents 
showed dysfunction in reward-related brain regions, with more variable, but also more extreme re-
sponses than depressed adolescents. This finding is corroborated by a recent study by Guyer et al. 
(2006), reporting greater striatal activation to incentives in behaviorally inhibited adolescents than in 
non-inhibited adolescents. Of note, behavioral inhibition has been considered an important tempera-
mental risk-marker for the development of affective disorders (Pine, 2007) (see chapter 1.3.5).  
 
2.2.3.1.3 Increased negative affect: Attentional bias for threatening or negative information 
One prominent affective model on adult mood and anxiety disorders is the tripartite model by 
Clark and Watson (1991) which proposes that depression is characterized by a decrease in positive 
affect, anxiety by physiological hyperarousal, and both depression and anxiety by an increase in nega-
tive affect which represents the displeasurable engagement with the environment and a sense of high 
subjective stress. The research group around Lonigan has adopted the notion of low positive and high 
negative affect in youth and propose that high levels of negative affect in conjunction with low levels of 
executive control represents a major risk factor for the development of an anxiety or depressive disor-
der, depression additionally being associated with low positive affect (for review see Lonigan et al., 
2004). Thus, a child with high negative affect but high executive control will have a smaller probability 
to develop an internalizing disorder than a child with high negative affect and low executive control. In 
addition, the authors propose that this combination of high negative affect and low executive control is 
reflected in an attentional bias for threatening or negative stimuli.  
Indeed, there is a vast body of literature documenting cognitive biases in adult and adolescent 
patients with depression and anxiety. Specifically, while patients with anxiety have been shown to 
exhibit heightened acquisition and/or diminished extinction of learned fear, attention allocation towards 
THEORETICAL PART: Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 34 
threats (and away from threats as their intensity increases), and interpretation of emotionally ambigu-
ous stimuli as threatening (for review see Bishop, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Pine, 2007), patients 
with depression have been reported to show a cognitive bias in encoding respectively recalling of 
negative events, but not an attentional bias (Caseras, Garner, Bradley, & Mogg, 2007; e.g. MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Siegle, Granholm, Ingram, & Matt, 2001; Silk et al., 2007). 
Two interconnected components of the mesocorticolimbic brain system have consistently 
been implicated in processing of threats or negative information; the amygdala and the PFC, in par-
ticular the ventrolateral PFC. The current view is that the amygdala is critical for recruiting and coordi-
nating cortical arousal and attention allocation to stimuli which are considered as important for the 
organism’s survival, while the PFC has been implicated in the regulation of such responses (Dalgleish, 
2004; for review see Phillips et al., 2003a). In anxious and depressed individuals, evidence suggests 
disruption in the function of both, amygdala and PFC, with amygdaloid hyper-responsivity and deficient 
recruitment of prefrontal regulatory mechanisms during threat-related or negative information process-
ing (for review in adults see Bishop, 2007; R. J. Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschke, & Putnam, 2002; for 
review in youth see Pine, 2007). Supporting the hypothesis of Lonigan et al. (2004) of an interaction 
between executive control and negative affect, there seems to be a functional relationship between 
these two brain areas, with higher prefrontal recruitment, for example due to performance of a cogni-
tively demanding task, leading to decreased feelings of anxiety and distress and decreased subcorti-
cal activation (McClure et al., 2007; Monk et al., 2008; Monk, McClure et al., 2003). Disruption of the 
amygdale-prefrontal circuitry has also been put forward to explain the above mentioned typical cogni-
tive biases observed in anxious and depressed individuals. 
 
2.2.3.2 Transient versus permanent maladjustment 
For most adolescents, affect regulation difficulties diminish with age, and the majority of young 
adults show significant improvements in behavioral control, positive affect, and self-confidence (B. W. 
Roberts, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2001). For some adolescents however, adjustment problems escalate to the 
level of depression or clinical anxiety, with their high continuity into adulthood and impairment in psy-
chosocial functioning (see chapters 1.2.4, 1.3.4). Several neurally mediated factors seem relevant in 
conferring risk of developing an affective disorder in adolescence: Genetic predisposition, activated by 
pubertal hormones or other maturational brain processes (for review see Walker et al., 2004), en-
hanced impact of environmental stressors on neural circuits undergoing maturational reorganization 
(for review see Luna & Sweeney, 2004; Pechmann et al., 2005), and/or timing of puberty-onset in 
relation to hormone-independent brain maturation (for review see Dahl, 2004a; Sisk & Foster, 2004). 
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2.3 Synopsis chapter 2 
Over the past decade, application of magnetic resonance imaging techniques has enabled 
neuroscientists to examine adolescent structural and functional brain maturation. Evidence indicates 
profound re-organization of brain systems involved in the regulatory control of cognitive functions, 
affective states and behaviors, which in some brain regions such as the prefrontal cortex continues 
well into adulthood. On the other hand, puberty-onset at the beginning of adolescence leads to a 
surge of hormones that is swamping the adolescent brain, affecting brain systems mediating sexual 
reproduction and the behavioral, motivational and social skills required for it.  
Cognitive developmental neuroscientists have employed these maturational changes of the 
adolescent brain to explain adolescent behavioral propensities. Although differing in details and spe-
cific brain regions at focus, most integrative cognitive developmental neuroscience models propose 
that the mismatch in maturation of regulatory and affective brain systems during adolescence leads to 
a period of natural affect dysregulation, in which strong impulses and affects are not yet tempered by 
cognitive control skills. Thus, according to this view, adolescent impulsivity may reflect the inability to 
use long-term adaptive goals to guide momentary affective needs and behaviors, while emotional 
turmoil may reflect the inability to use cognitive regulatory skills such as attention allocation or cogni-
tive restructuring to readjust and balance emotional states. In addition, in conjunction with genetic 
predispositions and/or stressful life events, this period of heightened experience-dependant plasticity 
of regulatory-affective brain regions may result in permanent alterations in neural structure that predis-
pose an individual for recurrent affect regulation impairments later in life. Form this background, the 
investigation of functional and structural brain maturation during adolescence may provide important 
insights in the development of affective disorders and possibly offer an informative basis for the devel-
opment of earlier and more focused intervention strategies.  
Yet, despite the advances in developmental cognitive neuroscience, the specific neural 
mechanisms underlying adjustment problems in adolescence, and their transition into manifest mood 
and anxiety disorders are still unclear, to date allowing only global statements on affect dysregulation. 
To further advance the field, more focused research, parsing complex psychological constructs into 
investigational components that can be mapped onto neural circuits, are of importance. One such 
promising approach is the study of reward-related information processing, since 1) the processing of 
rewards is crucially intertwined with the concept of affect in cognitive neuroscience, such that rewards 
lead to positive affect and approach behavior (as characteristic for impulsivity), and punishments or 
threats to negative affect and/or avoidance behavior (as characteristic for anxiety and depression), 2) 
the neural substrates underlying reward-processing are well understood, 3) these neural substrates 
are among those that undergo vast maturational changes during adolescence, and 4) healthy adoles-
cents as well as those with mood and anxiety disorders show peculiarities in reward-processing and 
brain activation during reward-processing, suggestive of increased or decreased reward sensitivity, 
and/or increased or decreased punishment sensitivity in healthy adolescents, respectively adolescents 
with mood and anxiety disorders.  
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In addition, besides specifying more precise behavioral components for further investigation, 
other neuroscience-based methods besides fMRI should complement the emerging picture on adoles-
cent functional brain maturation. Although use of fMRI has advanced the field of developmental cogni-
tive neuroscience in the past decade immensely by providing data on brain regions activated during 
information processing in pediatric populations (for review on the use of fMRI in pediatric populations, 
see for example M. C. Davidson, Thomas, & Casey, 2003; Gaillard, Grandin, & Xu, 2001), it has a 
slow response time in the range of seconds. Events occurring in the range of tens or hundreds of milli-
seconds can not be precisely mapped onto neural substrates by means of this technique. In the next 
chapter, the investigation of saccadic eye movements as a quantitative measure of the temporal char-
acteristics of information processing as a complementing investigational means to fMRI will be intro-
duced. 
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3.  Saccadic eye movements as a research tool 
Saccades are rapid (up to 600° visual angle per second), brief (around 20 to 30ms duration), 
accurate eye movements that direct the fovea – the part of the eye with best visual acuity- to capture 
points of interest in the environment (Leigh & Kennard, 2004; Ramat, Leigh, Zee, & Optican, 2007). 
Unrestrained, saccadic eye movements have been used in cognitive neuroscience as an index of 
overt attention allocation (Fischer, Biscaldi et al., 1997; Gottlieb, 2007). In addition, saccadic eye 
movements have been integrated in different task paradigms probing specific cognitive functions such 
as spatial working memory or executive cognitive control, for example by asking subjects to look at 
(different) remembered location(s) or to inhibit a gaze towards a novel, but task-irrelevant event (see 
Figure 3-1) (for review see Broerse et al., 2001).  
Depending on their application, saccadic eye movements recruit a more or less extensive neu-
ral network consisting of cortical and subcortical areas. The neural underpinnings of the specific tem-
poral and spatial characteristics of different saccade types (e.g. voluntary, involuntary) have increas-
ingly been delineated in the last 30 years using multiple techniques from the single neuron level in 
non-human primates to functional imaging and lesion studies in humans, allowing cognitive neurosci-
entists to map saccade performance parameters to the function of specific neural correlates. In this 
chapter, the use of saccadic eye movements as a research tool for investigating the cognitive control 
of behavior (chapter 3.1) in development (chapter 3.3), in affective disorders (chapter 3.4) and in con-
junction with reward-related information processing (chapter  3.5) will be addressed in more detail, as 
well as its underlying neural circuit (chapter 3.2). 
 
3.1 The antisaccade task paradigm 
In the antisaccade (AS) task paradigm, subjects are asked to perform eye movements towards 
the mirror location of a peripherally presented target relative to a central fixation point, referred to as 
antisaccades (see Figure 3-1, panel B). The AS task has been introduced by Hallett in 1978 in order to 
investigate the extent in which eye movements can be influenced voluntarily. In the 1980’s the AS task 
has increasingly been employed as a means to examine executive functions in various contexts such 
as in neurology, development, aging and psychopathology (for review see Sweeney, Levy, & Harris, 
2002). Specifically, successful performance of an antisaccade has been proposed to involve two ex-
ecutive cognitive processes: inhibition of the reflexive eye movement that normally is generated to-
wards a novel visual target appearing in the periphery (so-called visually-guided or pro-saccade), and 
programming of a voluntary motor response towards its opposite direction in absence of any external 
visual guidance (Guitton, Buchtel, & Douglas, 1985; e.g. Hallett & Adams, 1980; for review see Munoz 
& Everling, 2004). However, recent theoretical accounts embed both these functions - inhibition of a 
reflexive behavior and programming of a volitional one - into a broader framework of executive control, 
proposing that the performance on the antisaccade probes the ability to pursue an internal task goal, 
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involving besides inhibitory capacity and voluntary saccade programming other cognitive functions 
such as working memory, and/or shifting of attentional focus (e.g. Mitchell, Macrae, & Gilchrist, 2002; 
Nieuwenhuis, Broerse, Nielen, & de Jong, 2004; Reuter & Kathmann, 2004).  
Often, antisaccade performance is compared to performance of voluntary prosaccades (i.e. in-
tended saccades towards the target, see Figure 3-1, panel A), in order to have a control condition for 
the sensory and motor requirements of antisaccade performance (Luna et al., 2001).  
 
 
Figure 3-1: Different saccadic paradigms have been developed to examine different cognitive operations such as spatial atten-
tion, response inhibition, spatial working memory, and predictive and anticipatory behaviour. The core paradigms are: (A) Visu-
ally-guided paradigm: A visual stimulus is presented in a random sequence to the left of right of a central fixation point and 
subjects are instructed to respond with a rapid and accurate eye movement towards that stimulus. (B) Antisaccade paradigm: 
subjects are instructed to suppress the reflexive saccade that would normally be generated in response to a novel visual target, 
and to generate a volitional saccade to the opposite hemifield. (c) Memory-guided paradigm: Subjects are instructed to sup-
press the normal reflexive eye movement in response to a novel stimulus, and to delay the saccade until the offset of the central 
light. (D) A visible target steps between (two) fixed locations in a predictable temporal sequence, and subjects are instructed to 
repeat the sequence with their eye movements. From Broerse et al. (2001).  
 
 
3.1.1 Antisaccade performance measures 
AS task performance yields several global and dynamic measures that can be mapped onto 
specific neural substrates (see chapter 3.2), providing insights into the integrity of cognitive and neural 
mechanisms involved in the volitional control of behavior. 
 
3.1.1.1 Global performance measures 
Global measures of AS task performance include the proportion of correct antisaccades, pro-
portion of erroneous prosaccades (also referred to as antisaccade direction errors), and the proportion 
of such errors being corrected. While the error rate has been proposed to index the integrity of inhibi-
tory control processes, the rate of corrected errors has been suggested to reflect the ability to inter-
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nally generate a voluntary response (for review see Broerse et al., 2001; Hutton & Ettinger, 2006; 
Munoz & Everling, 2004). Studies using large samples indicate mean error rates of about 20% on the 
antisaccade task in adults (Ettinger, Hejda, Flak, & Corr, 2005; Ettinger et al., 2003; Smyrnis et al., 
2002; Tatler & Hutton, 2007).  
 
3.1.1.2 Dynamic performance measures 
Dynamic, temporal and spatial measures of AS task performance include the latency (the time 
between target onset and saccade initiation), duration, amplitude (the distance the eye travels during a 
saccade in degrees visual angle), and peak velocity of correct antisaccades, of antisaccade direction 
errors, and of corrected direction errors (for review see Broerse et al., 2001; Fischer, 1999; Hutton & 
Ettinger, 2006). Put in relation to the eccentricity of a visual target, saccade amplitude is a measure of 
the spatial accuracy of an eye movement, also referred to as saccade gain, with gains above 1 indicat-
ing saccade hypermetria, and gains below 1 saccade hypometria.  
Antisaccades generally have longer latencies (about 100-150 ms) than voluntary prosaccades, 
which have longer latencies than direction errors (Munoz & Everling, 2004; Olk & Kingstone, 2003) 
(see Figure 3-2). In addition, antisaccades are less accurate, have smaller amplitudes and slower 
peak velocities than prosaccades (Amador, Schlag-Rey, & Schlag, 1998; Hallett, 1978). The differ-
ences between antisaccade and prosaccades dynamic performance measures have been proposed to 
reflect their different cognitive demands and thus underlying neural substrates (see chapter 3.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Antisaccades (right side panel, indicated by red color of the fixation cue) have longer saccade 
latencies than prosaccades (left side panel, indicated by blue color of the fixation cue). Prosaccades dur-
ing antisaccade trials (direction errors) tend to have shorter latencies than volitional pro- and antisaccades. 
Adapted from Munoz and Everling (2004). 
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3.1.1.3 Indices related to antisaccade performance 
Saccadic eye movements are just one type of event that can be observed while subjects are 
scanning the visual environment or performing a saccade task. Other events that are interspersed 
and/or go along with saccadic eye movements are for example the number of blinks, changes in the 
aperture of the pupillary lens (pupil dilation or constriction) or the number, location and duration of 
fixational eye movements. Eye movements are considered “fixations” if they do not exceed certain 
spatial and temporal limits. Commonly, an eye movement is defined as a fixation if the eye moves less 
than 0.5 degrees visual angle for at least 100ms (e.g. Karsh & Breitenbach, 1983; L. R. Young & 
Sheena, 1975). 
Some of these eye movement measures have been shown to reflect endogenous factors in-
fluencing visual information processing. For example, higher cognitive demand and/or attentional en-
gagement of an individual go along with increased number and duration of fixations and larger pre-
paratory and more sustained pupil dilation, while arousal leads to a decrease in fixation duration but 
an increase in pupil dilation (for review see Beatty, 1982; Joos et al., 2003; Liversedge & Findlay, 
2000; Steinhauer & Hakerem, 1992). Thus, although not directly measuring saccadic eye movements, 
the investigation of fixation parameters and changes in pupil diameter can inform about the cognitive 
and emotional state of an individual while performing the AS task.  
 
3.2 Neural circuit underlying saccadic eye movements 
Saccadic eye movements are among the best understood movements in terms of their under-
lying neural substrates (Leigh & Kennard, 2004; Ramat et al., 2007). Research using multiple tech-
nologies and methods in humans and non-human primates has identified several distinct populations 
of neurons (such as saccade-related and fixation-related neurons), in different brain regions (from 
brainstem to the cerebral cortex), that code for initiation and course of specific types of saccadic eye 
movements, respectively the ability to hold the eye still between them.  
A central node in the neural system controlling visual fixation and saccadic eye movements is 
the superior colliculus (SC) of the midbrain (Scudder, Kaneko, & Fuchs, 2002) (see Figure 3-3). The 
SC receives and integrates input from several neural structures a) involved in the proximate process-
ing of visual information such as the retina and the visual cortex, and b) involved in the programming 
of visual or goal-related behavior such as the parietal eye fields PEF (an area within the posterior pa-
rietal cortex PPC), the frontal eye fields FEF (an area anterior of the motor cortex), the supplementary 
eye fields SEF (an area in the dorsomedial PFC that may be considered an extension of the supple-
mentary motor area SMA), the DLPFC, the basal ganglia, and the cerebellum. Saccades are triggered, 
if activity within saccade neurons in the SC - or upstream cortical eye fields projecting to the SC such 
as the FEF and PEF- reaches a certain saccade initiation threshold that is idiosyncratic for each neu-
ron (Dorris & Munoz, 1998; Dorris, Pare, & Munoz, 1997; Everling, Dorris, Klein, & Munoz, 1999; Ever-
ling & Munoz, 2000; Gold & Shadlen, 2000; Hanes & Schall, 1996; Pare & Hanes, 2003), leading to 
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release of tonic inhibition and generation of a saccadic pulse command in a brainstem saccade gen-
eration network which innervates the six extraocular muscles of the eye. Alternatively, a saccade may 
be generated bypassing the SC by direct input from cortical areas such as the FEF and SEF to the 
brainstem saccade generating network. For more detail on the neural system involved in saccade 
generation based on primate electrophysiological studies, see reviews by Leigh and Kennard (2004) 
or Munoz and Everling (2004).  
With increasing complexity of a saccadic eye movement in terms of its spatial and temporal 
characteristics, more upstream neural structures are involved in its generation (see Figure 3-3). For 
example, primate electrophysiological, and human imaging, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
and lesion studies indicate that visually-guided and express saccades mainly recruit the SC, occipital 
cortex and PPC, while voluntary saccades additionally involve the FEF, and complex voluntary sac-
cades such as antisaccades in addition to the PPC and FEF (where activity levels are enhanced as 
compared to visually-guided saccades), the DLPFC, SEF, SMA, the pre-SMA, ACC, basal ganglia, 
and thalamus (Broerse et al., 2001; for review see Gaymard, Ploner, Rivaud, Vermersch, & Pierrot-
Deseilligny, 1998; Hutton & Ettinger, 2006; Leigh & Kennard, 2004; Munoz & Everling, 2004; Pierrot-
Deseilligny, Ploner, Muri, Gaymard, & Rivaud-Pechoux, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Visual input to the eye movement and visual fixation system is transmitted from the retina to the superficial layers of 
the superior colliculus (SCs) in the midbrain (retinotectal pathway), and via the thalamus (lateral geniculate nucleus LGN) to the 
primary visual cortex (retino-geniculo-cortical pathway). In order to influence motor behavior, the information is further transmit-
ted from the visual cortex to the parietal eye fields (PEF, in primates referred to as intraparietal area LIP), which in turn project 
to the intermediate layers of the superior colliculus (SCi). The SC is a vital node in the premotor eye movement circuit where 
cortical and subcortical signals converge and are integrated. It provides the necessary input to the saccade premotor circuit so 
that a saccade is initiated or suppressed. In addition, the PEF projects to frontal oculomotor areas, including the frontal eye 
fields (FEF), supplementary eye fields (SEF), and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). All of these frontal cortical areas 
project to the SC, and the FEF and SEF in addition project directly to the reticular formation in the brainstem. Moreover, frontal 
cortical oculomotor areas project to the Caudate Nucleus (CN) of the basal ganglia. The CN projects either directly to the Sub-
stantia Nigra pars reticulata (SNpr), which leads to a disinhibition (i.e. activation) of the SCi, or indirectly through the external 
segment of the Globus Pallidus (GPe) and the subthalamic nucleus (STN), which leads to inhibition of the SCi. From Munoz and 
Everling (2004). 
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3.2.1 Neural correlates of antisaccade performance measures 
Different antisaccade parameters have been mapped onto specific neural substrates and cir-
cuits. Below, antisaccade performance parameters informing about the functional state of the neural 
circuit underlying its generation will be outlined in more detail. For more reviews on the neural under-
pinnings of antisaccades, see Munoz and Everling (2004) or Everling and Fischer (1998). 
 
3.2.1.1 Antisaccade error rate 
As mentioned in chapter 3.1, correct antisaccade performance has been proposed to require 
a) the canceling or inhibition of the reflexive saccade triggered by target appearance, to allow time for 
b) a voluntary saccade to be programmed and initiated towards the opposite side of the target (Hallett 
& Adams, 1980; for review see Munoz & Everling, 2004). According to this view, antisaccade errors 
occur if the neural cancellation process is too slow or too weak.  
Neurophysiological evidence supports the proposition of an active cancellation process taking 
place before antisaccade generation. Specifically, saccade neurons in the FEF and SC show de-
creased activity and fixation-neurons in the FEF and SC enhanced activity before correct antisaccades 
as compared to correct prosaccades (Everling et al., 1999; Everling & Munoz, 2000; Munoz & Ever-
ling, 2004). In contrast, high pre-target activity in the SC saccade neurons goes along with increased 
error rates on antisaccade trials (Everling, Dorris, & Munoz, 1998).  
The origin of the inhibitory influence on the FEF and SC on the other hand is still somewhat 
unclear. Brain regions that have been implicated are the DLPFC, SEF, and the basal ganglia (for re-
view see Munoz & Everling, 2004). For example, enhanced neural activity has been demonstrated in 
single-neuron monkey studies in DLPFC neurons before performance of correct antisaccades 
(Funahashi, Chafee, & Goldman-Rakic, 1993), and enhanced neural activity in the SEF before per-
formance of correct antisaccades as compared to correct prosaccades (Amador, Schlag-Rey, & 
Schlag, 2004; Schlag-Rey, Amador, Sanchez, & Schlag, 1997) (see also chapter 3.2.1.2). Likewise, 
imaging studies have shown increased activity in prefrontal cortex regions such as the DLPFC, SEF, 
and ACC before execution of correct antisaccades as compared to prosaccades, or as compared to 
antisaccade direction errors (Connolly, Goodale, Goltz, & Munoz, 2005; Curtis & D'Esposito, 2003; 
DeSouza, Menon, & Everling, 2003; Ford, Goltz, Brown, & Everling, 2005). In addition, clinical, lesion 
and TMS studies demonstrate increased error rates on the antisaccade task after DLPFC and basal 
ganglia impairment. For example, TMS over the DLPFC 100ms before target onset significantly in-
creases antisaccade error rate (Nyffeler et al., 2007), and patients with discrete lesions affecting the 
DLPFC, clinical populations with impairment of the DLPFC respectively the basal ganglia such as 
patients with schizophrenia, Huntington’s and Parkinson’s disease, and patients with lesion of the 
ventrolateral PFC and ACC have been reported to show an increased proportion of direction errors on 
the antisaccade task (for review see Gaymard et al., 1998; Milea, Lobel, Lehericy, Pierrot-Deseilligny, 
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& Berthoz, 2005; Pierrot-Deseilligny et al., 2002; Sweeney et al., 2002). In contrast, lesions of the 
PEF, FEF, or SEF/SMA have not been shown to influence antisaccade error rate (e.g. Gaymard, 
Lynch, Ploner, Condy, & Rivaud-Pechoux, 2003; Gaymard, Pierrot-Deseilligny, & Rivaud, 1990; 
Husain, Parton, Hodgson, Mort, & Rees, 2003; Rivaud, Muri, Gaymard, Vermersch, & Pierrot-
Deseilligny, 1994). 
However, enhanced activity in prefrontal brain regions may also reflect the programming and 
promotion of the correct antisaccade by these areas. Some researchers even have proposed that 
there might be no (active) cancellation process during antisaccade trials, but instead that distinct neu-
ral networks in the DLPFC, SEF, FEF or PEF simultaneously program a visually-guided prosaccade 
and an internally-guided antisaccade, and that the strength of activation first reaching saccade initia-
tion threshold determines which movement will be executed, the other one being cancelled on the go 
(Amador et al., 2004; Massen, 2004; Mokler & Fischer, 1999; e.g. Schlag-Rey et al., 1997). According 
to this view, increased error rates in the antisaccade task may result if the programming of the an-
tisaccade is slower than that of the visually-guided prosaccade, possibly because of a slower increase 
in activity towards the saccade initiation threshold in neurons coding for the antisaccade (Hutton & 
Ettinger, 2006). Whatever the specific executive role of the PFC in antisaccade programming is, i.e. 
inhibition of a reflexive prosaccade and/or promotion of the voluntary antisaccade, PFC function cer-
tainly plays a crucial role in determining antisaccade error rate.  
 
3.2.1.2 Latency 
Saccades are triggered if saccade neurons in the SC or FEF reach a particular activity level 
that is idiosyncratic for each neuron (see also chapter 3.2). Saccade latency thus has been proposed 
to reflect the pre-target activity of neurons capable of triggering a saccade, respectively the rate of rise 
in their post-target activity (for review see Munoz & Everling, 2004). 
For voluntary saccades, movement-related activity within the FEF seems to be essential in de-
termining latency. For example, patients with FEF lesions make correct antisaccades at increased 
latency (Braun, Weber, Mergner, & Schulte-Monting, 1992; Rivaud et al., 1994). Moreover, TMS ap-
plied over the FEF influences the latency of contralateral, memory-guided saccades (Pierrot-
Deseilligny et al., 2002; Wipfli et al., 2001). Finally, monkey single-neuron and human imaging studies 
have shown an inverse correlation between FEF preparatory activity and latency of contralateral vol-
untary saccades, but no such relationship for SEF or PEF pre-target activity (Connolly et al., 2005; 
Everling & Munoz, 2000). In contrast, visually-guided saccades seem to depend on the PEF, respec-
tively SC function. For example, after PEF but not FEF or SEF lesions, latency of visually triggered 
saccades is significantly increased, and SC damage reduces the ability to generate express saccades, 
i.e. visually-guided saccades with very short latencies (Pierrot-Deseilligny, Rivaud, Gaymard, & Agid, 
1991). 
THEORETICAL PART: Saccadic eye movements as a research tool 44 
The origin of the variability of growth of activity in the FEF is not known. It could for example 
be accounted for by the state of neuromodulatory systems (e.g. Aston-Jones, Rajkowski, Kubiak, & 
Alexinsky, 1994), and/or by upstream eye movement areas involved in executive functions such as the 
DLPFC or SEF. Recently, Stuphorn and Schall (2006) could demonstrate a modulatory influence of 
the SEF on saccade performance that depended on task goal. Specifically, subthreshold intracortical 
microstimulation of the monkey SEF lead to better performance on a “stop signal” eye movement task 
by delaying saccade initiation (i.e. increasing latency). In contrast, on a visually-guided control task, 
where no stop signal occurred and no executive function was necessary, SEF microstimulation de-
creased saccade latency. Similar findings of a modulatory influence of the SEF on eye movements 
have been reported by Missal and Heinen (2001), who showed increased velocity and decreased la-
tency of anticipatory smooth pursuit eye movements after microstimulation of the SEF. Such an execu-
tive function of the SEF on voluntary eye movements is consistent with enhanced SEF activity before 
correct antisaccades than prosaccades in monkey studies (Amador et al., 2004; Schlag-Rey et al., 
1997) (see chapter 3.2 above), in imaging studies (Ford et al., 2005; e.g. O'Driscoll et al., 1995; 
Sweeney et al., 1996), and ERP recordings (Everling, Krappmann, Spantekow, & Flohr, 1997; 
Everling, Spantekow, Krappmann, & Flohr, 1998).  
 
3.2.1.3 Metric performance measures 
From a neural perspective, the coding of saccade metrics requires sensorimotor, as well as 
spatiotemporal transformations. Specifically, the location of a target of interest in visual, auditory, 
and/or somatosensory space (the saccade goal) needs to be mapped onto a population of neurons 
with topographically arranged motor fields such that activity in specific neurons out of this population 
codes for a movement towards this specific location. The spatially coded signal subsequently needs to 
be transformed into a motor command that is related temporally to the saccade, i.e. informing the eye 
muscles when to start and when to stop contracting in what intensity to move the fovea to this location 
of interest.  
A large body of evidence points towards an important role of the PPC in sensorimotor trans-
formation, respectively the mapping of saccade targets onto movement-related neurons (for review 
see Andersen, 1995; Munoz & Everling, 2004). For example, many neurons in the intraparietal area 
LIP of the monkey have overlapping visual receptive and motor fields, i.e. these neurons become ac-
tive if a visual target falls in their receptive field, and/or if a movement is planned towards a location in 
this area, with particularly strong activity if both are true, i.e. when the stimulus signals the saccade 
target, as is the case with visually-guided saccades (e.g. Zhang & Barash, 2000, 2004). In addition, 
when the visual stimulus and saccade goal do not match, as is the case with antisaccades, neurons in 
the area LIP respectively its human analogue show a shift in population activity from neurons encoding 
the visual target to those encoding the saccade goal (Zhang & Barash, 2000), respectively from the 
hemisphere contralateral to the stimulus to that contralateral to the target goal (Everling, Dorris et al., 
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1998; Medendorp, Goltz, & Vilis, 2005; Moon et al., 2007). Additional support for a role of PPC in cod-
ing for the saccade target comes from TMS and lesion studies showing saccadic dysmetria with PPC 
dysfunction (Duhamel, Goldberg, Fitzgibbon, Sirigu, & Grafman, 1992; Nyffeler et al., 2005; Pierrot-
Deseilligny et al., 2002; Pierrot-Deseilligny et al., 1991).  
The spatiotemporal transformation of the neural signal coding for saccade amplitude is sup-
posed to take place in the SC and/or cerebellum, both of which project to the brainstem saccade gen-
erating circuit. Yet, as with sensorimotor transformation, the precise neural mechanisms underlying 
spatiotemporal transformation are still being debated (Optican, 2005; for different models and review 
see Scudder et al., 2002; Sparks, 2002). So far, the available evidence points towards a role of the SC 
in initiating the saccadic movement, with the location of SC neurons activated providing initial informa-
tion on the direction and amplitude of the saccade (i.e. spatial coding), and the strength of the activat-
ing pulse coding for its initial velocity, while the cerebellum is involved in adapting the course of the 
saccade to land on its supposed goal by adjusting velocity and providing the accurate stop signal (and 
thus defining saccade amplitude by temporal means), using feedback about the parameters of the 
ongoing saccade (e.g. Optican, 2005; Quaia, Lefevre, & Optican, 1999). In the brainstem, the firing 
pattern of saccade-generation neurons is related temporally to the dynamics of a saccadic eye move-
ment. For example, the duration of activity of these neurons is related to the duration of the saccade, 
their firing rate to its peak velocity, and the overall number of spikes to its amplitude (King, Fuchs, & 
Magnin, 1981; for review see Leigh & Kennard, 2004). 
Finally, although the coding of saccade metrics does not require frontal cortical regions, the 
latter may exert a modulatory influence. For example, TMS over the DLPFC in normal subjects, and 
lesions of the DLPFC, SEF, and FEF have been reported to impair the accuracy and peak velocity of 
voluntary saccades (Dias & Segraves, 1999; Fukushima, Fukushima, Miyasaka, & Yamashita, 1994; 
Husain et al., 2003; Oyachi & Ohtsuka, 1995; Sommer & Tehovnik, 1997).  
 
3.2.1.4 Fixation duration 
During natural viewing, saccades follow fixations and vice versa, i.e. there is an interplay be-
tween saccades that drive the eye to fixate points of interest and select new possible targets for future 
saccades. Accordingly, the neural substrates coding for movement and stopping of the eye are closely 
intertwined: Most areas involved in saccadic eye movements such as the SEF, FEF, PPC, SC, and 
brainstem contain neurons that are active shortly before and during a saccade and neurons that are 
active during fixational eye movements (Everling et al., 1999; Munoz & Everling, 2004; Munoz & 
Wurtz, 1993). These so-called fixation neurons have visual receptive fields that cover the fovea, i.e. 
the part of the retina with highest visual acuity. Activity of fixation neurons helps the eye to remain 
“locked” on an object of interest in the environment: Blockade of fixation neurons in the SC for exam-
ple leads to the generation of saccades to every new stimulus that appears in the environment (Munoz 
& Wurtz, 1993).  
THEORETICAL PART: Saccadic eye movements as a research tool 46 
3.2.1.5 Pupil diameter 
The so far presented measures about the movement or the holding of the eye are ultimately 
under the control of the voluntary motor system. Pupil diameter in contrast is modulated by activity of 
the autonomous nervous system, with complementary functions of its parasympathetic and sympa-
thetic components: While activation of the sympathetic pathway stimulates the radial dilator muscles of 
the pupil, causing enlargement of the pupillary aperture, activation of the parasympathetic efferent to 
the pupil leads to contraction of the sphincter muscles, a band of muscles arranged in circular orienta-
tion around the pupillary margin, causing constriction of the pupillary aperture (for review see Schan-
dry, 1998). Evidence indicates that both autonomous pathways are involved in pupil dilation observed 
under cognitive and emotional demand (see chapter 3.1.1.3), however along different timelines, and 
under differing circumstances. Specifically, under light conditions, high cognitive demand, and/or about 
600 to 900 ms after stimulus onset, pupil dilation is more strongly determined by parasympathetic 
inhibition, while after about 1200 ms and in darkness, activation of the sympathetic pathway may 
cause the pupil diameter to enlarge (e.g. Steinhauer, Siegle, Condray, & Pless, 2004). Both, modula-
tion of the parasympathetic pathway as well as the sympathetic pathway are influenced by corticolim-
bic inputs (for review see Steinhauer & Hakerem, 1992). For example, stimulation of the amygdala 
(Koikegami & Yoshida, 1953) as well as increase in DLPFC activity (Siegle, Steinhauer, Stenger, 
Konecky, & Carter, 2003) leads to increase in pupil dilation. 
 
3.3 Saccadic eye movements in development 
Different antisaccade performance parameters mature along different time lines during child-
hood and adolescence. For example, children below the age of 8 years have great difficulty suppress-
ing reflexive prosaccades towards the target, with two- to three times higher antisaccade error rates 
than adults (Fischer, Biscaldi et al., 1997; C. Klein & Foerster, 2001; Munoz, Broughton, Goldring, & 
Armstrong, 1998). Yet, most children immediately correct the direction errors they have committed, 
indicating that they understand the task and are able generate an antisaccade per se (Munoz et al., 
1998). Antisaccade error rates gradually decrease during adolescence to reach adult level at about 18 
years of age (Fischer, Biscaldi et al., 1997; Fukushima, Hatta, & Fukushima, 2000; Kramer, de Sather, 
& Cassavaugh, 2005; Luna et al., 2001; Munoz et al., 1998). In addition, latency of correct antisac-
cades, of corrective gazes and of prosaccades becomes less variable and decreases overall during 
adolescence, albeit at slightly different timescales: While prosaccade latency reaches adult levels at 
around late childhood/early adolescence, antisaccade latency reaches adult levels later at around 
middle adolescence and shows a greater overall change than prosaccade latency (Fischer, Biscaldi et 
al., 1997; Fukushima et al., 2000; Irving, Steinbach, Lillakas, Babu, & Hutchings, 2006; C. Klein, 2001; 
Kramer et al., 2005; Munoz et al., 1998) (see also Figure 3-4). Finally, in contrast to antisaccade error 
rate and latency, saccade metrics such as peak velocity and amplitude as well as other eye movement 
parameters such as pupil dilation and fixation duration reach adult patterns well before puberty onset 
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(Abel, Troost, & Dell'Osso, 1983; Fukushima et al., 2000; Irving et al., 2006; Karatekin, 2004; Luna et 
al., 2001; Munoz et al., 1998). One study (Irving et al., 2006) showed that peak velocity increases 
during childhood to reach its maximum at age 14, and steadily declines thereafter.  
 
 
Figure 3-4: Age related modulation of saccade parameters in a prosaccade-overlap (i.e. fixation point remains illumi-
nated during target appearance) and antisaccade-gap (i.e. fixation point is turned off before target appearance) para-
digm. The number of subjects is given in the left panel. SRT = saccadic reaction time; PO = prosaccade-overlap; AG = 
antisaccade-gap; %-errors = percent direction errors in the AG task. From Fischer et al. (1997). 
 
The different time lines along which the different antisaccade performance parameters de-
velop have been proposed to reflect the maturational course of their underlying neural substrates. For 
example, increased antisaccade error rates and longer, respectively more variable, pro- and antisac-
cade latency in young subjects relative to adults have been suggested to reflect a weak voluntary sac-
cade initiation system (Fischer, Biscaldi et al., 1997), difficulty in controlling visual attention (Munoz et 
al., 1998), or inability to maintain multiple top-down sets in working memory (e.g. inhibit an eye move-
ment to a salient stimulus and move the eyes in the opposite direction) (Eenshuistra, Ridderinkhof, 
Weidema, & van der Molen, 2007; Kramer et al., 2005), as a function of immature prefrontal executive 
control (e.g. Fukushima et al., 2000; Munoz et al., 1998). Indeed, the first fMRI study comparing neural 
activity during antisaccade performance between adolescents and adults indicated that although ado-
lescents and adults recruit largely the same brain regions during antisaccade performance, adoles-
cents more strongly recruit prefrontal regions such as the DLPFC and inferior FEF, and adults more 
strongly posterior and subcortical brain sites such as the PPC, thalamus, cerebellum, and SC (Luna et 
al., 2001). In addition, the earlier maturation of antisaccade latency as compared to antisaccade error 
rates has been proposed to indicate that these parameters are subserved by different PFC substrates 
that mature along different timelines (C. Klein, 2001; C. Klein & Foerster, 2001). Finally, the earlier 
maturation of saccade metrics has been suggested by the different authors to indicate earlier devel-
opment of sensorimotor neural processing circuits (Luna et al., 2001) respectively the saccade gen-
eration network in the cerebellum and brainstem (Fukushima et al., 2000; Irving et al., 2006; Munoz et 
al., 1998).  
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3.4 Saccadic eye movements in mood and anxiety disorders 
Antisaccades recruit an extensive neural circuit parts of which have been implicated in the 
pathophysiology of several psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, and mood- and anxiety disor-
ders. Thus, investigation of AS task performance in psychiatric patients can not only provide quantifi-
able information about cognitive (dys-) functions in these patient populations, but also allows drawing 
conclusions about the functional state of associated neural circuits.  
However, while a wealth of research has looked at AS task performance in patients with 
schizophrenia (Hutton & Ettinger, 2006; for review see Sweeney et al., 2002), surprisingly few studies 
have investigated AS task performance in mood and anxiety disorders (for review see Broerse et al., 
2001; Sweeney et al., 2002). In addition, most studies investigating AS task performance in mood and 
anxiety disorders have reported inconsistent results. According to a review by Sweeney et al. (2002), 
performance differences might be evident only with large samples of mildly affected individuals, or with 
severely depressed, unmedicated patients. Prior to the data presented in this thesis (Jazbec et al., 
2005), no study has investigated AS task performance in depressed and anxious adolescents. How-
ever, several studies have been done with children and adolescents with ADHD (Goldberg et al., 
2002) and autism (e.g. C. Klein, Raschke, & Brandenbusch, 2003; Munoz, Armstrong, Hampton, & 
Moore, 2003), indicating that the AS task may be useful for investigating brain dysmaturation in multi-
ple neuropsychiatric disorders (Luna & Sweeney, 2004).  
In contrast to the AS task, other eye movement parameters such as fixation duration and pupil 
diameter have been more extensively studied in adult and child mood and anxiety disorders, mostly as 
an index of attentional biases or cognitive demand. In terms of fixation duration, Caseras et al. (2007) 
for example reported that dysphoric individuals engage longer in processing of negative information 
(indexed as longer gaze duration on pictures showing negative scenes such as sadness and loss), 
however not differing from controls in initial attention orientation (indexed as latency of the first fixation) 
(for similar results see Eizenman et al., 2003). In contrast, anxious individuals have been reported to 
exhibit biases in initial orienting, but not in the maintenance of gaze on threat cues (Garner, Mogg, & 
Bradley, 2006; e.g. Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000). To my knowledge, no study has looked at fixation 
duration in anxious or depressed adolescents.  
In terms of pupil dilation, Siegle et al. (2001) have shown that depressed patients engage 
longer than controls in the processing of emotional (positive and negative) information as indexed by 
longer sustained pupil dilation. In contrast, depressed individuals engage less (i.e. have smaller sus-
tained pupil dilation) than controls when processing non-emotional information, such as during per-
formance of the Stroop color-naming task (Siegle, Steinhauer, & Thase, 2004). Interestingly, a recent 
study by Silk et al. (2007) reported that depressed adolescents in contrast to depressed adults show 
decreased sustained pupil dilation to negative information, which was associated with a decrease in 
positive affect and increase in negative affect in the natural environment. In anxiety, there is evidence 
for increased pupil dilation under anticipation of threats, and decreased pupillary constriction to light 
(e.g. Bitsios, Szabadi, & Bradshaw, 2004). 
THEORETICAL PART: Saccadic eye movements as a research tool 49 
3.5 Saccadic eye movements and reward processing 
Incentives influence saccade performance parameters. For example, in non-human primates, 
saccades to a rewarded location are initiated earlier, have faster peak velocities and are more accu-
rate (Kawagoe, Takikawa, & Hikosaka, 1998; Kobayashi, Lauwereyns, Koizumi, Sakagami, & Hiko-
saka, 2002; Takikawa, Kawagoe, Itoh, Nakahara, & Hikosaka, 2002); in humans, the number of cor-
rect antisaccades increases with incentives in adults (Duka & Lupp, 1997). Based on this influence of 
incentives on saccadic eye movements, it has been proposed that “saccadic eye movements can be a 
suitable behavioral measure for studying reinforcement learning and motivation” (Takikawa, Kawagoe, 
Itoh et al., 2002, pg. 284). 
The influence of reward on saccadic eye movements is proposed to be mediated through its 
basal ganglia pathway (Hikosaka, Takikawa, & Kawagoe, 2000), and/or the prefrontal eye movement 
areas such as the DLPFC, SEF and ACC (see also Figure 3-3). Simplified, the basal ganglia pathway 
exerts tonic inhibition on saccade-related neurons in the SC. This inhibition can be released by PFC 
input into the basal ganglia, leading to saccade generation by the SC. Neurons in the basal ganglia 
pathway receive dopaminergic input from the midbrain, which may inform about the significance of 
events (see chapter 2.2.1.1), and have been shown to substantially modulate their firing patterns in 
response to incentives (Lauwereyns, Takikawa et al., 2002; Lauwereyns, Watanabe, Coe, & Hikosaka, 
2002). Also the SEF and ACC receive dopaminergic input from the VTA (Gaspar, Stepniewska, & 
Kaas, 1992), and indeed both have different subpopulations of neurons that show a response pattern 
that varies depending on the outcome of a saccade (i.e. obtain reward, commit an error) (Niki & Wata-
nabe, 1976, 1979; Stuphorn, Taylor, & Schall, 2000). Finally, pharmacological inactivation of DLPFC 
with D1 dopamine antagonists impairs the accuracy of contralateral memory guided saccades in mon-
keys (Sawaguchi & Goldman-Rakic, 1994).  
 
3.6 Synopsis chapter 3 
The antisaccade (AS) task paradigm is uniquely well suited to study the influence of incentives 
on executive cognitive control during normative development and in psychiatric neurodevelopmental 
disorders such as adolescent mood and anxiety disorders, for several reasons:  
1. AS task performance probes different executive cognitive processes such as response in-
hibition and attention allocation. However, in contrast to traditional neuropsychological pa-
per-and-pencil tests, the AS task is simple, requiring only minimal verbal skills, and has 
inputs that can be easily manipulated and outputs that can be measured with precision, 
providing besides global performance measures quantitative information about the tempo-
ral dynamics of task responses (see chapter 3.1).  
2. The neural mechanisms engaged during performance of the AS task have been largely 
delineated in non-human primates, providing a superb tool for translational work, and in 
humans by means of functional imaging, TMS and lesion studies (see chapter 3.2).  
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3. The developmental trajectories of the AS task paradigm have been well characterized in 
humans, allowing a baseline against which to compare performance of pediatric patients 
(see chapter 3.3). In addition, the AS task is non-invasive, and can be easily combined 
with fMRI research, an advantage in the study of pediatric populations. 
4. Many psychiatric disorders such as mood and anxiety disorders are associated with ab-
normalities in brain structures engaged during performance of the AS task. Performance 
on the AS task thus can inform about the functional status of associated brain systems in 
patients with mood and anxiety disorders, respectively about the dysmaturation of these 
brain systems in pediatric patients (see chapter 3.4). 
5. Finally, studies of reward processes using saccadic eye movements have already been 
conducted in non-human primates and in human adults, providing a basis for forming hy-
potheses and interpreting findings. 
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4.  Summary and hypotheses 
Behaviorally, adolescence is a time period of heightened “storm and stress”, characterized by 
an increase in impulsive behaviors, emotional turmoil, and an increase in prevalence of psychiatric 
disorders such as mood and anxiety disorders with their high continuity into adulthood and severe 
implications for later psychosocial functioning (see chapter 1). Neurally, adolescence is characterized 
by profound structural and functional reorganization of brain systems involved in the regulatory top-
down control of affective states and behaviors (see chapter 2.1). Developmental neuroscientists have 
tried to link the behavioral and neural characteristics of the adolescent age span, proposing that the 
slow maturation of regulatory brain mechanisms during adolescence leads to a temporary time span in 
which impulses and affects – intensified by the surge of hormones at puberty - exert disproportional 
influence on adolescent behavior, leading to externalizing (see chapter 2.2) and/or internalizing (see 
chapter 2.3) adjustment problems, and in some instances in conjunction with genetic predispositions 
and/or environmental stressors to the development of mood and anxiety disorders and increased risk 
for suffering from these disorders in adulthood. Thus, research investigating adolescent brain matura-
tion and cognitive regulatory control may not only help our understanding of adolescent normative 
behavioral propensities, but also advance our knowledge of pathogenic factors involved in the devel-
opment of adult mood and anxiety disorders, eventually leading to the design of earlier, and more 
focused treatment strategies (Cicchetti & Posner, 2005; R. J. Davidson et al., 2002).  
To further advance the developmental cognitive neuroscience approach on the research of 
normative adolescence and adolescent mood and anxiety disorders, dissociable behavioral compo-
nents need to be identified that show peculiarities in these populations and that can be mapped onto 
specific neural correlates (Ernst et al., 2006; Forbes & Dahl, 2005; Hasler, Drevets, Manji, & Charney, 
2004; Pine, 2007). One such promising approach is the study of the influence of incentives on cogni-
tive control processes during adolescence (see synopsis chapter 2). However, prior to the data pre-
sented in this thesis (Jazbec et al., 2005), no research employing basic neuroscience measures has 
directly examined the association between adolescent affective disorders and reward-related informa-
tion processing (see chapter 2.2.3), and neuroscience-based research addressing reward-processing 
in healthy adolescents are predominantly based on fMRI studies which to date have reported inconsis-
tent results (for review see chapter 2.2.2). 
To fill this gap, a behavioral task was developed to probe the influence of incentives (obtain 
reward, avoid punishment) on cognitive regulatory control (attention allocation, response inhibition) in 
pediatric populations, employing basic neuroscience measures. Saccadic eye movements offer them-
selves as a complementary neuroscience-based investigational means to fMRI studies, since they can 
be integrated in paradigms testing executive cognitive processes, are sensitive to incentive manipula-
tion, and finally provide quantitative and easily measurable information on the temporal characteristics 
of information processing which can be mapped onto well delineated neural circuits (see chapter 3).  
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Thus, a saccadic eye movement task, the Reward Saccade Task (RST) was developed that 
investigated saccadic eye movements of differing cognitive demand (i.e. antisaccades versus prosac-
cades) under different incentive conditions (reward condition: obtain monetary gain with correct per-
formance, punishment condition: monetary loss with incorrect performance, neutral condition: no 
monetary consequence of task performance), in development (comparison of healthy adolescents and 
adults) and in mood and anxiety disorders (comparison of healthy adolescents and adolescents with a 
mood and/or anxiety disorder). The effect of incentives was measured at two stages of the task, during 
task performance (work to obtain reward), and during outcome notification (processing of outcome). 
The following hypotheses were addressed:  
 
Developmental focus 
1. Task performance improves with age: Adults will perform better than adolescents under high cog-
nitive demand. Specifically, in line with previous research on saccadic eye movements (see chap-
ter 3.3) it is hypothesized that adults will have lower antisaccade error rates and initiate correct an-
tisaccades faster in the RST than adolescents. After an antisaccade direction error, adults will be 
able to more quickly shift attention to initiate a corrective saccade than adolescents. In contrast, 
saccade measures that are independent of prefrontal function such as saccade duration and am-
plitude will not differ between age groups. 
2. Incentives improve task performance: Rewards are stimuli which an organism puts forth effort to 
obtain, and punishments are stimuli which he puts effort to avoid (see chapter 2.2.1). Primate 
studies have shown a facilitatory effect of incentives on saccade performance (see chapter 3.5). 
Thus, it is hypothesized that there will be better performance on the RST across groups on trials 
with incentives than on neutral trials; this will be evident in all measures of task performance, on 
global (better accuracy) as well as dynamic performance measures (shorter saccade latency, 
faster saccade peak velocity). 
3. Adolescents will show stronger modulation of task performance by incentives than adults:  
a. Adolescents have been reported to be more sensitive to rewards than adults (see chapter 
2.2.2). It is thus hypothesized that adolescents will show stronger within-group modulation of 
task performance by incentives than adults.  
b. Findings from fMRI studies suggest that recruitment of cognitive control as a major function of 
the prefrontal cortex (for review see chapter 2.1.2) may normalize function of subcortical brain 
regions mediating affective states and impulses (e.g. Monk et al., 2008). Thus, it is hypothe-
sized that the influence of incentives will be stronger for conditions of low cognitive control, i.e. 
it will be greater for correct prosaccades and antisaccade direction errors than antisaccades.  
4. Adolescents will be less affected by negative feedback than adults. It has been proposed that 
adolescents are less sensitive to punishments than adults (see chapter 2.2.2). Processing of af-
fective information is reflected in pupil diameter, pupil dilation and fixation duration (see chapter 
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3.2.1). Thus it is hypothesized that adolescents will have smaller changes in pupil diameter and/or 
in fixation duration between incentive and neutral trials as compared to adults. 
 
Clinical focus 
1. Diagnostic state will not influence task performance: Given that differences in (anti-) saccade per-
formance between patients with depression and controls have only been reported for adults with 
severe depression (see chapter 3.4), it is hypothesized that adolescents with MDD and adoles-
cents with anxiety will not differ from controls in antisaccade performance per se.  
2. Depressed and anxious adolescents will show different modulation by incentives than healthy 
adolescents:  
a. Depressed adolescents have been proposed to suffer from anhedonia (see chapter 2.2.3), 
which can be operationalized as decreased effort to obtain positive outcomes, i.e. obtain 
rewards and avoid punishments (see chapters 2.2.1). In the RST, adolescents with MDD 
are thus hypothesized to show a weaker modulation (improvement) of task performance 
by incentives as compared to controls.  
b. Anxious adolescents have been reported to be hypersensitive to punishment and to ex-
hibit an attentional bias for negative information (see chapter 2.2.3). During the RST, it is 
hypothesized that adolescents with anxiety will show an attentional bias for punishment 
trials as compared to neutral trials. This will specifically be reflected in better performance 
in patients with anxiety on punishment trials (i.e. better accuracy, earlier saccade laten-
cies) as compared to neutral trials and as compared to controls.  
3. Depressed and anxious adolescents will respond differently to feedback than controls:  
a. Depressed adolescents will be less responsive to positive outcomes than controls, as in-
dexed by shorter fixation duration and smaller pupil dilation for positive feedback as com-
pared to negative feedback and as compared to controls. 
b. Anxious adolescents will avoid negative information more strongly than controls, as in-
dexed by shorter fixation duration and smaller pupil dilation during notification of negative 
feedback. 
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III. EMPIRICAL PART 
5.  Methods 
5.1 Participants 
90 subjects were included in this study, 30 healthy adults (18m/12f; 28.09 ± 5.84 years), 32 
healthy adolescents (17m/15f; 13.70 ± 2.19 years), 16 adolescents with an anxiety disorder (10m/6f; 
12.44 ± 1.96 years), and 12 adolescent with a primary diagnosis of MDD (5m/7f; 14.15 ± 2.27 years). 
Groups did not differ in the proportion of sex (χ2df=3 = 1.567, p = 0.667), and the three adolescent 
groups did not differ significantly in age (F1,57 = 2.62, p = 0.082). Comorbid disorders within the anxiety 
spectrum and/or with MDD were common (see Table 5-1). For example, of the 12 adolescents with 
primary MDD, one third had a secondary comorbid anxiety disorder.  
Prior entering the study, all participants were tested for IQ with the Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence (WASI, Wechsler, 1999). Groups did not differ in IQ (adults 116.5 ± 11.5; control 
adolescents 112.6 ± 13.1; anxious patients 112 ± 14.4, depressed adolescents 107.5 ± 18.0; F3,71 = 
1.15, p = 0.336). In addition, subjects were assessed through semi-structured psychiatric interviews, 
adolescents through the Kiddie Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia for School-Age 
Children (K-SADS-PL, Kaufman et al., 1997), adults through the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-
IV (SCID, Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & First, 1992). Clinical evaluation was performed by experienced 
clinicians who each had demonstrated acceptable inter-rater reliability (kappa > 0.75, Cohen, 1960) for 
all relevant diagnoses. This interrater reliability was set by NIH intern standards. Reliability was ascer-
tained based on scoring of videotaped interviews that senior investigators had performed.  
Inclusion criteria for healthy subjects were age between 9 and 17 years for adolescents and 
between 18 and 40 years for adults. Exclusion criteria were 1) presence of acute or chronic medical 
problems, 2) pregnancy, 3) current or past psychiatric disorders or 4) mental retardation (IQ < 70). 
Inclusion criteria for patients were 1) age between 9 and 17 years; 2) a primary DSM-IV diagnosis of 
an anxiety or major depressive disorder by semi-structured diagnostic interview (K-SADS-PL, Kauf-
man et al., 1997); 3) elevated symptoms on the Child Depression Rating Scale (CDRS-R > 39, 
Poznanski et al., 1984) for participants with a primary diagnosis of major depressive disorder, and 
elevated symptoms on the Pediatric Anxiety Rating Scale score (PARS > 10, Walkup & Davies, 1999) 
for participants with an anxiety disorder. Exclusion criteria were 1) treatment with any psychotropic 
medications for one month (two months for fluoxetine); 2) acute or chronic medical problems; 3) se-
vere trauma history, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), mania, psychosis, pervasive developmen-
tal disorder, or attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) that requires treatment; 4) mental retar-
dation (IQ < 70).  
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Table 5-1: Summary of diagnoses per patient included in the study (N = 28). SepAD: Separation Anxiety Disorder; SoP: Social 
Phobia; GAD: Generalized Anxiety Disorder; AgPh: Agoraphobia; SpecPh: Specific Phobias; OCD: Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder; MDD: Major Depressive Disorder; ADHD: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Opp: Oppositional Defiant Disorder, 
Tic: Tic Disorder. 
 
VP# SepAD  SoP GAD AgPh / SpecPh OCD MDD ADHD Opp Tic 
1 x x        
2      x    
3  x x   x x   
4  x  x  x    
5  x    x x x  
6   x       
7 x x x x      
8      x    
9 x x        
10      x    
11   x       
12 x x     x   
13 x  x       
14   x    x   
15 x  x x   x x  
16   x    x   
17      x    
18 x x    x  x  
19  x        
20 x         
21      x    
22     x     
23 x  x       
24      x    
25      x    
26      x   x 
27 x         
28  x        
All 10 10 8 3 1 12 6 3 1 
 
Healthy adults and adolescents were recruited through advertisements, contacts with medical 
organizations and word of mouth, patients were recruited when they sought treatment for an acute 
mood and/or anxiety disorder. The Institutional Review Board of the National Institute of Mental Health 
approved this study. Adults and parents of adolescent participants gave written informed consent, 
adolescents written assent prior to participation, after the study was fully explained and all questions 
answered. Immediately following assessment and testing, all patients were provided treatment. Eye 
movement testing was only one part of this study, which consisted of three visits each lasting between 
2 to 4 hours. During the first visit, the study was explained, subjects consented and assessed regard-
ing their physical health, IQ and diagnostic status. During the second visit, different paper-and-pencil 
tests and computer tasks were performed, one of them the eye movement task presented here. During 
the third visit, one of the computer tasks performed during visit two was repeated in an fMRI environ-
ment. Results of one of these tasks investigating brain activation during risk-taking in healthy adoles-
cents was published in 2005 (Ernst et al., 2005) (see also chapter 2.2.2.2). 
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5.2 Procedures 
Prior to performing the eye movement task, all subjects filled out the Spielberger State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger, 1983), adult subjects the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, Beck, 
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) and adolescents the Children's Depression Inventory 
(Helsel & Matson, 1984; CDI, Kovacs, 1982) in order to obtain a measure of current anxiety and mood 
levels. Subjects were then thoroughly trained on the eye movement task with printouts of the different 
task scenarios, and again after being set up for eye movement recording. Thorough training was con-
ducted in order to prevent learning effects during task performance, to accustom subjects to the eye 
movement recording apparatus and to check for quality of eye calibration. After completion of the task, 
subjects filled out a debriefing questionnaire (see Appendix I).  
 
5.2.1 Reward Saccade Task 
For the purpose of testing the influence of incentives on cognitive control, an eye movement 
task, the so called “Reward Saccade Task” RST, was developed in which eye movements of differing 
cognitive difficulty (i.e. prosaccades and antisaccades) were to be performed under three incentive 
conditions: potential monetary gain, potential monetary loss and no monetary incentive.  
Each trial of the task was comprised of three periods that allowed for the separate examination 
of distinct components of reward-related information processing such as motivation to work for reward, 
or response to outcome: (1) Initial cue period (1250-1750 ms), which informed subjects about the va-
lence (reward, punishment, or neutral) of the trial and type of eye movement required (prosaccade or 
antisaccade); (2) the target or performance period (1850 ms), which prompted subjects to perform the 
required saccadic eye movement; (3) and the feedback period (1000 ms), during which participants 
were informed on the accuracy of their response and monetary outcome (see Figure 5-1).  
Cue Period: Each trial began with presentation of one of 6 differently shaped and colored cues 
displayed at the center of a black computer screen, subtending approximately 0.5º visual angle. The 
shape of the cue indicated the valence of the trial: a plus sign (“+”) signaled a $1.00 monetary gain for 
subsequent correct performance, or no gain for incorrect performance (reward condition); a minus sign 
(“-“) signaled a $1.00 monetary loss for subsequent incorrect performance, or no loss for correct per-
formance (punishment condition); and a circle (“o”) signaled no monetary consequences irrespective 
of subsequent performance (neutral condition). The color of the cue indicated the type of eye move-
ment required in response to the subsequent appearance of the target: White cues required perform-
ance of a prosaccade (i.e., an eye movement towards the target), and gray cues required performance 
of an antisaccade (i.e., an eye movement to the mirror position of the target).  
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Figure 5-1: Reward Saccade Task paradigm: A cue (1250 to 1750 ms duration) is presented at the center of a black computer 
screen at onset of each trial. The cue indicates the type of trial (gray for antisaccade and white for prosaccade) and the incen-
tive condition of the trial (‘o’ = neutral, ‘+’ = gain, and ‘-‘ = loss). As the cue disappears, a target appears for a duration of 100ms 
on the right or left side of the screen. 1850 ms after target onset, accuracy feedback is provided for 1000ms duration. As the 
feedback disappears, the next trial starts with appearance of the cue. 
 
Target Period: After a variable period of 1250-1750ms, the central cue was replaced by the 
target stimulus, a white asterix (“*”) subtending 0.5º visual angle located approximately 6.15º eccentric-
ity on the horizontal meridian either to the left or the right from the middle of the task screen and pre-
sented for a duration of 100ms. To succeed on a trial, subjects had to shift their gaze within 500ms 
after appearance of the target to the correct location, defined as an area of 60 pixels radius around the 
target in case of prosaccade trials or its mirror location in case of antisaccade trials, and to keep it 
there for at least 100ms (see Figure 5-2). Of note, criteria for performing well on the task differed from 
accuracy criteria employed for analysis (see chapter 5.3.2.1).  
Feedback Period: After 1850ms duration, feedback appeared at the location where the subject 
was supposed to have gazed, i.e. at the location of the target in prosaccade trials, or at the mirror 
location of the target in antisaccade trials. It was presented in form of dollar amounts (+ $1.00, - $1.00, 
$0.00) subtending approximately 1.8º visual angle, printed in green font for a correct response and in 
red font for an incorrect response. 
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Figure 5-2: Accuracy definition for task performance: To succeed on a trial, subjects had to shift their gaze 
within 500ms after appearance of the target to the correct location, defined as an area of 60 pixels radius (de-
picted as yellow circle) around the target in case of prosaccade trials or around its mirror location in case of an-
tisaccade trials, and to leave it there for at least 100ms. 
 
The task consisted of 3 runs of 4 minutes duration each. Each run comprised 48 active trials, 
with 4 trials per side (right, left) and condition (antisaccade-reward, antisaccade-punishment, antisac-
cade-neutral, prosaccade-reward, prosaccade-punishment, and prosaccade-neutral) (see Table 5-2). 
In addition, each run comprised 4 blank trials, in which no stimuli were displayed. The different types 
of trials were presented randomly per run.  
 
Table 5-2: Trials per condition, saccade type and side of the screen. 
 
 Antisaccade Prosaccade 
 Condition Right Left Right Side Total 
+ 4 4 4 4 16 
- 4 4 4 4 16 
o 4 4 4 4 16 
blank  4 
One run 
All 12 12 12 12 52 
+ 12 12 12 12 52 
- 12 12 12 12 52 
O 12 12 12 12 52 
blank  12 
Task  
(3 runs)  
All 36 36 36 36 156 
 
Subjects started with 0.00$ and could win up to 48.00$. Adults won on average 32.8 ± 8.3$, 
control adolescents won on average 23.7 ± 10.3$, anxious patients won on average 21.9 ± 11.4$, and 
patients with MDD won on average 25.1 ± 14.0$. An univariate ANOVA revealed a significant differ-
ence between groups in terms of money won (F3,86 = 5.43, p = 0.002), with post-hoc Scheffé tests 
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indicating that adults earned significantly more money than healthy adolescents (p = 0.012) and ado-
lescents with an anxiety disorder (p = 0.012), but not as compared to adolescents with MDD (p = 
0.209). The three adolescent groups did not differ in terms of money won. Participants were told that 
they would receive the dollar amount they won, and were sent a check after the completion of the 
study. 
 
5.2.2 Recording 
Eye movements were measured with an ASL Model 504 eye tracking system (Applied Science 
Laboratories [ASL], Boston, MA). This eye tracking system uses a corneal reflection method with 
bright pupil technology: The point-of-gaze is determined by relating the corneal reflection of an infrared 
beam that is projected to the eye, to the center of the illuminated pupil rotating with each eye move-
ment. For this purpose, an auto-focus eye camera and eye illuminator (infrared beam) are contained in 
a pan-tilt module that automatically moves the camera and illuminator to follow the subjects head. 
Recordings were taken from the right eye only. 
A magnetic head tracker placed behind the subject tracked the position of its head within a 
specified field by means of a small magnetic sensor that was attached to a baseball hat above the 
subject’s eye (for experimental set-up, see Figure 5-3). Spatial accuracy of this eye tracker is 0.25º 
visual angle. The range within which valid data can be obtained is 50º visual angle (± 25º) horizontally 
and 35º visual angle (+ 25º to - 10º) vertically. Sampling rate is 60Hz.  
The use of a magnetic head tracker and an auto-focusing lens minimized the possibility of arti-
facts due to head movements. Nevertheless, participants were instructed to remain still, and a chin 
rest was employed unless the subject asked not to. Differences in eye-screen distance emerging 
across subjects were corrected for in the off-line analysis of the raw data. The average distance from 
the eye to the screen was 66.6 ± 5.2cm (adults: 67.7 ± 5.8cm; control adolescents: 66.5 ± 5.2cm, pa-
tients with anxiety disorders: 65.2 ± 3.2cm, patients with MDD: 66.1 ± 5.9cm), with no significant dif-
ference between groups (F3,86 = 0.88, p = 0.455).  
Following task instructions, subjects were seated in front of the task computer screen and a 9-
point eye calibration was performed. Calibration was repeated between task runs as needed. Re-
cordings were obtained in a room lit by standard overhead fluorescent lights. 
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Figure 5-3: Model 504 Eye Tracking system setup with Magnetic Head tracker 
(adapted from the system setup and operations manual by ASL, version 2.4, 2001). 
 
5.3 Analyses 
5.3.1 Data preparation 
The raw eye movement data were analyzed off-line. Data on fixations and pupil diameter were 
extracted from the raw data using software provided by the eye tracking equipment producer (“EYE-
NAL” by Applied Science Laboratories). Data on saccadic eye movements were extracted from the 
raw data using a MATLAB-based (Mathworks, Natick, MA) program (“ILAB”) developed by D. Gitel-
man from the Northwestern University in Chicago (Gitelman, 2002). 
 
5.3.1.1 Fixation parameters 
EYENAL uses an algorithm that identifies a fixation when the point of regard does not change 
by more than 1° visual angle for 6 or more consecutive data samples. Specifically, fixation onset is 
defined as the first data sample in a row of 6 or more consecutive data samples during which the point 
of regard has a standard deviation of below 0.5° visual angle. Fixation offset is defined as the first data 
sample in a row of 3 consecutive data samples that are further than 1° visual angle from the initial 
fixation position. With a sampling rate of 60Hz, these criteria lead to minimal fixation duration of 100ms 
(i.e. 6x16.67ms). Fixation duration after feedback onset was considered for analysis if the fixation had 
a maximal duration of 1.5sec, which was the case for 93.7% of all fixations analyzed (mean + 2*std = 
0.60 + 0.98s). Pupil diameter is given by EYENAL per fixation in pixels and had to be converted to mm 
based on a scale factor that depends on the magnification of the eye camera lens and distance from 
the eye to the computer screen of each subject.  
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5.3.1.2 Saccade parameters 
ILAB identifies saccades based on an algorithm developed by Fischer, Gezeck, and Hartnegg 
(1997; Gitelman, 2002). According to this algorithm, saccade onset is set at the time point at which 
saccade velocity reaches 30deg/second, and saccade offset at the time point at which it decreases to 
15% of its peak. Saccade duration and latency can be evaluated based on the temporal characteris-
tics of the saccadic eye movement, with saccade duration being the time difference between saccade 
on- and offset, and saccade latency the time difference between target and saccade onset. Saccade 
direction and amplitude can be evaluated based on the eye position difference between the start and 
end point coordinates of the saccade (for a graphic illustration of saccade parameter identification by 
ILAB, see Figure 5-4). Saccade amplitude was measured in degree (°) visual angle, i.e. the distance 
the eye travels between saccade on- and offset. All data points within an identified saccade with incor-
rect position information (i.e. coordinates outside the boundaries of the computer screen) or during 
which the pupillary signal was lost were considered as blink artifacts and the missing data intervals 
were interpolated.  
All first saccades after target onset identified were selected for analysis according to the fol-
lowing criteria: a) the saccadic eye movement had to be directed either to the left or right side of the 
screen (i.e. to or away from the target), b) had to have an amplitude greater than 1.5° visual angle or 
smaller than 17° visual angle, and c) had to be initiated within 0 and 700ms after target onset. The 
lower spatial limit of 1.5° visual angle was set in order to exclude fixational eye movements such as 
tremor, drifts or fixational microsaccades which rarely are larger than 1° visual angle (e.g. Fischer, 
1999, Conde et al., 2004). The upper spatial limit of 17° visual angle was set in order to exclude out-
liers, with 99% of all first saccades after target onset across all subjects being smaller than 17° visual 
angle (mean + 2*std = 5.51 + 10.71° visual angle). The time limits were defined a priori based on rec-
ommendations by Fischer et al. (1997) assuming that responses above 700ms can not be considered 
true reactions to a task stimulus (see also Fischer & Weber, 1992; or Klein et al. 2003, 2001, and 2004 
using an upper temporal limit of 700ms in their developmental and clinical eye movement studies in 
children with ADHD). In the current study, 97% of all responses across all subjects had a latency be-
low 700ms (mean + 2*std = 248.02 + 399.92ms). All first saccades that met criteria for analysis were 
further segregated into three latency categories based on recommendations by Fischer et al. (1997). 
According to these recommendations, saccades initiated between 0 and 80ms after target onset are 
considered as anticipatory responses, saccades initiated within 80 and 135 ms as express responses, 
and saccades with latencies between 135 and 700ms as regular saccades (for review see Fischer, 
1999). While anticipatory saccades were not analyzed further in terms of their spatial and temporal 
characteristics, express and regular saccades were pooled for further analysis since both can be con-
sidered true reactions to the target stimuli.  
All second saccades after target onset were included in the analysis if they a) occurred after a 
primary saccade under the antisaccade instruction that fulfilled the above criteria and was directed to 
the wrong side of the screen, b) had greater amplitudes than the primary incorrect saccade, c) were 
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directed to the correct side of the screen, and d) had latency below 1850ms. The temporal limit of 
1850ms was given by feedback onset occurring 1850ms after target onset (see Figure 5-1).  
 
 
Figure 5-4: Graphic illustration of saccadic eye movement identification and characterization by ILAB (Gitelman, 2002).  
Top panel: eye position graph during one trial of the RST task, x-axis horizontal eye position coordinates in pixels, y-axis vertical 
eye position coordinates in pixels, screen size 600X800 pixels. Blue traces indicate eye position coordinates before target on-
set, pink traces eye position coordinates after target onset. The green dot indicates the eye position at the start of the trial, the 
red dot the eye position at the end of the trial. Depicted is an antisaccade trial in which the subject first erroneously looked at the 
target (left side of the screen) after which he initiated a corrective gaze towards the opposite side of the target (right side of the 
screen).  
Middle panel: Horizontal eye position in degrees visual angle versus time of the RST trial depicted in the top panel, x-axis time 
in seconds, y-axis degree visual angle. Target onset is indicated by the vertical green line at about 1.6 seconds after cue onset. 
Blue traces indicate eye position before target onset, pink traces eye position after target onset. 
Bottom panel: Velocity plot of the eye movement data shown in the top and middle panel, x-axis time in seconds, y-axis velocity 
in degrees visual angle per second. Identified saccades are colored in red, their beginnings and endings by triangles, and their 
peak by an asterix.  
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5.3.2 Statistics 
Two studies were performed, a) a developmental study investigating the influence of incen-
tives on cognitive control in adolescents versus adults and b) a clinical study investigating the influ-
ence of incentives on cognitive control in adolescent mood and anxiety disorders. To this aim, the 
influence of the three incentive conditions (potential reward, potential punishment, and neutral) on 
global and dynamic characteristics of saccadic eye movements of differing cognitive demands (an-
tisaccades, prosaccades, and corrective saccades after direction errors) was evaluated. In addition, 
response to outcome notification was evaluated based on duration of the first fixation after feedback 
onset and pupil diameter during this fixation as a supplementary index of reward-processing that 
should be more closely related to consummatory behavior. Data was analyzed using SPSS Version 
11.5.1 (SPSS Inc.). 
 
5.3.2.1 Dependant Variables Performance Period 
To investigate the effect of incentives on task performance, saccadic responses after target 
onset were stratified by trial instruction (antisaccade, prosaccade), accuracy (correct, direction errors), 
and valence (reward, punishment, neutral condition). Saccades were classified as correct if they were 
directed to the correct side of the screen (to the target in case of prosaccades, to the mirror location of 
the target in case of antisaccades), and as direction errors if they were directed to the incorrect side of 
the screen (to the target during antisaccade trial, to the mirror location of the target in case of prosac-
cade trials). Thus, accuracy criteria differed during actual task performance and during analysis: Dur-
ing task performance, subjects achieved a positive outcome also if they corrected an initial incorrect 
saccade as long as it happened within 500ms after target onset, while in the analysis the direction of 
the first saccade determined accuracy. For examples of different accuracy scenarios, see Appendix II, 
Figure 10-1. Since there was too little data for the analysis of prosaccade direction errors - 10.1% of all 
recorded direction errors across all subjects occurred during prosaccade trials, and 89.9% during an-
tisaccade trials (see also Appendix II, Figure 10-3) - only correct pro- and antisaccades, and antisac-
cade direction errors were analyzed. In addition, corrective saccades after an antisaccade direction 
error were analyzed as an additional index of cognitive control (e.g. initiation of voluntary saccade and 
error monitoring).  
All of the resulting 12 saccade scenarios were characterized by their frequency, latency, peak 
velocity, amplitude and duration (see Figure 5-5). Frequency was indicated as the proportion of sac-
cadic eye movements of a specific scenario relative to all responses recorded for the given instruction 
type. For example, percent correct antisaccades during the punishment condition was obtained by 
dividing the number of all correct antisaccades during the punishment condition of a specific subject by 
the total number of responses recorded during the antisaccade instruction for this subject, i.e. inde-
pendent of accuracy and incentive condition. Percent corrected antisaccade direction errors were ob-
tained by dividing the number of corrected antisaccade direction errors in each incentive condition by 
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the total number of antisaccade direction errors committed during the task. Latency was defined as the 
time span between target onset and onset of the first saccade in response to it, respectively for correc-
tive saccades as the time span between offset of the first saccade and onset of the corrective sac-
cade. 
 
 
Figure 5-5: All saccadic eye movements of interest (correct prosaccades, correct antisaccades, antisaccade direc-
tion errors and corrected antisaccade direction errors) were characterized for each incentive condition (reward, 
punishment, neutral) separately by their frequency, saccade latency, peak velocity, amplitude and duration.  
 
5.3.2.2 Dependant Variables Outcome notification period 
For analysis of response to the different trial outcomes (i.e. winning or not winning 1$, losing 
or not losing 1$, no monetary consequence), data was stratified per outcome notification (false, true) 
and valence (reward, punishment, neutral). Of note, outcome was based on performance accuracy 
criteria as employed during the task (i.e. correct gaze within 500ms after target onset), and not as 
defined for analysis in the target phase (correct direction of the first saccade after target onset).  
Each scenario was characterized by pupil diameter, change in pupil diameter (i.e. pupil dila-
tion) after feedback display, and duration of this fixation (see Figure 5-6). Pupil dilation was obtained 
by subtracting the mean pupil diameter during the last fixation before feedback onset, from the mean 
pupil diameter obtained during the first fixation after feedback onset, for each incentive condition, and 
for each subject. Only those responses were included in the analysis where subjects gazed at the 
same side of the screen as the feedback was displayed.  
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Figure 5-6: All fixations directed at feedback were characterized for each valence condition (reward, punishment, 
neutral) separately by their duration and the change in pupil diameter. 
 
5.3.2.3 Statistical Procedures 
5.3.2.3.1 Analysis of Variance 
Eye movement parameters were analyzed with a series of univariate repeated measures 
Analysis of Variance based on the general linear model method (GLM). Between subjects factors were 
age (adults vs. adolescents) for the developmental study and diagnosis (healthy adolescents vs. pa-
tients with anxiety disorder vs. patients with MDD as primary diagnosis) for the clinical study. Within 
subject (repeated measures) factor for both, developmental and clinical studies was incentives (re-
ward condition vs. punishment condition vs. neutral condition). To test if the influence of contingencies 
differed depending on the level of required cognitive control, an additional within subject factor in the 
performance period analysis was type (correct prosaccades vs. correct antisaccades). Antisaccade 
direction errors and corrective saccades after direction errors were not included into the within subject 
factor type because they are related to antisaccade trial performance and/or capture distinct cognitive 
processes (i.e. error monitoring). For the analysis of the outcome notification period, an additional 
within subject factor besides incentives was feedback (positive vs. negative feedback). For within sub-
ject effects and interactions, Roy’s largest root multivariate test statistic was employed which has been 
shown to have superior power relative to other commonly used test statistics such as the Pillai-Bartlett 
trace test in a concentrated noncentrality data structure, i.e. in a data structure where the means of the 
dependant variables are expected to capture a common dimension (such as responsiveness to differ-
ent types of contingencies) (for review see Olson, 1976).  
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5.3.2.3.2 Post-hoc analyses 
Significant main effects of the between subjects factor diagnosis were followed up by post-hoc 
Scheffé tests. For significant main effects of the between subjects factor age, no post-hoc tests were 
necessary since this variable included only two levels.  
To explore significant main effects and interactions of the within subject factors incentives, 
type and feedback, post-hoc independent t-tests (between the two age groups in the developmental 
study, between any two of the three diagnostic groups in the clinical study) were performed for nor-
mally distributed dependent variables, and the Mann-Whitney tests for not normally distributed vari-
ables. To test differences between different incentive conditions, types of saccadic responses, or types 
of feedback, paired sample t-tests for normally distributed dependent variables respectively Wilcoxon 
tests for not normally distributed variables were performed. Normal distribution of dependent variables 
per subject group was tested using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. 
 
5.3.2.3.3 Significance level 
All conclusions of the Analysis of Variance are based on an a priori α of 0.05 unless Levene 
tests indicated inhomogeneous variances between groups of each study, in which case significance 
level was lowered to 0.025. However, trends, defined as a significance level below 0.10 (i.e. Luciana 
et al., 2005) were followed up if considered of relevance for the hypotheses of this study.  
T-tests were tested oneway except if otherwise explicitly stated. For multiple post-hoc analy-
sis, the significance level was lowered according to the Bonferroni correction (α’ = α / [#of compari-
sons]).  
 
5.3.2.3.4 Effect size calculation 
To measure the strength of the relationship between independent and dependent variables, 
effect sizes were determined for any significant effect or trend reported. For Analysis of Variance, ήp2 
was indicated, which is calculated by SPSS and defined as the ratio of the effect variance to the effect 
and its error variance, i.e. ήp2 = s2effect/ (s2effect + s2error for effect) (Cohen, 1988). According to Cohen 
(1988), a ή2 of 0.01 can be considered a small effect, a ή2 of 0.06 can be considered a medium effect, 
and ή2 of 0.14 a large effect. According to Barnette (2006), ήp2 is interpreted in the same way as ή2.  
For post-hoc independent sample t-tests, Cohen’s d was calculated as the mean of the de-
pendant variable in the first subject group minus the mean of the dependant variable in the second 
subject group, divided by the pooled standard deviation of both samples (i.e. the square root of the 
average of the two squared standard deviations), i.e. d = 21 xx − /√[(σ12 + σ22)/2] (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 
1996). For paired-sample t-tests, Cohen’s dz was calculated as the mean of the first measurement in 
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one sample minus the mean of the second measurement in this sample, divided by the standard de-
viation of the difference of those means, i.e. dz = dx / σd (Cohen, 1988). Cohen indicates a d of ± 0.2 
as a small effect, a d of ± 0.5 as a medium effect, and a d of ± 0.8 as a large effect. However, although 
widely in use, these criteria levels given for evaluation of the strength of an effect were not intended by 
Cohen to be used in practice and need to be treated with caution (Barnette, 2006). 
For Mann-Whitney independent-sample tests, θ was calculated as an indicator of effect size, 
which is defined by Newcombe (2006) as the Mann-Whintey-U value divided by the product of both 
sample sizes, i.e. θ = U/(n1*n2). According to an analysis by Newcombe (2006), a θ of 0.50 corre-
sponds to Cohen’s d of 0.00, and θ of 0.45 respectively of 0.55 to a Cohen’s d of ± 0.18, and thus may 
be considered weak. Finally, for Wilcoxon paired-sample t-test and Kruskal-Wallis-test for independent 
samples, no widely used indicator of effect size could be found in the statistical literature and thus 
effect size is not reported for these non-parametric statistical tests.  
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6.  Results 
6.1 General characteristics of data analyzed 
Overall, there was little loss of data due to subjects missing a trial or the eye camera losing the 
pupillary signal. Specifically, on 97.87 ± 2.41% of all 144 active trials of the RST task a saccadic eye 
movement was identified after target onset that had an amplitude between 1.5 and 17° visual angle 
and went either to the left or to right side of the screen. The four subject groups did not differ in the 
amount of saccadic responses recorded (F3,86 = 1.36, p = 0.261, for proportion of saccades recorded 
per subject group, see Table 9-1).  
Of all saccadic responses after target onset identified that went either to the right or left side of 
the task screen, 1.61 ± 1.93% were anticipatory (i.e. had latencies below 80ms), 10.54 ± 12.56% had 
latencies in the range of express saccades (between 80 and 134ms), 86.97 ± 13.11 in the range of 
regular saccades (between 135 and 700ms), and 0.89 ± 1.41% were classified as late (latency above 
700ms). The four subject groups did not differ in terms of the proportion of saccadic responses per 
latency category recorded (anticipatory saccades: F3,86 = 1.05, p = 0.374; express saccades: F3,86 = 
0.79, p = 0.503; regular saccades: F3,86 = 1.04, p = 0.381; late saccades: F3,86 = 1.28, p = 0.288; for 
proportion of saccades recorded per subject group and latency category, see Table 9-1).  
Of all true saccadic responses, i.e. those with latencies between 80 and 700ms after target 
onset that went either to the left or right side of the task screen, 49.67 ± 2.60% across all subjects 
were recorded during antisaccade trials and 50.33 ± 2.60% during prosaccade trials. Of those true 
saccadic responses recorded during antisaccade trials, 67.60 ± 19.10% across all subjects were cor-
rect and the remaining 32.40 ± 19.10% were direction errors, of which 78.12 ± 20.36% were corrected 
according to the criteria specified in chapter 5.3.2.1. Finally, 96.53 ± 4.41% of all true saccadic re-
sponses recorded during the prosaccade instruction were correct, with large variations in the propor-
tion of prosaccade direction errors being corrected across all subjects (49.86 ± 40.12%). For propor-
tion of correct and incorrect saccades per subject group and saccade type, see Table 9-1; for saccadic 
reaction time distributions per subject group and accuracy, see Figure 10-2 and Figure 10-3.  
During outcome notification, 90.63 ± 8.08% of all possible responses (i.e. fixations after feed-
back onset in 144 active trials per task) were recorded by the eye tracker. Loss of data was due to 
similar reasons as during the performance period of the task, i.e. subjects missing feedback, blinking, 
or the eye camera losing the pupillary signal. Of all fixations recorded, 93.43 ± 6.45% were directed at 
the side of the screen where the feedback was displayed and thus included into the analysis, with no 
difference between the four groups (F3,86 = 1.03, p = 0.382). Finally, of those responses directed at the 
feedback display, 23.40 ± 11.89 received negative feedback (i.e. monetary loss, no win, or notification 
of incorrect performance on neutral trials), and 76.60 ± 11.89 positive feedback (monetary win, no loss 
or notification of correct performance on neutral trials). For proportion of fixations recorded after feed-
back display, and directed at positive and negative feedback per subject group, see Table 9-2. 
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6.2 Developmental Study 
6.2.1 Self-Report Measures 
The two groups did not differ significantly in their emotional state at the time of testing as evi-
dent by a lack of significant group differences in the state version of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (T47 = -0.82, p = 0.207). However, there was a significant difference between age groups on 
the trait form of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (T48 = -1.89, p = 0.032, d = 0.53) indicat-
ing that adolescents generally felt more anxious than adults (see also Figure 10-4). Results of the 
Depression Inventories were not compared between age groups since different forms were used for 
adults (Beck Depression Inventory) and Adolescents (Children Depression Inventory). 
In addition, there were differences between age groups in the Debriefing Questionnaire per-
formed after completion of the eye tracking task (see Figure 10-5). Specifically, adolescents reported 
to have been more bored by the task than adults (Z = -2.71, p = 0.007, θ = 0.29), to have become 
more tired during the task than adults (Z = -1.78, p = 0.075, θ = 0.36), to have had more difficulty stay-
ing focused (Z = -2.62, p = 0.009, θ = 0.30), and finally to have had more difficulty sitting still (Z = -
2.36, p = 0.018, θ = 0.32). In addition, adolescents thought more often than adults that the task was 
rigged (manipulated) by the experimenters (Z = -2.35, p = 0.019, θ = 0.37) and they reported more 
often than adults to have tried to guess on which side of the screen the target would appear (Z = -2.44, 
p = 0.015, θ = 0.32). Both groups rated money as similarly incentive (Z = -1.03, p = 0.303; θ = 0.38). 
Importantly, they did not differ in their reported ability to distinguish the colors grey and white (Z = -
0.09, p = 0.931, θ = 0.49). For a listing of group differences on all items of the debriefing question-
naire, see Table 9-9. 
 
6.2.2 Homogeneity of Variance and Distribution of data 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit tests conducted per age groups indicated normal distri-
bution for the majority of dependant variables of the performance period analyzed in both groups ex-
cept for some of the characteristics of antisaccade direction errors and their corrections (see Table 
9-5). For the dependant variables of the outcome notification period, Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-
of-fit tests indicated throughout normal distribution (Table 9-6). For those variables for which no normal 
distribution of data can be assumed, non-parametric post-hoc tests were applied to follow up signifi-
cant interactions of the Analysis of Variance.  
Levene tests for homogeneity of variance indicated inhomogeneous variances for several 
global and dynamic characteristics of saccadic eye movements, in particular of correct prosaccades 
(see Table 9-7). For the feedback period, all variables analyzed had homogenous variances (Table 
9-8). The significance level for variables with inhomogeneous variances was lowered in the Analysis of 
Variance to 0.025.  
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6.2.3 Significant main effects and interactions performance period 
Significant main effects and interactions of the Analysis of Variance will be outlined per be-
tween and within subject’s factors in the subsequent sections. For an overview of all effects and inter-
actions, see Table 9-10.  
 
6.2.3.1 Age-related differences in task performance 
Groups differed in their global task performance as indicated by a main effect of age for per-
cent correct responses (F1,60 = 11.32, p ≤ 0.025, ήp2 = 0.16). This main effect was modulated by type 
of saccadic eye movement (F1,60 = 8.68, p ≤ 0.025, ήp2 = 0.13). Analysis of Variance per saccade type 
and examination of descriptives and graphs (see Figure 10-6) indicated that groups did not differ in 
terms of percent correct prosaccades (F1,60 = 3.02, p = 0.087), but in percent correct antisaccades 
(F1,60 = 10.85, p ≤ 0.025, ήp2 = 0.15), with adults making significantly more correct antisaccades per 
incentive condition (adults: 25.90 ± 5.29%; adolescents: 21.27 ± 7.11%) and committing less antisac-
cade direction errors per incentive condition than adolescents (adults: 7.44 ± 5.23%; adolescents: 
12.07 ± 7.01%). 
In addition, age groups differed in dynamic indicators of task performance such as latency and 
peak velocity of correct responses, both of which depended on saccade type (saccade latency: F1,60 = 
8.60, p ≤ 0.025, ήp2 = 0.10; saccade peak velocity: F1,60 = 6.33, p ≤ 0.025, ήp2 = 0.10): While both 
groups had comparable prosaccade latency (F1,60 = 1.46, p = 0.232) and prosaccade peak velocity 
(F1,60 = 0.003, p = 0.957), they differed in these measures for correct antisaccades (latency: F1,60 = 
11.49, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.16; peak velocity: F1,60 = 4.06, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.06), with adults initiating cor-
rect antisaccades across incentive conditions earlier than adolescents (adults: 260.85 ± 28.83ms; 
adolescents: 290.86 ± 47.03ms), and adolescents having faster antisaccade peak velocities than 
adults (adults: 95.21 ± 18.14° visual angle/s; adolescents: 105.08 ± 26.32° visual angle/s, see also 
Figure 10-6). Finally, there was a highly significant effect of age for latency of corrective saccades 
(F1,48 = 22.05, p ≤ 0.025, ήp2 = 0.32) with adults having overall shorter correction times than adoles-
cents (adults: 124.87 ± 79.90ms; adolescents: 229.63 ± 139.23 ms). 
 
6.2.3.2 Incentive-related modulation of task performance 
6.2.3.2.1 Effect of Incentives on global performance measures 
The incentive manipulation clearly influenced global task performance on all primary saccades 
as indicated by a significant main effect of incentives for percent correct responses (F2,59 = 18.99, p ≤ 
0.025, ήp2 = 0.24) which differed between saccade type (F2,59 = 18.43, p ≤ 0.025, ήp2 = 0.23), and a 
significant main effect of incentives for percent antisaccade direction errors (F2,59 = 14.17, p ≤ 0.025, 
ήp2 = 0.32). However, there were no significant interactions of incentives with age, indicating that the 
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two groups modulated frequency variables similarly by incentives. Results of all paired-sample post-
hoc tests mentioned subsequently are summarized in Table 9-11 and descriptives in Table 9-3. 
Post-hoc paired-sample t-tests and examination of descriptives and graphs (see Figure 10-6) 
indicated that subjects made most correct prosaccades on the reward (33.29 ± 2.05%) and the fewest 
on the punishment condition (31.24 ± 3.09%; reward – punishment: T61 = 4.03, p < 0.017, d = 0.51; 
reward – neutral: T61 = 3.62, p < 0.017, d = 0.46; punishment – neutral: T61 = -1.46, 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, d 
= -0.19). For antisaccades, subjects made significantly more correct responses on both incentive con-
ditions (reward: 24.46 ± 5.71%, punishment: 25.17 ± 7.09%) as compared to the neutral condition 
(20.89 ± 7.29%; reward – neutral: T61 = 4.85, p < 0.017, d = 0.62; punishment – neutral: T61 = 5.88, p < 
0.017, dz = 0.75), and committed less direction errors on the reward (8.79 ± 5.91%) and punishment 
conditions (8.51 ± 6.80%) as compared to the neutral condition (12.18 ± 7.12%; reward – neutral: T61 
= -4.71, p < 0.017, dz = -0.60; punishment – neutral: T61 = -5.33, p < 0.017, dz = -0.68).  
 
6.2.3.2.2 Effect of Incentives on dynamic performance measures 
Incentives also influenced the dynamic characteristics of task performance such as reaction 
time measures, saccade peak velocity and saccade amplitude, but not saccade duration. Although 
descriptives and graphs pointed out several differences in groups in modulation of these measures, 
few of them reached significance level in the Analysis of Variance. However, since differences be-
tween groups in incentive-related modulation of task performance were the main focus of the current 
study, post-hoc tests were not only applied to significant main effects and interactions of the Analysis 
of Variance, but in an exploratory manner to all variables where group differences could be expected 
based on results from non-human primate studies and involvement of brain circuits known to undergo 
developmental alterations during adolescence. This were namely reaction time measures which re-
portedly are based on prefrontal neural circuits (for review see Munoz & Everling, 2004) (see chapter 
3.2.1.2), and peak velocity which concerns aspects of motor regulation that depend on basal gan-
glia/prefrontal pathways (Kawagoe et al., 1998)  
 
Reaction Time Measures 
For reaction time measures, there was a trend for a modulation by incentives for latency of 
correct saccades (F2,59 = 2.71, 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, ήp2 = 0.08), and a significant main effect of incentives 
for latency of corrective saccades which differed between age groups (F2,47 = 4.85, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 
0.16).  
Post-hoc analysis indicated that subjects across age groups initiated correct saccades later on 
the punishment (223.98 ± 29.27ms) as compared to the reward (218.45 ± 24.39ms) and neutral condi-
tions (219.22 ± 30.55ms, punishment - reward: T61 = -2.68, p < 0.017, d = -0.34; punishment – neutral: 
T62 = 2.46, p < 0.017, d = 0.31). Exploratory paired-sample t-tests performed per age group indicated 
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that this modulation across subjects was mainly brought about by adolescents on prosaccade trials 
(see also Figure 10-6). Specifically, while adults did not show a significant incentive-related modulation 
of latency of correct pro- or antisaccades, adolescents initiated correct prosaccades significantly later 
on the punishment (192.06 ± 30.91ms) relative to the reward condition (186.16 ± 26.71ms, punish-
ment – reward: T31 = -2.42, p < 0.017, dz = -0.43). This prolongation of prosaccade initiation resulted 
on independent-sample t-tests in a trend for a group difference between adolescents and adults for 
the punishment condition (T60 = -1.58, p ≤ 0.10, d = - 0.40). Of note, effect sizes obtained for this ex-
ploratory post-hoc analysis indicated that albeit not reaching significance level in the Analysis of Vari-
ance, the effects observed can be considered practically relevant (d or dz > 0.4, see also discussion in 
chapter 7.3).  
A similar pattern of modulation could be observed for latency of antisaccade direction errors 
during the reward condition: while adults did not show significant differences between any two of the 
three incentive conditions for this measure in exploratory post-hoc paired-sample t-tests, adolescents 
had increased latencies on the reward condition (206.79 ± 59.22ms) as compared to the neutral condi-
tion (183.73 ± 36.58ms; T31 = 2.43, p < 0.017, dz = 0.43) and on a trend level on the punishment con-
dition (186.60 ± 37.43ms; T31 = 1.98, 0.017 ≤ p ≤ 0.05, dz = 0.36). This prolongation of initiation of a 
direction error on the reward condition for adolescents lead to a significant difference for this measure 
as compared to adults (reward condition: 182.74 ± 42.70ms; T55 = -1.71, p ≤ 0.05, d = -0.47).  
In terms of latency of corrective saccades, where there was a significant age-by-incentives in-
teraction, paired-sample t-tests performed for each group separately and examination of descriptives 
and graphs (see Figure 10-6) indicated that adolescents initiated corrective saccades significantly 
earlier for the reward (198.65 ± 112.27ms) as compared to the neutral condition (280.85 ± 154.47ms; 
T28 = -3.12, p < 0.017, dz = -0.58), and on a trend level earlier on the punishment condition (209.39 ± 
150.95ms) as compared to the neutral condition (T28 = -1.76, 0.017 ≤ p ≤ 0.05, dz = -0.33). Adults in 
contrast showed a trend for slower initiation of corrective saccades on the reward condition (154.10 ± 
107.35ms) as compared to the neutral condition (108.75 ± 64.92ms; reward – neutral: T23 = 1.71, 
0.017 ≤ p ≤ 0.05, dz = 0.35), but not as compared to the punishment condition (111.77 ± 67.13ms). 
Independent-sample t-tests revealed significant differences between age groups for the punishment 
(T54 = -2.84, p ≤ 0.05, d = -0.84) and neutral condition (T43.54 = -5.15, p ≤ 0.05, d = -1.45). 
 
Saccade Peak Velocity 
For saccade peak velocity, there was a small trend for an incentive-related modulation of peak 
velocity of correct saccades that however reached medium-level effect size (F2,59 = 2.38, 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 
0.11, ήp2 = 0.08), and a significant incentive-related modulation of peak velocity of antisaccade direc-
tion errors (F2,52 = 3.44, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.12) and peak velocity of corrective saccades (F2,47 = 4.34, p ≤ 
0.025, ήp2 = 0.16).  
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Post-hoc within-group tests and examination of descriptives and graphs (see Figure 10-6) in-
dicated that for all saccade types, peak velocities were higher on the reward as compared to the neu-
tral condition (peak velocity of correct responses, reward condition: 96.08 ± 12.98° visual angle/s; 
neutral condition: 92.66 ± 13.81° visual angle/s; T61 = 2.91, p < 0.017, dz = 0.37; peak velocity of an-
tisaccade direction errors, reward condition: 98.70 ± 48.25° visual angle/s; neutral condition: 83.63 ± 
21.71° visual angle/s; Z = -2.48, p < 0.017; peak velocity of corrective saccades, reward condition: 
170.14 ± 44.93° visual angle/s; neutral condition 152.38 ± 30.94° visual angle/s; Z = -2.91, p < 0.017).  
Incentive modulation did not differ significantly between age groups for any saccade type in 
the Analysis of Variance. However, exploratory post-hoc paired-sample t-tests indicated a pattern that 
was very reminiscent of that obtained for reaction times measures. Specifically, while within-group 
post-hoc tests revealed no significant modulation by incentives for peak velocity for any primary sac-
cades in the adult subject group, adolescents had significantly faster peak velocity of prosaccades 
during the punishment condition (92.94 ± 13.26° visual angle/s) as compared to the neutral condition 
(88.62 ± 11.03° visual angle/s; T31 = 2.65, p < 0.017, dz = 0.47) and faster peak velocity of antisaccade 
direction errors on the reward condition (104.37 ± 48.60° visual angle/s) as compared to the neutral 
condition (82.49 ± 10.46° visual angle/s; Z = 2.15, p < 0.017). The speeding of peak velocity on these 
two measures by adolescents led to trend for a between-group difference for peak velocity of antisac-
cade direction errors on the reward condition (adults: 91.45 ± 47.78° visual angle/s; Z = -1.51, 0.05 ≤ p 
≤ 0.10, θ = 0.38).  
 
Saccade Amplitude 
For amplitude of corrective saccades there was a significant main effect of incentives (F2,47 = 
4.55, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.16) that differed between age groups (F2,47 = 3.40, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.13). Wil-
coxon tests performed for each group separately indicated that while adolescents did not modulate 
amplitudes of corrective saccades by incentive condition (reward condition: 9.52 ± 2.04° visual angle; 
punishment condition: 9.26 ± 1.46° visual angle; neutral condition: 9.30 ± 1.65° visual angle), adults 
had significantly smaller amplitudes of corrective saccades on the punishment (9.38 ± 1.75° visual 
angle) as compared to the reward condition (10.86 ± 2.18° visual angle; Z = -3.19, p < 0.017), and the 
neutral condition (10.66 ± 7.92° visual angle; Z = -2.71, p < 0.017). However, there were no significant 
group differences for any single incentive condition of this measure as indicated by Mann-Whitney-U 
tests.  
 
6.2.3.3 Saccade type related differences in task performance 
Correct prosaccades and correct antisaccades differed on all characteristics investigated. Al-
though differences between these two types of saccadic eye movements were not the main focus of 
this study, they may serve as an important validation for the data obtained, since differences between 
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pro- and antisaccade performance are well documented in the eye movement literature (see chapter 
3.1). In line with previous research, there were more correct pro- than antisaccades across age groups 
(32.14 ± 2.59% vs. 23.51 ± 6.69%), indicating the higher cognitive demand of performing a correct 
antisaccade irrespective of age (F1,60 = 166.39, p ≤ 0.025, ήp2 = 0.74). In addition, correct antisac-
cades were initiated later than correct prosaccades (276.34 ± 41.86ms vs. 184.95 ± 27.54ms; F1,60 = 
450.61, p ≤ 0.025, ήp2 = 0.88), also in line with previous research and supporting the notion that an-
tisaccade performance requires more computational processes than prosaccade performance. Finally, 
antisaccades had faster peak velocities than prosaccades (100.30 ± 23.20° visual angle/s vs. 90.97 ± 
11.74° visual angle/s; F1,60 = 21.24, p ≤ 0.025, ήp2 = 0.26), longer saccade durations (119.48 ± 
18.42ms vs. 105.58 ± 9.05ms; F1,60 = 61.23, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.50), and larger saccade amplitudes 
(5.90 ± 1.42° visual angle vs. 4.91 ± 0.41±; F1,60 = 45.50, p ≤ 0.025, ήp2 = 0.43). While faster antisac-
cade peak velocities were mainly observed in adolescents, saccade duration and amplitude did not 
differ between groups (see chapter 6.2.3.1). In particular higher peak velocities and larger saccade 
amplitudes of antisaccades as compared to prosaccades contradict findings from the eye movement 
research conducted in humans under non-incentive conditions, however, a large influence of incen-
tives for peak velocities of internally-guided saccades and their spatial accuracy has commonly been 
observed in non-human primates (Kawagoe et al., 2002; Kobayashi et al., 2002; Leon & 
Shadlen,1999; Takikawa et al., 2002; Roesch & Olson, 2003), suggesting that in the current study, the 
incentive nature of the RST might have had a stronger influence on peak velocity and amplitude of 
antisaccades as compared to visually-guided prosaccades. 
 
6.2.4 Significant main effects and interactions outcome notification period 
Significant main effects and interactions of the Analysis of Variance will be outlined per de-
pendant variable in the subsequent sections. For an overview of significant main effects and interac-
tions, see Table 9-12, results of dependant-sample post-hoc tests mentioned below are summarized in 
Table 9-13 and descriptives in Table 9-4. 
 
6.2.4.1 Fixation Duration 
Duration of the first fixation after feedback onset was modulated differently by feedback type 
(F1,57 = 19.20, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.25), with positive feedback leading to longer fixation durations across 
subjects (0.53 ± 0.07s) than negative feedback (0.48 ± 0.12s, see also see Figure 10-7). However, 
there was no significant modulation of fixation duration by incentives or age, or interactions thereof. 
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6.2.4.2 Pupil diameter 
There were several main effects for pupil diameter during the first fixation after feedback on-
set. First, pupil diameter differed between age groups (F1,57 = 24.57, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.30), with adoles-
cents having larger pupil diameters than adults (adolescents: 7.32 ± 1.53mm; adults 5.62 ± 1.20mm, 
see also Figure 10-7). In addition, pupil diameter differed between feedback type (F1,57 = 79.80, p ≤ 
0.05, ήp2 = 0.58), with pupil diameter across groups being larger for negative (6.57 ± 1.59mm) than 
positive feedback (6.42 ± 1.63mm). Finally, there was a main effect of incentives for pupil diameter 
(F2,56 = 23.41, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.46), with post-hoc paired-sample t-tests indicating that subjects had 
larger pupil diameter for both incentive conditions (reward condition: 6.48 ± 1.61mm; punishment con-
dition: 6.47 ± 1.62mm) as compared to the neutral condition (6.40 ± 1.64mm; reward – neutral: T61 = 
5.29, p < 0.017, dz = 0.67; punishment – neutral: T31 = 5.21, p < 0.017, dz = 0.66). This effect of incen-
tives in addition differed between feedback type (F1,56 = 4.22, 0.017 ≤ p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.13). Paired-
sample t-tests per feedback type indicated that pupil diameter was modulated similarly by incentives 
for both types of feedback, with pupil diameter being larger for both incentive conditions as compared 
to the neutral condition (negative feedback: reward condition: 6.62 ± 1.58mm, punishment condition: 
6.65 ± 1.61mm; neutral condition: 6.50 ± 1.62mm; reward – neutral: T59 = 5.35, p < 0.017, dz = 0.69, 
punishment - neutral: T59 = 4.47, p < 0.017, dz = 0.58; positive feedback: reward condition: 6.45 ± 
1.62mm; punishment condition: 6.43 ± 1.63mm; neutral condition: 6.37 ± 1.65mm; reward – neutral: 
T61 = 4.59, p < 0.017, dz = 0.58; punishment – neutral: T61 = 3.95, p < 0.017, dz = 0.50). However for 
positive but not negative feedback there was in addition a trend for pupil diameter being larger on re-
ward as compared to punishment trials (T61 = 1.41, 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, dz = 0.18). 
The main effects for pupil diameter during the first fixation after feedback onset differed for 
some variables between age groups. Specifically, there was a significant age-by-incentives interaction 
(F2,56 = 3.43, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.11), and a trend for an age-by-feedback interaction (F1,57 = 3.65, 0.05 ≤ 
p ≤ 0.10, ήp2 = 0.06) which was followed up being of interest for the hypothesis of this thesis and hav-
ing sufficiently large, i.e. medium effect sizes (ήp2 < 0.06, see also chapter 5.3.2.3.4).  
Post-hoc paired-sample t-tests conducted per age group across feedback type indicated that 
the larger pupil diameter observed for contingent conditions as compared to the neutral condition was 
true for both age groups, but was in terms of effect size and significance level more pronounced in 
adults as compared to adolescents (adults: reward: 5.59 ± 1.16mm; punishment: 5.58 ± 1.18mm; neu-
tral: 5.49 ± 1.23mm; reward – neutral: T29 = 4.17, p < 0.017, dz = 0.76; punishment – neutral: T29 = 
5.17, p < 0.017, dz = 0.94; adolescents: reward: 7.31 ± 1.53mm; punishment: 7.30 ± 1.54mm; neutral: 
7.24 ± 1.53mm; reward – neutral: T31 = 3.29, p < 0.017, dz = 0.58; punishment – neutral: T31 = 2.63, p 
< 0.017, dz = 0.47). Independent-sample t-tests indicated that the two age groups differed on all three 
incentive conditions, with no difference being stronger relative to the others (reward: T60 = -4.90, p < 
0.017, d = -1.25, punishment: T60 = -4.95, p < 0.017, d = -1.26; neutral: T60 = -4.94, p < 0.017, d = -
1.26). Post-hoc paired-sample t-tests per subject group and feedback type indicated that adults as 
compared to adolescents had more pronounced difference in pupil diameter between negative (5.53 ± 
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1.20mm; adolescents: 7.25 ± 1.55 mm) and positive feedback (5.70 ± 1.19mm; adolescents: 7.37 ± 
1.51mm; T29 = 6.34, p ≤ 0.025, dz = 1.16), however, the difference between pupil diameter for positive 
and negative feedback reached high significance for adolescents as well (T31 = 5.30, p ≤ 0.025, dz = 
0.94).  
 
6.2.4.3 Pupil dilation 
The results on pupil dilation after feedback onset corroborated those reported for absolute pu-
pil diameter after feedback onset reported above, although reaching smaller significance levels and 
effect sizes. Specifically, pupil dilation differed on a trend level between age groups (F1,57 = 3.61, p = 
0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, ήp2 = 0.06) with adults having greater change of pupil diameter after feedback onset 
as compared to adolescents (adults: 0.014 ± 0.083mm; adolescents: 0.008 ± 0.059mm; see also 
Figure 10-7); it differed significantly between feedback type (F1,57 = 20.74, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.27) with 
larger pupil dilation for negative (0.048 ± 0.093mm) than positive feedback (0.003 ± 0.078mm); and 
finally pupil dilation differed on a trend level between incentives (F2,56 = 3.06, 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, ήp2 = 
0.10) which similarly to pupil diameter additionally depended on feedback type (F2,56 = 4.96, p ≤ 0.05, 
ήp2 = 0.15).  
Post-hoc paired-sample t-tests across groups per feedback type indicated that for negative 
feedback, subjects dilated pupil diameter stronger for the reward (0.063 ± 0.119mm) as compared to 
the neutral condition (0.029 ± 0.073mm; reward – neutral: T59 = 2.99, p < 0.017, dz = 0.39), while for 
positive feedback pupil diameter contracted for the punishment condition (-0.006 ± 0.078mm) and 
dilated for the neutral condition (0.012 ± 0.069mm, punishment – neutral: T61 = -2.31, p < 0.017, dz = -
0.29).  
Since it was hypothesized that adults would be more affected by negative feedback than ado-
lescents, exploratory paired-sample t-tests within each age group were conducted. Results confirmed 
this hypothesis, showing that the above reported enhanced dilation after receiving notification of nega-
tive outcome for reward trials was largely based on the adult sample (reward condition: 0.096 ± 
0.090mm; neutral condition: 0.037 ± 0.081mm; reward – neutral: T27 = 3.19, p < 0.017, dz = 0.60), who 
additionally showed a trend for greater pupil dilation for the punishment (0.078 ± 0.15mm) as com-
pared to the neutral condition (T26 = 1.84, p < 0.05, dz = 0.35). In contrast, adolescents did not show a 
significant within-group modulation by incentive condition of pupil dilation for negative feedback. In 
contrast, significant constriction of pupil diameter after receiving positive feedback for the punishment 
condition as compared to the neutral condition could only be observed on a trend level in adolescents 
(punishment: -0.014 ± 0.081mm; neutral condition: 0.012 ± 0.053mm; T31 = -2.07, 0.017 ≤ p ≤ 0.05, dz 
= -0.37) but not in adults. Finally, independent sample t-tests indicated that the observed pupil dilation 
in adults, but not adolescents after receiving negative feedback for incentive conditions, lead to a sig-
nificant difference between these two groups for the reward condition (T58 = 2.88, p ≤ 0.05, d = 0.82), 
and on a trend level for the punishment condition (T58 = 1.50, 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, d = 0.42).  
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6.3 Clinical Study 
6.3.1 Self-Report Measures 
The three diagnostic groups differed in their emotional state at the time of testing as revealed 
by Oneway Analysis of Variance with significant main effects or trends of diagnosis for the Spielberger 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory state (F2,36 = 3.02, p = 0.061) and trait version (F2,36 = 22.08, p = 0.000), 
and for the Children Depression Inventory (CDI) (F2,47 = 12.56, p = 0.000). Post-hoc Scheffé tests indi-
cated that both patient groups were significantly more anxious than controls (STAI trait: controls vs. 
anxious patients p = 0.000; controls vs. depressed patients p = 0.000) and scored significantly higher 
on the Child Depression Inventory than controls (CDI: controls vs. anxious patients p = 0.006; controls 
vs. depressed patients p = 0.000), however, the self-report measures did not differentiate between the 
two patient groups (STAI trait: anxious vs. depressed patients p = 0.193; CDI anxious vs. depressed 
patients p = 0.150, see also Figure 10-8).  
In terms of the debriefing questionnaire filled out after completion of the RST, a Kruskal-Wallis 
test - employed due to the ordinal scaling of the ratings - revealed no significant group differences 
(Table 9-14). However, there were trends for groups to differ in their ratings on three questions, 
namely boredom during the task (χ2df=2 = 5.20, p = 0.074), upset when receiving negative feedback 
(χ2df=2 = 4.79, p = 0.091), and sadness after performance of the task (χ2df=2 = 4.63, p = 0.099, see 
Figure 10-9). Importantly, the groups did not differ in other, for the interpretation and/or validity of the 
results important items. For example, they did not differ in their reported ability to distinguish the colors 
grey and white; they perceived the task as similarly difficult, and indicated similar ability to stay fo-
cused. In line with self-reports, patient and control groups performed equally well in terms of money 
won in the task (see chapter 5.2.1). Finally, all diagnostic groups rated money as similarly incentive. 
 
6.3.2 Homogeneity of Variance and Distribution of data 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit tests indicated normal distribution for the majority of 
variables analyzed except for some characteristics of antisaccade direction errors and their corrective 
gazes, in particular for controls (see Table 9-5). For the dependant variables of the outcome notifica-
tion period, Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit tests indicated throughout normal distribution (see 
Table 9-6). For those variables for which no normal distribution of data could be assumed, non-
parametric post-hoc tests were applied to follow up significant interactions of the Analysis of Variance.  
Levene tests for homogeneity of variance indicated inhomogeneous variances for peak veloc-
ity of different saccadic responses, for percent correct prosaccades, for duration of correct responses, 
for amplitude of direction errors, and for percent corrective gazes (see Table 9-7). For the outcome 
notification period, all variables analyzed except for fixation duration after receiving feedback during 
the reward condition and pupil dilation after positive and combined (i.e. positive and negative) feed-
back during the neutral condition had homogenous variances (Table 9-8). For variables with inhomo-
geneous variances, significance level was lowered to 0.025 in the Analysis of Variance.  
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6.3.3 Significant main effects and interactions performance period 
Significant main effects and interactions of the Analysis of Variance will be outlined per be-
tween and within subject’s factors in the following sections. For an overview of all effects and interac-
tions, see Table 9-15, for an overview of effects and interaction when excluding patients with a comor-
bid anxiety disorders from the MDD group, see Table 9-16. All post-hoc within-group tests mentioned 
below are summarized in Table 9-17, results of post-hoc between-group tests in Table 9-18, and de-
scriptives in Table 9-3. 
 
6.3.3.1 Diagnosis-related differences in task performance 
There were no significant main effects of diagnosis or type-by-diagnosis interactions; but sev-
eral significant incentives-by-diagnosis and incentives-by-type-by-diagnosis interactions, indicating 
that the three adolescent groups did not differ in performance of different types of saccadic eye 
movements per se, but in their modulation of saccadic eye movements by incentives.  
 
6.3.3.2 Incentive-related modulation of task performance 
6.3.3.2.1 Effect of Incentives on global performance measures 
The three incentive conditions exerted a strong modulatory influence on global task perform-
ance as indicated by a significant main effect of incentives for percent correct saccades (F2,56 = 7.24, p 
≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.21), which in addition depended on saccade type (F2,56 = 7.20, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.20) and 
diagnostic status (F2,57 = 3.34, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.10), and a significant main effect of incentives for per-
cent antisaccade direction errors (F2,55 = 3.24, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.10).  
In terms of percent correct responses and percent antisaccade direction errors, a series of 
post-hoc paired-sample t-tests and examination of descriptives and graphs (see Figure 10-10) indi-
cated that while for percent correct prosaccades subjects across groups performed best on the reward 
(33.11 ± 2.13%) and worst on the punishment (30.90 ± 2.97%) condition relative to the other two con-
ditions (neutral condition: 32.01 ± 2.65%; reward – punishment: T66 = 4.35, p < 0.017, dz = 0.53; re-
ward – neutral T66 = 2.89, p < 0.017, dz = 0.35; punishment – neutral: T66 = -2.55, p < 0.017, dz = -
0.31), they performed equally well on both contingent conditions for percent correct antisaccades (re-
ward condition: 21.65 ± 5.96%, punishment condition: 22.01 ± 7.92%; reward – punishment: T66 = -
0.43, p = 0.333) respectively percent antisaccade direction errors (reward condition: 11.74 ± 6.26%, 
punishment condition: 11.58 ± 7.53%; reward – punishment: T66 = 0.12, p = 0.417), with performance 
on both contingent conditions being superior to that on the neutral condition (correct antisaccades 
neutral condition: 18.90 ± 8.00%; reward – neutral: T66 = 3.63, p < 0.017, dz = 0.44; punishment – neu-
tral: T66 = 3.72, p < 0.017, dz = 0.45; direction errors neutral condition: 14.12 ± 7.73%; reward – neu-
tral: T66 = -3.35, p < 0.017, d = -0.41, punishment – neutral: T66 = -3.47, p < 0.017, d = -0.42).  
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Post-hoc-paired-sample t-tests performed for each subject group separately indicated that the 
superior performance on the reward condition relative to the neutral or punishment conditions for per-
cent correct prosaccades was in particular characteristic for the performance pattern of the control 
group (reward condition: 32.91 ± 2.10%; punishment condition 30.97 ± 3.17%; neutral condition: 31.51 
± 3.22%; reward – neutral: T31 = 2.50, p < 0.017, dz = 0.44; reward – punishment: T31 = 3.00, p < 
0.017, dz = 0.53; punishment – neutral: T31 = -0.87, p = 0.195), while the deterioration of prosaccade 
performance observed on the punishment condition relative to the reward and neutral conditions was 
mainly brought about by the MDD group (reward condition: 32.91 ± 1.87%; punishment condition: 
30.23 ± 3.65%; neutral condition: 32.82 ± 1.77%; reward – neutral: T11 = 0.11, p = 0.457; reward – 
punishment: T11 = 1.80, p ≤ 0.05, dz = 0.52; punishment – neutral: T11 = -2.50, p < 0.017, dz = -0.72). 
Finally, anxious patients showed both types of performance patterns observed for either the control or 
MDD group, i.e. better performance on the reward condition (33.65 ± 2.38%) relative to the neutral 
(32.39 ± 1.56%) and punishment (31.29 ± 1.89%) conditions and a trend for deterioration of perform-
ance on the punishment relative to the neutral condition (reward – neutral: T15 = 1.84, 0.017 ≤ p ≤ 
0.05, dz = 0.46; reward – punishment: T15 = 2.56, p < 0.017, dz = 0.64; punishment – neutral: T15 = -
1.56, 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, dz = -0.39). For correct antisaccades and antisaccade direction errors, post-hoc 
paired-sample t-tests indicated that the above reported better performance on both contingent condi-
tions relative to the neutral condition persisted for controls only (correct antisaccades: reward condi-
tion: 22.25 ± 5.32%; punishment condition: 23.15 ± 8.11%; neutral condition: 18.41 ± 7.91%; reward – 
neutral: T31 = 3.40, p < 0.017, dz = 0.60; punishment – neutral: T31 = 4.10, p < 0.017, dz = 0.72; an-
tisaccade direction errors: reward condition: 11.05 ± 5.62%; punishment condition: 10.67 ± 7.64%; 
neutral condition: 14.48 ± 7.77%; reward – neutral: T31 = -3.09, p < 0.017, dz = -0.55; punishment – 
neutral: T31 = -3.41, p < 0.017, dz = -0.60), while both patient groups did not show a significant modula-
tion of correct antisaccades by incentives. A series of independent-sample t-tests revealed no signifi-
cant differences between any two of the three diagnostic groups on any of the single incentive condi-
tions of either percent correct prosaccades, correct antisaccades, or antisaccade direction errors. 
In terms of percent corrective saccades, it was hypothesized that greater sensitivity for pun-
ishments in patients with anxiety may be reflected in a higher proportion of direction errors during this 
condition being corrected as compared to the other incentive conditions (see chapter 4). This hypothe-
sis was supported by exploratory paired-sample t-tests performed for each diagnostic group and ex-
amination of descriptives and graphs (see Figure 10-10): Specifically, while controls did not show dif-
ferences between any two of the three incentive conditions for percent corrective saccades, patients 
with anxiety corrected more antisaccade direction errors that occurred on the punishment (88.57 ± 
12.38%) than neutral condition (75.10 ± 27.62%; T16 = 2.18, 0.017 ≤ p ≤ 0.05, dz = 0.55). In contrast, 
patients with MDD showed a trend for correcting more antisaccade direction errors on the neutral con-
dition (86.04 ± 19.03) as compared to the punishment condition (78.53 ± 22.24%; T11 = -1.50, 0.05 ≤ p 
≤ 0.10, dz = -0.43). Accordingly, independent sample t-tests indicated that patients with anxiety cor-
rected more errors on the punishment condition than did controls (74.48 ± 24.53%; T46 = -2.62, p ≤ 
0.05, d = -0.73) and on a trend level but with satisfactory effect size than patients with MDD (T16.41 = 
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1.41, 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, d = 0.56), while patients with MDD corrected significantly more antisaccade 
direction errors on the neutral condition as compared to controls (70.17 ± 27.18; T42 = -1.85, p ≤ 0.05, 
d = -0.68).  
 
6.3.3.2.2 Effect of Incentives on dynamic performance measures 
As revealed by Analysis of Variance, incentives modulated with exception of saccade duration 
all dynamic saccade parameters investigated such as saccadic reaction times, saccade peak veloci-
ties and saccade amplitudes. In addition, for all of these dynamic saccade characteristics, modulation 
differed between groups per saccade type, indicating that cognitive control was differently affected by 
incentives in the three diagnostic groups. Moreover, interactions between diagnostic group and incen-
tives became more significant when excluding patients with comorbid anxiety disorders from the MDD 
group. 
 
Reaction Time Measures 
In terms of saccadic reaction times, there was a significant main effect of incentives for latency 
of correct saccades (F2,56 = 3.59, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.11), which differed between diagnostic groups (F2,57 
= 3.14, p = 0.05, ήp2 = 0.10), saccade type (F2,56 = 3.58, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.11) and finally between diag-
nostic groups and saccade type (F2,57 = 4.13, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.13). In addition, there was a significant 
main effect of incentives for latency of corrective saccades (F2,51 = 3.50, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.12). 
In terms of latency of correct responses, paired-sample t-tests conducted per saccade type 
and diagnostic group revealed that neither patient group showed a significant modulation of these 
measures (see also Figure 10-10). In contrast, controls modulated saccade latency by incentives, but 
only during visually-guided saccades, i.e prosaccades, but not during internally-guided antisaccades. 
Specifically, controls initiated correct prosaccades significantly later on the punishment condition 
(192.06 ± 30.91ms) as compared to the reward condition (186.16 ± 26.71ms; T31 = -2.42, p < 0.017, dz 
= -0.43). This pattern of modulation was corroborated by exploratory examination of antisaccade direc-
tion errors (see also developmental study, chapter 6.2.3.2.2), which also can be considered visually-
guided saccades. Here, controls initiated antisaccade direction errors significantly later on the reward 
condition (206.79 ± 59.22ms) as compared to the neutral condition (183.73 ± 36.58ms; T31 = 2.43, p < 
0.017, dz = 0.43).  
Independent-sample t-tests revealed significant differences in latency of primary saccades (i.e. 
correct pro- and antisaccades, and antisaccade direction error) between groups for several incentive 
conditions. Specifically, patients with MDD initiated correct antisaccades earlier on the punishment 
condition (patients with MDD: 247.87 ± 88.37ms; controls: 293.67 ± 51.89ms; T42 = 2.13, p ≤ 0.05, d = 
0.63) and antisaccade direction errors faster on the reward condition (patients with MDD: 175.26 ± 
30.47ms; controls: 206.79 ± 59.22ms; T42 = 1.75, p ≤ 0.05, d = 0.67) as compared to controls. Patients 
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with anxiety initiated saccades of both saccade types generally faster than did controls across condi-
tions (see Figure 10-10). This resulted in trends for group differences between anxious patients and 
controls for correct prosaccades on the reward condition (patients with anxiety: 174.89 ± 26.12ms; 
controls: 186.16 ± 26.71ms; T46 = 1.39, 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, d = 0.43) and punishment condition (patients 
with anxiety: 178.16 ± 22.32ms; controls: 192.06 ± 30.91ms; T46 = 1.60, 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, d = 0.52). 
In terms of latency of corrective saccades, paired-sample t-tests performed across subjects 
indicated that corrective saccades were initiated faster on the reward condition (185.97 ± 113.58ms) 
relative to the neutral condition (246.77 ± 149.51ms; T66 = -2.23, p < 0.017, dz = -0.29) and on a trend 
level relative to the punishment condition (229.21 ± 155.82ms; T66 = -1.77, 0.017 ≤ p ≤ 0.05, dz = -
0.23). Paired-sample t-tests conducted per diagnostic group indicated that the delay of initiation of 
corrective saccades on the punishment condition relative to the reward condition was brought about by 
the two patients groups (patients with MDD, reward condition:190.74 ± 110.74ms; punishment condi-
tion: 269.01 ± 140.72ms; T11 = -1.62, 0.017 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, dz = -0.47; patients with anxiety, reward condi-
tion: 158.62 ± 120.49ms; punishment condition: 236.54 ± 177.70ms; T15 = -1.72, 0.017 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, dz = 
-0.43), while the delay of initiation on neutral trials relative to the two contingent conditions was more 
characteristic for the response pattern observed for the control group (reward condition: 198.65 ± 
112.27ms; punishment condition: 209.39 ± 150.95ms; neutral condition: 280.85 ± 154.47ms; reward – 
neutral: T28 = -3.12, p < 0.017, dz = -0.58; punishment – neutral: T28 = -1.76, 0.017 ≤ p ≤ 0.05, dz = -
0.33). Independent sample-tests did not show significant differences between groups for latency of 
corrective saccades on any of the three incentive conditions. However, there was a trend for controls 
to initiate corrective saccades later on the neutral condition (280.85 ± 154.47) as compared to patients 
with anxiety (204.21 ± 13.93ms; T44 = 1.61, 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, d = 0.56).  
 
Saccade Peak Velocity 
For peak velocity, there was a trend for a incentives-by-type-by-diagnosis interaction for peak 
velocity of correct responses (F2,57 = 3.33, 0.025 ≤ p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.10) and a trend for a incentives-
by-diagnosis interaction for peak velocity of antisaccade direction errors (F2,56 = 2.70, 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, 
ήp2 = 0.09). Both trends were followed up being of interest for the hypotheses of this thesis. In addition, 
when excluding the four subjects with comorbid anxiety disorder from the MDD group, the trend for an 
interaction between incentives and diagnostic group reached significance level for peak velocity of 
correct responses, and became stronger for peak velocity of antisaccade direction errors.  
Post-hoc paired-sample t-tests and examination of descriptives and graphs (see Figure 10-10) 
per subject group and saccade type indicated that while controls modulated peak velocity of correct 
prosaccades and peak velocity of antisaccade direction errors by incentives, both clinical groups failed 
to show an incentive-related modulation for any of the dependant variables analyzed that would reach 
significance level. For the control group, prosaccade peak velocities were significantly faster on the 
punishment condition (92.94 ± 13.26° visual angle/s) as compared to the neutral condition (88.62 ± 
11.03° visual angle/s; T31 = 2.65, p < 0.017, dz = 0.47). In addition, the control group had significantly 
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faster peak velocities of antisaccade direction errors on the reward (104.37 ± 48.60° visual angle/s) 
relative to the neutral condition (82.49 ± 10.46° visual angle/s; Z = -2.15, p < 0.017, dz = 0.49).  
Independent-sample t-tests indicated differences between the control and anxious group, but 
not between the control and the MDD group or between the two patient groups. Specifically patients 
with anxiety had high peak velocity for correct responses of both saccade types, regardless of incen-
tive condition. This resulted in group differences to controls on the neutral condition for correct an-
tisaccades (patients with anxiety: 114.68 ± 23.72° visual angle/s; controls: 102.40 ± 23.99° visual an-
gle/s; T46 = -1.68, p ≤ 0.05, d = -0.51) and on a trend level for correct prosaccades (patients with anxi-
ety: 94.46 ± 14.97° visual angle/s; controls: 88.62 ± 11.03° visual angle/s; T46 = -1.53, 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, 
d = -0.44).  
 
Saccade Amplitude 
For amplitudes of correct responses, there were trends for an interaction of incentives-by-
diagnosis (F2,57 = 3.67, 0.025 ≤ p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.12) and incentives-by-type-by-diagnosis (F2,57 = 3.91, 
0.025 ≤ p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.12) interactions.  
Post-hoc paired-sample t-tests per saccade type and group and examination of descriptives 
and graphs (see Figure 10-10) indicated similarly to reaction time measures and peak velocity, that 
while both patient groups did not show a significant incentive-related modulation of saccade amplitude 
of neither correct pro- or antisaccades, controls had significantly larger amplitude of correct prosac-
cades on the reward condition (4.99 ± 0.39° visual angle) as compared to the neutral condition (4.86 ± 
0.39° visual angle; T31 = 2.88, p < 0.017, dz = 0.51).  
Independent-sample t-tests revealed group differences between patients with MDD and con-
trols for amplitude of correct antisaccades on the punishment condition (T42 = -1.88, p ≤ 0.05, d = -
0.55) and for amplitude of correct prosaccades on all incentive conditions (punishment: T42 = -2.01, p 
≤ 0.05, d = -0.62; reward: T42 = -1.96, p ≤ 0.05, d = -0.60; neutral: T42 = -1.83, p ≤ 0.05, d = -0.56), with 
patients with MDD having consistently larger amplitudes than controls (amplitude of correct antisac-
cades punishment condition, patients with MDD: 7.03 ± 2.45° visual angle; controls: 5.92 ± 1.42° vis-
ual angle; amplitude of correct prosaccades, patients with MDD: reward condition: 5.28 ± 0.56° visual 
angle, punishment condition: 5.30 ± 0.68° visual angle; neutral condition: 5.13 ± 0.56° visual angle; 
controls: reward condition: 4.99 ± 0.39° visual angle, punishment condition: 4.94 ± 0.47° visual angle; 
neutral condition: 4.86 ± 0.39° visual angle). Patients with an anxiety disorder similarly to patients with 
MDD had large amplitudes for all incentive conditions, differing from controls for correct prosaccades 
on the neutral condition (patients with anxiety: 5.11 ± 0.39° visual angle; controls: 4.86 ± 0.39° visual 
angle; T46 = -2.04, p ≤ 0.05, d = -0.61). The two patient groups did not differ significantly from each 
other on any incentive condition for amplitudes of correct pro- or antisaccades. 
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6.3.3.3 Saccade type related differences in task performance 
Similarly to the developmental study, correct prosaccades and correct antisaccades differed 
on all characteristics investigated, indicating that the different types of saccades recruited different 
cognitive functions and underlying substrates across subjects regardless of clinical state. Specifically, 
there were more correct pro- than antisaccades per incentive condition (32.01 ± 2.58% vs. 20.85 ± 
7.30%; F1,57 = 157.19, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.73), correct antisaccades were initiated later than correct 
prosaccades (286.73 ± 54.48ms vs. 184.38 ± 30.51ms; F1,57 = 440.75, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.89), had faster 
peak velocities than prosaccades (109.26 ± 32.38° visual angle/s vs. 91.59 ± 11.49° visual angle/s; 
F1,57 = 38.46, p ≤ 0.025, ήp2 = 0.40), longer durations (119.14 ± 23.30ms vs. 106.45 ± 9.33ms; F1,57 = 
26.10, p ≤ 0.025, ήp2 = 0.31), and larger saccade amplitudes (6.31 ± 1.68° visual angle vs. 5.04 ± 
0.48° visual angle; F1,57 = 45.76, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.45).  
 
 
6.3.4 Significant main effects and interactions outcome notification period 
Significant main effects and interactions of the Analysis of Variance will be outlined per de-
pendant variable in the subsequent sections. For an overview of significant effects and interactions, 
see Table 9-19, for an overview of descriptives per age group, see Table 9-4.  
 
6.3.4.1 Fixation Duration 
Duration of the first fixation after feedback onset differed between feedback type across sub-
jects (F1,57 = 6.49, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.10) with fixation duration being longer for positive feedback (0.54 ± 
0.11s) as compared to negative feedback (0.49 ± 0.08s) across diagnostic groups (see Figure 10-11).  
In addition, duration of the first fixation after feedback onset differed on a trend level with satis-
factory effect size between diagnostic groups by feedback type and incentive condition (F2,57 = 3.11, 
0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, ήp2 = 0.10). Post-hoc paired-sample t-tests per diagnostic group, incentive condition 
and feedback type indicated that while controls and patients with anxiety disorders did not modulate 
fixation duration by incentives for neither type of feedback, patients with MDD modulated fixation dura-
tion differently between incentive conditions for negative feedback. In particular, patients with MDD 
fixated negative feedback longer on the punishment condition (0.63 ± 0.22) as compared to the neutral 
condition (0.49 ± 0.17s; T11 = 2.93, p < 0.017, dz = 0.84) and on a trend level as compared to the re-
ward condition (0.50 ± 0.18s; T11 = -1.94, 0.017 ≤ p ≤ 0.05, dz = -0.56). This prolongation of fixation 
duration on the punishment condition for negative feedback in the MDD group lead to a significant 
difference to the other two diagnostic groups for this measure (controls: 0.51 ± 0.16s, patients with 
anxiety: 0.48 ± 0.14s; controls – patients with MDD: T42 = -1.94, p ≤ 0.05, d = -0.62, patients with MDD 
– patients with Anxiety: T26 = -2.13, p ≤ 0.05, d = -0.81). On a trend level, patients with MDD also had 
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longer fixation duration for positive feedback as compared to controls on the punishment condition 
(patients with MDD: 0.57 ± 0.11s; controls: 0.52 ± 0.10s; T42 = -1.46, 0.017 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, d = -0.48). 
There were no other differences between any two of the three diagnostic groups for any other incen-
tive condition for duration of the first fixation after feedback onset.  
 
6.3.4.2 Pupil diameter 
Pupil diameter during the first fixation after feedback onset differed significantly between feed-
back type (F1,57 = 80.63, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.59), with subjects across diagnostic groups having larger 
pupil diameter for negative (7.05 ± 1.30mm) than positive feedback (6.90 ± 1.34mm) (see also Figure 
10-11). In addition, pupil diameter during the first fixation after feedback onset differed between incen-
tive conditions (F2,56 = 10.68, p ≤ 0.05, ήp2 = 0.28) and on a trend level between diagnostic groups 
(F2,57 = 2.87, 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10, ήp2 = 0.09). Post-hoc paired-sample t-tests per incentive condition indi-
cated that subjects across diagnostic groups had greater pupil diameter for the two incentive condi-
tions (reward condition: 7.00 ± 1.31mm, punishment condition: 6.99 ± 1.33mm) as compared to the 
neutral condition (6.93 ± 1.31mm; reward – neutral: T66 = 5.41, p < 0.017, dz = 0.66, punishment – 
neutral: T66 = 4.44, p < 0.017, dz = 0.54). Finally post-hoc Scheffé tests indicated a trend for a signifi-
cant difference between patients with MDD and controls for pupil diameter, with patients with MDD 
having overall smaller pupil diameter (6.34 ± 0.94mm) than controls (7.32 ± 1.53mm, 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.10), 
but not as compared to patients with Anxiety (6.76 ± 0.86mm, p = 0.372).  
 
6.3.4.3 Pupil Dilation 
Pupil dilation differed between feedback type (F1,57 = 26.38, p ≤ 0.025, ήp2 = 0.32), which addi-
tionally was modulated by incentive condition (F2,56 = 6.27, p ≤ 0.025, ήp2 = 0.18). Examination of de-
scriptives and graphs (see Figure 10-11) indicated that across subjects of all diagnostic groups, pupil 
diameter dilated after notification of negative outcome (0.028 ± 0.080mm) whereas for positive feed-
back, there was a constriction in pupil diameter (-0.012 ± 0.069mm). Post-hoc paired-sample t-tests 
between different incentive conditions per feedback type indicated that while for negative feedback 
pupil dilation was significantly greater for the reward (0.043 ± 0.090) as compared to the neutral condi-
tion (0.013 ± 0.070; reward – neutral: T66 = 2.44, p < 0.017, dz = 0.30), for positive feedback dilation 
was greater for the punishment condition (-0.022 ± 0.076) as compared to the reward condition (-0.010 ± 
0.069; T66 = 2.20, p < 0.017, dz = 0.27) and on a trend level as compared to the neutral condition (-
0.004 ± 0.061mm; T66 = -1.89, 0.017 ≤ p ≤ 0.05, dz = 0.23). 
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7.  Discussion 
The current study investigated developmental and clinical differences in performance on a 
Reward Saccade Task (RST) in which saccadic eye movements of differing cognitive demand were to 
be performed under a contingency schedule. Specifically, subjects had to perform in random fashion 
either a prosaccade, which is a saccadic eye movement towards a target appearing in the peripheral 
visual field, or an antisaccade, which is a saccadic eye movement towards the mirror location of the 
target, and depending on performance accuracy they could either win or not win 1$ (“reward” condi-
tion), lose or not lose 1$ (“punishment” condition), or did receive performance feedback without mone-
tary implications (“neutral” condition). While prosaccades are externally, visually-guided eye move-
ments that principally rely on visual attention and sensori-motor processes, antisaccades are internally 
guided, voluntary eye movements which rely on inhibitory processes in addition to the same processes 
engaged in prosaccades (attention and sensori-motor systems). Moreover, the structure of the RST 
introduces an additional cognitive load in the form of working memory (remember the significance of 
the saccadic instruction cue, i.e., grey color of the cue signaling an antisaccade trial, and white color 
signaling a prosaccade trial).  
Two stages of the RST were investigated, the actual performance period, and the outcome no-
tification period, from two perspectives, a developmental perspective comparing performance of 
healthy adolescents and adults, and a clinical perspective comparing performance of healthy adoles-
cents with a sample of adolescents with clinical depression and a sample of adolescents with an anxi-
ety disorder. The task performance period was characterized by five parameters: accuracy of saccadic 
responses, saccade latency, saccade peak velocity, saccade duration and saccade amplitude. While 
accuracy provides a more global index of performance, saccade latency, peak velocity, duration and 
amplitude index dynamic characteristics of eye movement preparation (latency) and regulation (peak 
velocity, duration and amplitude). Moreover, all saccadic parameters employed can be mapped onto 
specific neural circuits and thus can be used as an index of the function of these circuits in different 
populations. Reaction to feedback presentation was measured by three parameters: Pupil diameter, 
pupil dilation, and duration of the fist fixation after feedback onset. Findings of the developmental 
study (see chapter 6.2) and the clinical study (see chapter 6.3) are discussed separately.  
 
7.1 Developmental study 
For the developmental aspect of this study, it was hypothesized that 1) adults will outperform 
adolescents on antisaccade trials because of the still ongoing maturation of prefrontal cortex networks 
and cognitive control functions during adolescence, that 2) the prospect of monetary reward will im-
prove task performance across groups, that 3) incentives (i.e. prospect of winning or losing money as 
compared to no monetary implication) will influence task performance in adolescents more strongly 
than in adults, in particular under conditions of comparatively low cognitive control (i.e. weaker incen-
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tive-related modulation of correct antisaccades as compared to antisaccade direction errors and 
prosaccades), and 4) that adolescents will be less affected than adults by negative performance feed-
back. The findings largely support these hypotheses, specifically, 1) cognitive control was superior in 
adults than adolescents as indicated by a higher rate of correct antisaccades and earlier initiation of 
correct antisaccades in adults as compared to adolescents, 2) the prospect of winning money im-
proved global accuracy on the task in both adults and adolescents; 3) adolescents but not adults 
showed an incentive-related modulation of the dynamic characteristics of saccadic eye movements, 
selectively in the context of prosaccades and antisaccade direction errors; and 4) outcome notification 
lead to greater change in eye movement parameters in adults as compared to adolescents. Results 
are discussed in more detail by hypothesis in the sections below. 
 
7.1.1 Age-related differences in RST performance 
As hypothesized, performance on the RST improved with age: Adults performed better than 
adolescents on antisaccade trials as indicated by a higher proportion of correct antisaccades respec-
tively a lower proportion of antisaccade direction errors. In contrast, performance on prosaccade trials 
did not differ significantly between age groups. The lack of a group difference on prosaccade trials 
suggests that the overall efficiency of visually-guided eye movements has reached maturity by adoles-
cence, in line with other developmental research showing adult level performance on prosaccades by 
middle to late childhood (e.g. Fischer, Gezeck et al., 1997; Fukushima et al., 2000; C. Klein & 
Foerster, 2001; Munoz et al., 1998). It also suggests that the additional cognitive load of working 
memory of the RST (remembering which cue asks for which saccadic response) did not affect adoles-
cents and adults differentially during preparation and initiation of a saccade and thus is not a main 
reason for the differences observed in antisaccade performance between age groups. Rather, the 
worse antisaccade performance of adolescents as compared to adults indicates that the cognitive 
capacities and the neural circuits specifically underlying antisaccade performance have not reached 
maturity by adolescence.  
In terms of the neural substrates underlying antisaccade performance, clinical and transla-
tional animal research point towards a central role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in 
determining antisaccade performance accuracy (for review see Broerse et al., 2001; Everling & 
Fischer, 1998; Hutton & Ettinger, 2006; Munoz & Everling, 2004) (see chapter 3.2.1.1). For example, 
transcranial magnetic stimulation applied over the DLPFC 100ms before target onset significantly in-
creases antisaccade error rate (Nyffeler et al., 2007), and patients with lesions of the DLPFC but not 
the parietal cortex show increased error rates on the antisaccade task (for review see Gaymard et al., 
1998; Milea et al., 2005; Pierrot-Deseilligny et al., 2002; Sweeney et al., 2002). The higher number of 
incorrect responses on antisaccade trials in adolescents as compared to adults thus points to imma-
ture prefrontal cortex function in youth, in line with other developmental research showing protracted 
development of the (dorsolateral) prefrontal cortex up until late adolescence/early adulthood (Giedd, 
2004; Giedd et al., 2006) (see chapter 2.1) and in line with eye movement research showing adult 
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performance level on the antisaccade task not before late adolescence (Fischer, Biscaldi et al., 1997; 
Fukushima et al., 2000; Kramer et al., 2005; Luna et al., 2001) (see chapter 3.3).  
In terms of the cognitive capacities underlying antisaccade performance, two main processes 
are proposed to be involved: (1) inhibition of the natural tendency to look at a suddenly appearing 
target, and (2) generation of a saccade in absence of visual input towards the mirror position of the 
target (for review see Broerse et al., 2001; Everling & Fischer, 1998; Hallett & Adams, 1980; Hutton & 
Ettinger, 2006; Munoz & Everling, 2004) (see chapter 3.1). A low proportion of correct antisaccades in 
conjunction with an increased proportion of antisaccade direction errors commonly have been inter-
preted as a failure to inhibit prepotent, reflexive responses. In contrast, a low proportion of correct 
antisaccades in absence of increased numbers of antisaccade direction errors commonly have been 
used as an index for a failure to generate an internally-guided behavior. In addition, the rate of correc-
tive saccades after an antisaccade direction error may be used as an index of the ability to generate 
an internally-guided movement and serve as a proof of task comprehension (e.g. Everling, Dorris et 
al., 1998; Munoz & Everling, 2004). Thus, the results obtained here - increased error rates in adoles-
cents as compared to adults and no difference between age groups in the proportion of correct 
prosaccades and the proportion of corrective saccades - indicate that the worse performance of ado-
lescents on antisaccade trials was not because they could not generate internally-guided voluntary 
behavior, neither in age-related differences in working memory capacities or task understanding, but 
mainly because of an impairment in inhibiting prepotent, reflexive responses.  
Yet, although adolescents were able to perform correct antisaccades per se and corrected 
their direction errors as often as did adults, they did so with significantly greater latency than adults. 
This finding further specifies the above conclusions indicating that although functional and in place, 
internally-guided programming of behavior nevertheless affords more time and cognitive capacity in 
adolescents as compared to adults. Latency of internally-guided saccades has been shown in non-
human primate studies to reflect the pre-target activity and/or the rate of rise in the post-target activity 
of neurons in the supplementary eye fields (SEF) and the frontal eye fields (FEF) located anterior of 
the motor cortex in the frontal lobe (for review see Munoz & Everling, 2004) (see Figure 3-3 and chap-
ter 3.2.1.2). In addition, there is evidence indicating that the rise of activity in the SEF can be modu-
lated by the goal of a task (Stuphorn & Schall, 2006). Thus, longer latency of antisaccades and correc-
tive saccades in the current context may reflect a slower accumulation of neuronal activity in the SEF 
and/or FEF brought about by lower efficiency of goal-related network activity in the frontal cortex in 
adolescents as compared to adults. Similar conclusions have been drawn by Luna et al. (2001), who 
by means of fMRI reported greater activation in adolescents as compared to adults in the DLPFC and 
inferior FEF during performance of an antisaccade task, while adults showed increased activity in pos-
terior cortical and subcortical brain regions. The authors interpreted these findings as indicating in-
complete integration of neural networks orchestrated by the PFC at adolescence, requiring greater 
effort to exert cognitive control over reflexive behaviors as compared to adults (on similar fMRI reports, 
see chapter 2.1.2). Of note, similarly to the finding of increased error rates during the antisaccade 
task, also the finding of increased latencies of internally-guided saccades is in line with other devel-
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opmental research on the antisaccade task, reporting adult level in antisaccade latency and latency of 
corrective saccades not before late adolescence or even early adulthood (e.g. Fischer, Biscaldi et al., 
1997; Munoz et al., 1998) (see chapter 3.3). 
Finally, adolescents had significantly higher peak velocities than adults on correct antisac-
cades. In contrast to the results discussed above about increased antisaccade error rates and latency 
in youth, this finding contradicts other developmental research on antisaccade task performance. To 
my knowledge, two studies to date have compared antisaccade peak velocity between adolescents 
and adults and both of them report no differences between age groups on this measure (Fukushima et 
al., 2000; Luna et al., 2001). Both research groups explain the dissociation in the development of an-
tisaccade latency (improvement during childhood and adolescence) and antisaccade peak velocity (no 
developmental improvement) by the maturational lags of the different neural circuits supporting the two 
functions. Saccade latency, which involves processes before initiation of a saccade, has been shown 
to be modulated by activity of frontal brain areas as reported above. Peak velocity, which involves 
processes of motor regulation, has been proposed to depend on subcortical brain circuits in the brain-
stem and cerebellum (for review see Leigh & Kennard, 2004) (see chapter 3.2.1.3) - circuits that are 
largely developed by early-middle childhood (Fukushima et al., 2000). However, other findings indicate 
that peak velocity can be modulated by activity of prefrontal and/or basal ganglia projections to the 
saccade generation network in the brainstem (see also Figure 3-3 in chapter 3.2). For example, stimu-
lation of the SEF increases peak velocity of anticipatory smooth pursuit eye movements (Missal & 
Heinen, 2001). In contrast, reductions of saccade peak velocity have been observed after inactivation 
of the FEF produced by injection of lidocaine (Sommer & Tehovnik, 1997) or the GABAA agonist mus-
cimol (Dias & Segraves, 1999) and after medication with neuroleptics (Fukushima et al., 2000; 
Straube, Riedel, Eggert, & Muller, 1999). Straube et al. (1999) for example have reported significantly 
reduced peak velocity of internally-guided saccades (i.e. antisaccades or memory-guided saccades) 
but not externally-guided saccades (i.e. prosaccades) in patients medicated with neuroleptics as com-
pared to their pre-medication state and as compared to controls. An increase in peak velocity of inter-
nally-guided saccades has also been reported in non-human primates under the influence of reward, 
which has been proposed to be mediated through the basal ganglia or prefrontal input to the brain-
stem saccade generation network (e.g. Kawagoe et al., 1998; Kobayashi et al., 2002; Takikawa, Ka-
wagoe, Itoh et al., 2002) (see chapter 7.1.3). Finally, changes in saccade peak velocity have been 
observed under influence of anesthetics, leading to the use of this measure as a biophysical index of 
alertness, and sedation during anesthesia (for review see Khan, Taylor, & Jones, 2000). Thus, the 
increased peak velocity observed in adolescents as compared to adults in this study may reflect age-
related differences in upstream (i.e. prefrontal cortical and/or basal ganglia) modulation of the brain-
stem saccade generation circuit, brought about by structural differences in these upstream brain ar-
eas, higher sensitivity of these brain areas to the reward context in which the task was performed in 
adolescents as compared to adults, and/or as a result of an increased level of arousal in adolescents 
as compared to adults. Less likely is that maturational changes in the brainstem itself lead to differ-
ences in peak velocity between age groups. 
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Finally, the age-related differences in RST performance obtained here are consistent with the 
data published in 2006 that were based on the same task and largely the same subject group (Jazbec 
et al., 2006), with some exceptions. For example, increased latencies for correct antisaccades in ado-
lescents as compared to adults were also observed in the previous publication, but the group differ-
ences did not reach significance. In addition, similarly to the current results, higher peak velocity in 
adolescents as compared to adults were observed in the Jazbec et al. (2006) study, however group 
differences reached significance for correct prosaccades and antisaccade direction errors, whereas in 
the current study, group differences reached significance for correct antisaccades. These differences 
in results observed between the two studies might be due to several methodological differences, such 
as number of subjects (in the current study, data of 9 additional adolescents were included), and in 
terms of differences in data extraction procedures and criteria used. For example, in the Jazbec et al. 
(2006) study, saccade parameters were extracted from the raw data based on information about fixa-
tions, whereas in the current study, saccades were defined independent from information about fixa-
tions based on saccade velocity and size, a procedure more commonly used in eye movement re-
search (Fischer, Gezeck et al., 1997).  
 
7.1.2 Incentive-related modulation of RST performance across age groups 
As predicted, the prospect of a monetary gain improved accuracy of prosaccades and antisac-
cades in both age groups, i.e. subjects across age groups had a higher proportion of correct prosac-
cades and correct antisaccades for the reward condition as compared to the neutral, non-incentive 
condition. This improvement in task performance was expected based on the neuroscience conceptu-
alization of rewards being anything an organism will put forth effort to obtain (Rolls, 2000) (see chapter 
2.2.1.1), and based on results obtained in non-human primates (Kawagoe et al., 1998; Kobayashi et 
al., 2002; Takikawa, Kawagoe, Itoh et al., 2002) and one human study (Duka & Lupp, 1997) reporting 
enhanced accuracy of internally-guided eye movements under incentives (see chapter 3.5). Impor-
tantly, this improvement by the prospect of monetary gain indicates that the incentive manipulation of 
the RST exerted its desired influence. 
The threat of a monetary loss (punishment condition) also influenced performance accuracy in 
a similar fashion in adults and adolescents. However, its effect was more complex than that of re-
wards: It improved accuracy on antisaccade trials, but not on prosaccade trials as compared to the 
non-incentive, neutral condition. This latter finding is in line with the results published by Jazbec et al. 
(2006) obtained by a different data preparation procedure and with a smaller sample size. Specifically, 
in the Jazbec et al. (2006) study, accuracy was determined by the location of the first fixation after 
target onset, whereas in the current analysis, accuracy was determined by the direction of the first 
saccade after target onset.  
There are two possibilities that may explain lack of improvement of task performance on the 
punishment condition of prosaccade trials. First, it may reflect increased attentional engagement with a 
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threat-associated stimulus, hampering attention allocation towards a new position and initiation of a 
saccadic eye movement towards it. Alternatively, it may reflect avoidance of a threat-related stimulus, 
assuming that not only the cue but also the target was associated by subjects with the threat of losing 
money during the punishment condition. Both possibilities comply with cognitive models and research 
on emotional biases in information processing in low-anxious individuals, which suggests that stimuli 
perceived as highly threatening draw increased attentional resources, whereas mildly threatening 
stimuli are avoided, presumably in an attempt of emotion regulation to preserve a positive mood state 
(e.g. MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; for review see Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Mogg, Bradley, & Hallowell, 
1994). In addition, both possibilities are in line with the finding of  improved performance on the pun-
ishment condition for correct antisaccades: On one hand, increased attentional engagement with the 
cue signaling threat allows more time for the voluntary antisaccade away from the target to be pro-
grammed, given that programming of a correct antisaccade commonly requires more time that that of 
visually-guided saccades (for review see Broerse et al., 2001; Fischer, 1999; Hutton & Ettinger, 2006; 
Munoz & Everling, 2004) (see chapter 3.1.1.2). On the other hand, attention allocation away from a 
threat-associated stimulus complies with the antisaccade instruction of moving away from the target. 
Finally, saccade latency was increased on punishment trials for correct responses as compared to the 
reward and neutral condition across subjects, although reaching within-group significance only for 
adolescents (see Table 9-11, for discussion of developmental differences in RST performance, see 
paragraph below). In stimulus-response tasks, increased latency of a response in conjunction with an 
emotionally salient stimulus commonly has been taken as an index of increased attentional engage-
ment with the stimulus (Mogg & Bradley, 1998, see also paragraph below). Thus, both possibilities - 
increased attentional engagement with a threat-associated stimulus or avoidance of a threat-related 
stimulus - may apply to explain deterioration of performance on prosaccade but improvement on an-
tisaccade trials during the punishment condition, the first one possibly affecting more strongly adoles-
cents, the second one adults.  
 
7.1.3 Incentive-related modulation of RST performance: Developmental differences 
While global accuracy (percent correct responses – percent direction errors) was modulated 
by incentives similarly across groups, the dynamic measures of task performance showed a more 
complex pattern of modulation by incentives with some noticeable differences between age groups. 
Specifically, while adults did not show significant within-group differences between the three incentive 
conditions for any dynamic parameter of any primary saccade analyzed (i.e. correct antisaccades, 
correct prosaccades or antisaccade direction errors, see Table 9-11), adolescents showed a clear 
modulation of dynamic saccade parameters for correct prosaccades and antisaccade direction errors. 
For example, adolescents initiated correct prosaccades later and with higher peak velocity when fac-
ing the threat of monetary loss as compared to the reward respectively the neutral condition and as 
compared to adults. In terms of antisaccade direction errors, the same was true for the prospect of 
winning money, i.e. adolescents initiated antisaccade direction errors later for the reward condition and 
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with higher peak velocity than for the other incentive conditions and as compared to adults. In contrast, 
adults but not adolescents showed a more pronounced modulation of corrective saccades, i.e. for 
saccades initiated after an antisaccade direction error. 
As mentioned above, increased reaction times in conjunction with emotionally salient stimuli 
such as threats may indicate increased capture of attention by these stimuli. For example, in the emo-
tional Stroop color-naming task, in which subjects have to name the color in which words with emo-
tional contents are printed, increased color-naming latency commonly is interpreted as reflecting the 
extent to which attentional resources are engaged by the emotional content of the word (Mogg & Brad-
ley, 1998). Thus, more time needed to program and initiate a simple, visually-guided prosaccade in 
adolescents during the punishment condition as compared to the other conditions and as compared to 
adults might indicate that the prospect of a monetary loss engaged more attentional resources in ado-
lescents as compared to adults. Alternatively or in parallel, more time needed to program and initiate a 
simple visually-guided eye movement under the punishment condition may indicate that adolescents 
were more strongly disrupted by the prospect of a monetary loss than adults. Evidence supporting this 
notion is the deterioration of global performance (for discussion see chapter 7.1.2 above) and the in-
creased peak velocities of adolescents for correct prosaccades under the punishment condition, given 
that peak velocity serves as an indicator of arousal (for review see Khan et al., 2000) (see also chapter 
7.1.1). Finally, a dissociation of prosaccade performance on the two incentive conditions in adoles-
cents, with delayed initiation and deterioration of performance on the punishment condition, but effi-
cient initiation and improved performance for the reward condition, points towards a conflict between 
motivational and cognitive demands of the task in youth: During the prosaccade instruction, gazing at 
the target under the reward condition is congruent with the motivation to approach a reward, while for 
the punishment condition, the cognitive demand to gaze at the target contradicts the natural motivation 
to avoid a threat-associated stimulus. Thus, all of these scenarios alone or in combination essentially 
imply that adolescents were more strongly affected in performance of a simple visually-guided eye 
movement by the threat of a monetary punishment as were adults.  
A higher conflict between motivational and cognitive aspects of task performance in adoles-
cents as compared to adults also offers a readily explanation for the increased latency and peak veloc-
ity observed in adolescents for antisaccade direction errors under the reward condition. That is, more 
time to initiate an (incorrect) eye movement when facing the prospect of a potential monetary gain 
might reflect a conflict between the motivation to approach a reward-related stimulus and the antisac-
cade instruction of having to gaze away from it. In non-human primate studies, such conflicts between 
cognitive and motivational task requirements for internally-guided saccades such as memory-guided 
saccades and their errors have been reported (memory-guided saccades are eye movements towards 
a remembered location, see also Figure 3-1). For example, in a study by Takikawa et al. (2002), mon-
keys had to perform memory-guided saccades towards four different directions, only one of them be-
ing associated with reward. When examining the trajectories of erroneous saccades, the researchers 
noticed that they had curved shapes, the saccade initially being directed towards the required, non-
rewarded location, but in mid-flight diverted to the rewarded location, and vice versa for some of the 
DISCUSSION  92 
correct saccades. Thus, these results indicate that adolescents are not only hampered for visually-
guided prosaccades by the threat of losing money, but also for the preparation of internally-guided 
antisaccades by the prospect of obtaining rewards.  
In contrast to prosaccades and antisaccade direction errors, there was no age-specific modu-
lation of dynamic saccade parameters by incentives for correct antisaccades. This finding was ex-
pected based on the higher cognitive control that is necessary for the performance of a correct an-
tisaccade (see also chapter 3.1). The advance of neuroimaging studies in child populations has accu-
mulated evidence indicating that the lower the age and the more fragile the emotional mental health of 
an individual (i.e. adolescents with mood disturbances vs. healthy adolescents vs. adults), the stronger 
the activation of subcortical limbic brain areas associated with evaluation of the emotional significance 
of stimuli such as the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and amygdala (for review on these neural circuits, 
see chapter 2.2.1.1) by emotionally challenging stimuli such as threats or rewards - unless attention is 
captured by cognitively demanding operations, in which case lower age and mood disturbances are 
associated with increased recruitment of prefrontal cortical areas (Levesque et al., 2004; Monk, 
McClure et al., 2003) (see chapters 2.2.2 and 2.2.3). These findings have been employed to suggest 
that recruitment of cognitive control as a major function of the prefrontal cortex (for review see chapter 
2.1.2) may normalize function of subcortical brain regions mediating affective states and impulses (e.g. 
Monk et al., 2008). Similar conclusions can be drawn from clinical and every-day observations with 
adolescents. For example, on the Stroop color-naming task, phobic individuals commonly show a 
naming interference effect of threat-related stimuli (i.e. they are slower to name the color in which a 
word with a threatening emotional content is written) – unless they are tested in close physical or tem-
poral vicinity to their phobic object in which case they show no interference effect presumably due to 
the recruitment of additional cognitive resources (a process called “strategic override”, for review see 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998). In addition, many parents and teachers have made the painful observation 
that adolescents are very well able to reflect on the negative consequences of risky actions such as 
smoking or unsafe sexual behaviors until they are in midst their peers, where they will commit these 
very same actions they rated as highly dangerous before (for review and reflection see also Steinberg, 
2004, 2005). This phenomenon of note has lead developmental neuroscientists to ask for experimen-
tal designs in which adolescent behavioral propensities are probed under “hot” cognitions and under 
closer approximations of real-life situations, as opposed to asking adolescents on their thoughts about 
hypothetical risk scenarios.  
Finally, in contrast to the findings on the primary saccades after target onset (i.e. correct pro- 
and antisaccades, and antisaccade direction errors) a more complex picture emerged for dynamics of 
secondary, corrective saccades. Here, not only adolescents, but also adults showed a significant 
within-group modulation of dynamic performance parameters by incentives, and this pattern of modu-
lation differed between groups. In terms of latency, adolescents initiated corrective gazes faster on 
both incentive conditions as compared to the neutral condition, while adults had longer saccade la-
tency for the reward as compared to the punishment and neutral conditions. In terms of peak velocity 
and amplitude, only adults, but not adolescents showed a modulation by incentives. Specifically, 
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adults had higher peak velocity and larger saccade amplitude for the reward as compared to the neu-
tral condition, and larger amplitude for the reward as compared to the neutral and punishment condi-
tions.  
This pattern of findings for corrective saccades indicates that whereas performance in adults 
for primary saccades may have reached a ceiling that could not be modulated substantially by context 
(i.e. incentives) anymore, initiation and regulation of corrective saccades was actually based on infor-
mation about incentives in this age group. Correction of a direction error depends on two basic sets of 
mechanisms, one responsible for error detection, and one for initiating remedial actions (Nieuwenhuis, 
Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001). Neuroimaging, neuropsychological, electrophysiological and 
non-human primate studies implicate the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC, for review see Bush et al., 
2000; Paus, 2001; Rushworth et al., 2004) and for eye movements also the adjacent SEF (Stuphorn et 
al., 2000) in such an error processing system. Both receive dopaminergic input from the VTA (Gaspar 
et al., 1992) and thus are able to base error monitoring on information about environmental contingen-
cies (for review on incentive-related modulation of ACC activity, see Rushworth et al., 2004). Accord-
ing to Rushworth et al. (2004, pg. 416) the “ACC’s most crucial contribution in the domain of action-
outcome associations may be in guiding decisions whether the expected value of a reward means that 
it is worth acting”. The current results of stronger modulation of corrective saccades by incentives in 
adults as compared to adolescents thus may reflect a progressively more efficient error monitoring 
system with age that facilitates remedial behavior and maintenance of goal-related actions in situa-
tions for which a reward can be obtained. This notion is also supported by the finding that adults cor-
rected their errors significantly earlier than adolescents (mean correction time for adults was 124.87 ± 
79.90ms, for adolescents 229.63 ± 139.23ms), and corrected more errors than adolescents although 
this difference did not reach significance (proportion of antisaccade error corrected by adults: 80.46 ± 
24.05%; and adolescents: 71.63 ± 20.16%; F1,60 = 2.47, p = 0.121, n.s). 
In sum, as hypothesized, RST task performance was improved by incentives in both age 
groups, in particular under conditions of high cognitive control (i.e. for correct antisaccades, and in 
adults for corrective saccades), but deteriorated performance of adolescents under conditions of low 
cognitive control (i.e. visually-guided eye movements such as prosaccades and antisaccade direction 
errors). In a previous study using the RST (Jazbec et al., 2006), similar findings were reported, al-
though this study was based on a smaller sample size and used different data extraction procedures. 
Specifically, Jazbec et al. (2006) reported improved accuracy for the prospect of winning a monetary 
reward, and decreased accuracy on prosaccades for the threat of monetary loss. In terms of dynamic 
performance measures, Jazbec et al. (2006) reported similarly to the current study no differences be-
tween groups in incentive-related modulation of correct antisaccades, but of antisaccade direction 
errors. However, in contrast to the present results, no differences were found in incentive-related 
modulation of correct prosaccades. These findings are also consistent with the one study in human 
adults (24 males, age 29.3 ± 6.2 years) that examined the effect of monetary incentives on visually-
guided saccades, antisaccades, and memory-guided saccades (Duka & Lupp, 1997). Similarly to the 
current study, Duka and Lupp (1997) reported that monetary reward improved accuracy of antisac-
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cades, without affecting dynamic antisaccade parameters. However, in contrast to the current study, 
Duka and Lupp (1997) did not find an influence of the prospect of monetary reward on accuracy of 
visually-guided saccades. This disparity in findings might be due to differences between the two stud-
ies in the way in which monetary incentives were administered: While in Duka and Lupp (1997) study 
the monetary incentive was a global “honorarium” at the end of testing for a “particularly good per-
formance”, it was delivered in the current study on a trial-by-trial basis in conjunction with immediate 
performance outcome notification. Finally, the findings from this study are partly supported by findings 
from non-human primate studies reporting in line with the data obtained here an influence of incen-
tives on dynamic parameters of eye movements, but in contrast to the current findings for internally-
guided saccades. Specifically, in non-human primates, memory-guided saccades have been reported 
to have shorter latency (Kawagoe et al., 1998; Kobayashi et al., 2002; Lauwereyns, Watanabe et al., 
2002; Roesch & Olson, 2003; Takikawa, Kawagoe, Itoh et al., 2002), faster peak velocity (Kawagoe et 
al., 1998; Kobayashi et al., 2002; Leon & Shadlen, 1999; Roesch & Olson, 2003; Takikawa, Kawagoe, 
Itoh et al., 2002); and lower rates of error and fixation breaks (Kobayashi et al., 2002; Lauwereyns, 
Takikawa et al., 2002; Roesch & Olson, 2003; Takikawa, Kawagoe, Itoh et al., 2002) under expecta-
tion of (high) reward as compared to no or low reward. This disparity of findings may be due to spe-
cies-specific differences in neural circuits underlying cognitive control, and/or differences in suscepti-
bility to incentives of neural substrates underlying antisaccade versus memory-guided saccade per-
formance. 
 
7.1.4 Incentive-related modulation of RST performance: Implications for brain maturation 
What conclusions can be drawn from these findings of differential developmental modulation 
of saccadic eye movements of differing cognitive demand by incentives about the maturation of re-
ward-related neural circuits during adolescence and the interaction of cognitive-regulatory and affec-
tive brain systems? As reviewed in chapter 3.5, the influence of incentives on saccade performance 
has been proposed to be mediated by cortical inputs, and/or by the basal ganglia pathway projecting 
directly or indirectly to the superior colliculus and the saccade generation network in the brainstem. In 
both of these brain regions, neurons are modulated by incentives before, during or after performance 
of internally-guided saccadic eye movements. For example, a subpopulation of neurons in the monkey 
LPFC and DLPFC have been shown to adjust their firing rate in relation to presence or absence of 
reward on a memory-guided saccade task (Kobayashi et al., 2002; Leon & Shadlen, 1999). Similar 
results have been obtained for the SEF (Amador, Schlag-Rey, & Schlag, 2000; Stuphorn et al., 2000) 
and ACC (Niki & Watanabe, 1976, 1979; Sweeney, Takarae, Macmillan, Luna, & Minshew, 2004), 
however, here incentive-related modulation of neural activity is temporally more closely related to de-
livery of reward after performance of the operant response, which would comply with the notion of 
these brain areas being involved in performance monitoring (see above). In a careful study by Roesch 
and Olson (2003) neurons from several frontal cortical areas (i.e. DLPFC, SEF, SMA, FEF, and in 
particular in the premotor cortex) showed enhanced responses for expectation of a large versus a 
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small reward in a memory-guided saccade task. Similarly, in the basal ganglia caudate nucleus (CN) 
neurons have been shown to exhibit enhanced activity before and after presentation of a cue instruct-
ing a specific eye movement during a reward-associated memory-guided saccade task (Lauwereyns, 
Takikawa et al., 2002; Lauwereyns, Watanabe et al., 2002). According to the authors, anticipatory 
activity of CN neurons might lead to an enhancement of visual discrimination of the cue by CN projec-
tions to the cortex, and/or inhibit the substantia nigra par reticulata (SNPr) in the midbrain which in turn 
would facilitate saccade generation by the superior colliculus (SC) (Lauwereyns, Takikawa et al., 
2002; Sato & Hikosaka, 2002) (for review on the basal ganglia pathway to the brainstem generation 
network, see Figure 3-3). Indeed, incentive-related modulation of neural activity has also been re-
ported for the SNpr (Sato & Hikosaka, 2002) and SC (Ikeda, Takikawa, & Hikosaka, 2001) neurons, 
and activity in CN neurons has been shown to correlate positively with saccade peak velocity and 
saccade latency (Kawagoe et al., 1998). Based on these results, it has been suggested that while the 
prefrontal cortex changes the cognitive aspects of behavior based on expected reward outcomes, the 
basal ganglia changes its motor aspects (Kobayashi et al., 2002).  
Putting the findings from the non-human primate studies just reviewed in relation to a) devel-
opmental cognitive neuroscience models proposing enhanced dopaminergic activity at the level of the 
Nucleus accumbens (NAcc) in adolescence (Chambers & Potenza, 2003; Chambers et al., 2003), b) 
reports from fMRI studies showing enhanced activity in the NAcc in response to rewards in adoles-
cents as compared to adults (Ernst et al., 2005; Galvan et al., 2006), and to c) reports from functional 
and structural MRI showing ongoing functional and structural integration of neural networks orches-
trated by the PFC including the ACC up until early adulthood (Davies, Segalowitz, & Gavin, 2004; 
Giedd, 2004) – i.e. brain regions that have been implicated in goal-directed behavior, executive cogni-
tive control, response conflict resolution between incongruent responses, and error monitoring (for 
review see Miller & D'Esposito, 2005; Rushworth et al., 2004), the current results may indicate that the 
prospect of winning money and threat of losing money could have led in adolescents to higher pretar-
get neural activity in the basal ganglia as compared to adults, facilitating saccade initiation congruent 
with the motivational, but not the cognitive demand of task performance, whereas the resulting re-
sponse conflict could not be tempered by regulatory prefrontal control. Such an interpretation is also 
supported by the study of Duka and Lupp (1997) investigating the effect of monetary incentives and 
administration of the dopamine agonist levodopa on antisaccade performance in adults: While incen-
tives improved antisaccade performance, administration of levodopa increased antisaccade error rate. 
The authors tried to reconcile these seemingly contradictory findings by proposing that administration 
of levodopa might have lead to an increase of dopamine subcortically in the basal ganglia that might 
have increased responsiveness, while incentives improved cognitive control prefrontally. Similarly, 
increased antisaccade error rates and latency have been observed after administration of ampheta-
mine in chronic amphetamine abusers (Dursun, Wright, & Reveley, 1999), and finally subcortical hy-
perdopaminergia and/or prefrontal hypodopaminergia have been implicated in leading to increased 
antisaccade error rates and antisaccade latencies in patients with schizophrenia (e.g. Fukushima et 
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al., 2000; Hutton & Ettinger, 2006). Further research, combining the RST with fMRI is needed to fur-
ther address these hypotheses. 
 
7.1.5 Feedback notification 
For the feedback notification period of the RST, it was hypothesized that adolescents would be 
less sensitive for negative feedback as compared to adults. Findings supported this hypothesis. Spe-
cifically, while adolescents did not show a different modulation of pupil dilation by incentive conditions 
for negative feedback, adults dilated the pupil significantly more when obtaining negative feedback for 
the reward condition (i.e. notification of not winning money) and on a trend level for the punishment 
condition (i.e. notification of losing money) as compared to the non-incentive, neutral condition (notifi-
cation of inaccurate performance without monetary implications). Moreover, adults differed significantly 
from adolescents in pupil dilation for both incentive conditions, with adults showing greater pupil dila-
tion than adolescents. For absolute pupil diameter, stronger modulation of pupil diameter by incentives 
was obtained in adults as compared to adolescents, although such a modulation could be observed 
for adolescents as well. 
Reduced influence of negative feedback in adolescents as compared to adults was expected 
based on the triadic model proposed by Ernst et al. (2006) which suggests that decreased activity of 
harm-avoidant brain systems such as the amygdala in conjunction with insufficient PFC control may 
contribute to increased risk-taking behavior during adolescence (see chapter 2.2.2.4). In support for 
this assumption, Ernst et al. (2005) reported reduced activity in the amygdala after notification of not 
winning money in a monetary decision-making task in adolescents as compared to adults.  
Behaviorally, reduced pupil dilation indexes reduced attentional engagement by feedback noti-
fication and/or reduced cognitive processing of feedback in adolescents as compared to adults 
(Beatty, 1982; Joos et al., 2003; Liversedge & Findlay, 2000; Steinhauer & Hakerem, 1992; 
Steinhauer et al., 2004). Reports of pupil dilation after amygdala stimulation (Koikegami & Yoshida, 
1953) and DLPFC recruitment (Siegle et al., 2003) indeed suggest that this might be due to reduced 
activity in the amygdala and/or DLPFC in adolescents as compared to adults. However, more research 
on the RST in combination with neuroimaging methods is necessary to make more definite conclu-
sions about the underlying neural mechanisms mediating this finding.  
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7.2 Clinical study 
For the clinical part of this study, it was hypothesized that 1) diagnostic state would not influ-
ence task performance based on reports of little or no difference in saccade performance between 
adults with MDD and controls (for review see Sweeney et al., 2002), however 2) that adolescents from 
the control group would differ from adolescents with mood and anxiety disorders in the way they 
modulate task performance parameters by incentives. Specifically, it was expected that adolescents 
with MDD would show a weaker modulation of task parameters based on notions of low positive affect 
and anhedonia in depression, which can be operationalized as decreased effort (motivation) to obtain 
positive outcomes (i.e. obtain rewards and avoid punishments). In contrast, for patients with an anxiety 
disorders, it was hypothesized that they would show an attentional bias for negative information and 
exhibit a strong motivation to avoid negative outcomes (i.e. avoid monetary punishment) based on 
notions of hypersensitivity to threats in anxiety disorders. Finally, it was hypothesized that 3) controls 
would differ from both patient groups in the way they respond to outcome notification. Here, it was 
expected that again based on the notion of decreased positive affect patients with MDD would be less 
responsive to positive outcomes than controls, indexed by less reactivity of autonomous responses 
such as (change in) pupil diameter when receiving positive performance feedback. For patients with 
anxiety, it was expected that based on the notion of hypersensitivity to punishment they would avoid 
negative information as compared to controls, indexed by shorter fixation duration and/or decreased 
pupil dilation when receiving negative feedback.  
The findings largely support these hypotheses. First, there were no significant main effects of 
diagnosis on any single task parameter investigated, indicating that the three groups did not differ in 
their ability to perform internally- and externally-guided eye movements per se. However, groups dif-
fered in the way they modulated different saccade parameters by incentives: Specifically, while ado-
lescents from the control group showed a clear improvement of task performance by incentives under 
high, but less so for low cognitive control, patients with MDD failed to optimize monetary pay-off re-
gardless of saccade type, and patients with anxiety exhibited an attentional bias for the punishment 
condition. Results will be discussed below in more detail addressing incentive-related modulation of 
task parameters for each clinical group in relation to performance of the control group. For a more 
detailed discussion of the performance pattern observed in the adolescent group, the reader is re-
ferred to chapter 7.1. 
 
7.2.1 Modulation of RST performance in adolescents with MDD 
Whereas adolescents from the control group showed a clear influence of incentives on RST 
performance, with improvement by incentives for saccades of high cognitive control (i.e. antisaccades, 
corrective saccades), but interference by incentives for saccades of low cognitive control (i.e. visually-
guided prosaccades and antisaccade direction errors), patients with MDD were not able to modulate 
performance on the RST to maximize financial pay-off.  
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For example, in terms of global performance measures, patients with MDD did not show an 
improvement under the prospect of monetary gain (i.e. the reward condition) as compared to the non-
incentive, neutral condition for both prosaccade and antisaccade trials, which is at a stark contrast to 
performance of adult and adolescent controls. In addition, patients with MDD did not modulate global 
performance in order to avoid a monetary punishment. For example, in contrast to controls, patients 
with MDD did not perform better on antisaccade trials under the punishment condition, where avoiding 
the threat-associated stimulus was congruent with the task requirement of moving the eyes away from 
the target. On prosaccade trials, patients with MDD similarly to controls had worse performance under 
the punishment condition as compared to the reward condition, but in contrast to controls they also 
performed worse under the punishment condition as compared to the non-incentive, neutral condition. 
Finally, patients with MDD corrected on a trend level but with a relevant effect size of 0.43 (for discus-
sion on effect sizes, see chapter 7.3) less antisaccade direction errors that occurred under the pun-
ishment condition as compared to the neutral condition, whereas controls and patients with an anxiety 
disorder showed the opposite pattern of incentive-related modulation of correction of erroneous re-
sponses. In sum, the global performance pattern of patients with MDD under incentives supports the 
hypothesis that patients with MDD did not put forth effort to obtain reward, nor to avoid punishment. In 
fact, there seemed to be a deterioration of global task performance in patients with MDD under the 
threat of monetary punishment. 
This pattern of (absent) incentive-related modulation in patients with MDD was expected 
based on clinical observations, etiological models of MDD and previous behavioral results in adults 
and adolescents with MDD. For example, as reviewed in chapter 2.2.3.1.2, the research group around 
Dahl and Forbes (e.g. Forbes et al., 2006; Forbes & Dahl, 2005; Forbes et al., 2007) propose that not 
only adults but also adolescents with MDD suffer from decreased positive affect, which they suggest is 
reflected in either decreased motivation to pursue natural or conditioned rewards, and/or diminished 
subjective experience of enjoying rewards. In adults, several models have been postulated that at their 
core propose a reduction in positive affect for patients with MDD, such as the “tripartite model” (Clark 
& Watson, 1991), the reduced social reinforcement-model (Lewinsohn et al., 1985) or the under-active 
behavioral facilitation system-model in MDD (Depue & Iacono, 1989). In addition, behavioral studies in 
adults with MDD consistently document decreased responsivity to experimentally presented positive 
stimuli. For example, adults with depression or dysphoria versus controls have been shown to exhibit 
less positive expressive behavior in response to pleasant film and drink stimuli (Berenbaum & 
Oltmanns, 1992) or pleasant pictorial stimuli (Sloan et al., 1997; Sloan et al., 2001), to exhibit reduced 
heart rate reactivity to amusing short films (Rottenberg et al., 2002), reduced facial EMG reactivity to 
happy but not sad facial expressions (Sloan et al., 2002), and finally to exhibit a failure in response 
bias for monetary rewards (Henriques & Davidson, 2000; Henriques et al., 1994; Hughes et al., 1985; 
Pizzagalli et al., 2005). Indeed, the studies investigating responses to monetary rewards in adult MDD 
are grossly in line with the results obtained in the current thesis for adolescents with MDD. For exam-
ple, in the study by Henriques and Davidson (2000) performance of adults with MDD and controls was 
compared on a verbal recognition task under monetary incentives (reward of 0.10$ for a correct re-
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sponse), monetary penalty (loss of 0.10$ for an incorrect response) or a neutral condition (accuracy 
feedback without monetary implication). Results indicated that while controls showed an approach-
related behavior that served to maximize their monetary earnings, patients with MDD did not change 
their pattern of responding for either the reward condition, and when excluding patients with comorbid 
anxiety disorders, also for the punishment condition. Similarly, in the study by Pizzagalli et al. (2005) 
subjects with high scores on the BDI failed to show an increase in facilitatory behavior on a signal-
detection task in response to a reinforcing monetary stimulus. In terms of adolescent MDD, a recently 
published behavioral study by Forbes et al. (2007) reported that boys with a depressive disorder fail to 
choose options with high probability of yielding a high monetary reward on a reward-related decision-
making task. However, somewhat surprisingly, to my knowledge no research has investigated reward-
related behavior in depressed adolescents with psychophysiological or neuroscience -based methods 
prior to the data published in this thesis (Jazbec et al., 2005). In the Jazbec et al. (2005) study using 
the RST, but with less subjects and different data extraction procedures, reduced reactivity in adoles-
cents with MDD to incentives also has been reported, however, in this study results were analyzed 
selectively for antisaccade direction errors.  
Similarly to the results obtained for global performance measures, adolescents with MDD also 
did not show any significant within-group modulation by incentives for dynamic performance measures 
such as latency, peak velocity and amplitude. These findings are in line with the results on global task 
performance and studies outlined above (Henriques & Davidson, 2000; Henriques et al., 1994; Pizza-
galli et al., 2005) and extend the results from the eye movement study by Jazbec et al. (2005) and 
Hardin et al. (2007), both reporting no modulation of latency and peak velocity of antisaccade direction 
errors by incentives in adolescent patients with MDD. Yet, despite the lack of significant effects, closer 
examination of the data revealed several consistent trends for a within-group incentive-related modula-
tion of dynamic antisaccade parameters in patients with MDD, all with practically relevant effect sizes 
of above 0.4. Specifically, patients with MDD differed in their modulation of dynamic performance pa-
rameters between the reward and neutral, respectively the punishment condition. Moreover, there 
were significant group differences between adolescents with MDD and controls for dynamic measures 
of correct antisaccades, with patients initiating saccades earlier, with faster peak velocity and with 
larger amplitude as compared to controls under the threat of monetary loss. These results point to-
wards a greater interference of incentives on motor behavior under conditions of high cognitive control 
in adolescents with MDD as compared to controls or patients with anxiety, with reward possibly im-
proving cognitive control (i.e. similar performance between controls and patients with MDD on the 
reward condition), and punishment deteriorating cognitive control (differences between groups on the 
punishment condition). Indeed, adults with MDD commonly have been reported to show state-
dependant impairments in several functions underlying executive cognitive control such as working 
memory, attentional set shifting, and response inhibition (for review see Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 
2001; Rogers et al., 2004). For example, Sweeney et al. (1998) reported increased antisaccade errors 
rates and dysmetric visually-guided saccades in a sample of severely depressed adults with MDD, the 
latter finding also being found in the adolescent patient group in this study.  
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Finally, for the outcome notification period of the RST, it was hypothesized that patients with 
MDD would show less engagement by positive outcomes, as evidenced by shorter fixation duration 
and/or decreased pupil dilation both of which are measures of attentional engagement and/or cogni-
tive demand (for review see Beatty, 1982; Joos et al., 2003; Steinhauer & Hakerem, 1992; Steinhauer 
et al., 2004). Yet, in contrast to predictions, there was no significant difference between patients with 
MDD and controls for positive feedback for any of the parameters measured. However, for negative 
feedback, patients with MDD fixated notification of a monetary loss significantly longer than did con-
trols or patients with anxiety. Such a finding suggests that patients with MDD devoted more processing 
resources to notification of negative feedback as compared to the other diagnostic groups. This finding 
is in line with reports on attentional biases in patients with depression, for example found on the visual 
dot-probe task, which is a reaction time task analogue to the emotional Stroop task, but with visual 
instead of verbal stimuli. These studies have consistently reported an attentional bias for subjects with 
MDD or subclinical depression for negative information that is displayed for longer stimulus durations 
of about one second (Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004; 
Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995). In terms of eye movement studies, Eizenman, Yu et al. (2003) and 
Caseras, Garner, Bradley, and Mogg (2007) found that adults with depression or dysphoria fixate pic-
tures depicting negative scenes longer as compared to neutral pictures respectively as compared to 
controls. As pointed out by Caseras et al. (2007), a bias in the maintenance of attention on negative 
information may be an important factor sustaining dysphoric mood, and could be caused by difficulty in 
disengaging attention from the spatial location of negative cues, or enhanced elaborative processing 
of negative material. The current data indicates that such a bias for processing negative information is 
already evident in eye movement parameters of adolescents with MDD. 
In sum, adolescents with MDD in contrast to adolescent controls showed no improvement of 
global performance on the RST under incentives, and exhibited a sound tendency for incentives to 
influence dynamic parameters of eye movements of high cognitive demand. Moreover, patients with 
MDD exhibited an attentional bias for negative information, as indexed by longer fixation duration for 
negative outcomes. These results are in line with models and findings on adult and adolescent MDD 
suggesting not only a decrease in reward-seeking behaviors and positive affect (e.g. Depue & Iacono, 
1989; Forbes et al., 2006; Forbes & Dahl, 2005; Forbes et al., 2007), but also an increase in negative 
affect (Clark & Watson, 1991; Joiner et al., 1996; Joiner & Lonigan, 2000; Lonigan, Hooe, David, & 
Kistner, 1999; Lonigan, Phillips, & Hooe, 2003; Lonigan et al., 2004; Watson et al., 1995). For exam-
ple, Lonigan et al. (2004) have proposed that increased negative affect in conjunction with low execu-
tive control may be a risk factor for developing an internalizing disorder such as an anxiety or depres-
sive disorder in youth (see also chapter 2.2.3.1.3).  
What conclusions can be drawn from these findings about the underlying neural mechanisms 
that may mark vulnerability for suffering from depression in adulthood? In adult MDD, prominent neu-
roscience models based on a variety of research methods suggest hypofunction of cognitive-executive 
brain systems such as the DLPFC, and hyperfunction of affective brain systems such as the orbi-
tofrontal and ventromedial PFC and the amygdala, with an important role of the ACC in reciprocally 
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balancing activity in these two systems (R. J. Davidson et al., 2002; Drevets, 2000, 2001; Mayberg, 
1997; Phillips, Drevets, Rauch, & Lane, 2003b) (see also chapter 2.2.1 and Figure 2-11). In addition, 
several authors have proposed dysfunction of the mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic system in depres-
sion (Depue & Collins, 1999; Drevets, 2001; Nestler & Carlezon, 2006). Similarly, for adolescent inter-
nalizing disorders, models such as the triadic model (Ernst et al., 2006) or the social information proc-
essing network model (Nelson et al., 2005) suggest reduced regulatory prefrontal control over affective 
neural systems, with some additionally proposing either enhanced activity of the amygdala (Ernst et 
al., 2006) and/or dysfunction of the mesocorticolimbic reward system (Ernst et al., 2006; Forbes & 
Dahl, 2005).  
Recently, several functional imaging studies have been published that have investigated brain 
activation in adolescents with MDD in response to affective stimuli (Forbes et al., 2007; Killgore & 
Yurgelun-Todd, 2006; Monk et al., 2008; Roberson-Nay et al., 2006; Thomas et al., 2001). For exam-
ple, Forbes et al. (2007) reported diminished activity in the ACC, ventral OFC, and striatum (bilateral 
caudate nucleus) and increased activity in the dorsal OFC in adolescents with MDD as compared to 
controls during anticipation for responding to reward. Similarly, in a very recent study by Monk et al. 
(2008), adolescents at familial risk for developing MDD activated the NAcc less when viewing happy 
faces, and the amygdala more when viewing fearful faces as compared to controls. However, these 
differences in brain activation were only evident when attention was unconstrained (i.e. under low 
cognitive control), but not when attention was captured by a cognitive demand (rating the nose width 
of the face seen), which was associated with higher recruitment of the medial PFC in at-risk adoles-
cents as compared to controls. Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd (2006) reported enhanced neural activity in 
the ventromedial PFC including the medial OFC and rostral ACC in dysphoric adolescents while view-
ing faces with fear expressions. Finally, Roberson-Nay et al. (2006) found enhanced amygdala activa-
tion in adolescents with MDD during incidental encoding of faces. In light of these findings, the current 
results of absent improvement of RST task performance by incentives in adolescents with MDD as 
compared to controls may indicate reduced activation of the mesocorticolimbic brain system by re-
wards, while the deterioration of RST performance under threat of monetary loss and attentional en-
gagement by notification of monetary loss may indicate enhanced activity of the amygdala by punish-
ments. Finally, the trends for an interference of incentives on dynamic performance measures under 
conditions of high cognitive control but not low cognitive control in adolescents with MDD are difficult 
to put in relation to the existing data. Since dynamic performance measures of internally-guided sac-
cades have been proposed to be mediated through its basal-ganglia-superior-colliculus pathway 
(Kawagoe et al., 1998; Lauwereyns, Takikawa et al., 2002; Takikawa, Kawagoe, & Hikosaka, 2002) 
these findings may indicate a weaker top-down modulatory influence on basal-ganglia pathways in 
adolescents with MDD as compared to controls. However, as also pointed out in chapter 7.3, further 
studies in greater patient samples and combining the RST with neuroimaging methods are necessary 
to replicate these findings and to allow sound conclusions about the neural pathways and systems that 
may exhibit dysfunction in adolescent MDD during performance of the RST. 
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7.2.2 Modulation of RST performance in adolescents with an Anxiety Disorder 
Patients with an anxiety disorder were expected to exhibit an attentional bias for negative in-
formation and a strong motivation to avoid negative outcomes (i.e. avoiding monetary punishment). 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that adolescents with anxiety will perform better on punishment trials 
(i.e. better accuracy, earlier saccade latencies) as compared to neutral trials and as compared to con-
trols. For the outcome notification period, it was hypothesized that anxious patients will avoid negative 
information more than controls, as indexed by shorter fixation duration and smaller pupil dilation for 
notification of negative feedback. 
Findings partly support these hypotheses. First, patients with anxiety initiated prosaccades on 
a trend level faster than did controls on punishment trials (p = 0.058, effect size = 0.52), and corrected 
more antisaccade direction errors than controls on the punishment condition (p = 0.006, effect size = 
0.73). These findings are in line with several cognitive models on anxiety proposing preconscious at-
tentional biases in anxious individuals towards threats (e.g. Eysenck, 1992; Mathews, May, Mogg, & 
Eysenck, 1990; J. M. G. Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997) and in line with empirical evi-
dence assessing attentional biases in adult and adolescent patients with an anxiety disorder (for re-
view in adults, see Bishop, 2007; for review in youth, see Pine, 2007). For example, on the modified 
Stroop color-naming task, where subjects have to name the color in which words with emotional con-
tents are written, patients with anxiety name words with threatening contents later than controls, which 
commonly is interpreted in terms of anxious individuals‘ attention being captured by the threat content 
of the word (for review see Mogg & Bradley, 1998). On probe detection tasks, where reaction time to a 
visual probe is used as an index of spatial attention, patients with anxiety respond faster to a probe if it 
replaces a threatening word or if it replaces a picture depicting a threatening scene, as compared to a 
word or picture with a neutral content, and as compared to controls, which is consistent with an atten-
tional bias favoring threats (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1986). Finally, on dot-probe tasks assessing orienta-
tion of eye movements, adults with anxiety tend to orient their gaze faster at pictures depicting angry 
or fearful faces relative to happy or neutral faces and as compared to non-anxious individuals (Mogg, 
Garner, & Bradley, 2007; e.g. Mogg et al., 2000; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004). Thus, the current 
finding of shorter latency for prosaccades under the punishment condition and a higher rate of correc-
tive gazes under the punishment condition indicates a selective bias for processing threat-related 
stimuli in adolescents with anxiety. A selective orientation bias towards threatening information is fur-
ther supported by the finding that patients with anxiety disorders did not differ from controls in latency 
of correct antisaccades on punishment trials, where the gaze had to be directed away from the threat-
ening cue/stimulus.  
In addition, patients with anxiety differed from controls on neutral trials for peak velocity of cor-
rect antisaccades, and on a trend level for correct prosaccades, where controls but not patients 
slowed down on neutral trials. Since peak velocity may be used as an indicator of alertness and 
arousal (for review see Khan et al., 2000), this finding indicates that patients with anxiety were highly 
activated by the RST, independent of financial pay-off. Additional support for the notion of an in-
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creased level of arousal in patients with anxiety might be the absent within-group modulation of task 
parameters by incentives: With exception for percent correct prosaccades, where patients with anxiety 
similarly to controls performed significantly better on the reward as compared to the punishment condi-
tion, no other parameter of any saccade type was modulated differently between the three incentive 
conditions for patients with anxiety. An increased level of arousal in anxiety has also been postulated 
by cognitive-affective models on anxiety. For example, the “tripartite model” by Clark and Watson 
(1991) proposes that anxiety in contrast to depression is characterized by physiological hyperarousal 
and Eysenck (1987) has proposed that individuals with high trait anxiety are not only prone to attend 
preferentially to threat stimuli (which he termed specific hypervigilance), but to exhibit a general hyper-
vigilance also to task-irrelevant stimuli, in order to detect a salient stimulus quicker.  
Attentional bias for threats might depend on the stage of information processing. For example, 
Mogg et al. (1992) and Mathews (1990; 1993) have proposed that individuals with high anxiety exhibit 
a “vigilance-avoidance” pattern of bias, with initially directing attention to threats, but subsequently 
diverting attention away from threats in order to reduce discomfort. Such a vigilance-avoidance pattern 
of attention is supported by a study by Hamm, Cuthbert, Globisch, and Vaitl (1997), where subjects 
with specific phobia had shorter viewing times of pictures of their own phobic objects. However, results 
from the current study do only support a vigilance, but not an avoidance pattern of attention bias in 
adolescents with an anxiety disorder. Specifically, adolescents with anxiety differed from controls only 
in parameters investigated during the performance period of the RST, but not in parameters investi-
gated during the outcome notification period. 
In terms of underlying neural substrates, attentional bias for threat in anxiety commonly has 
been implicated to reflect perturbation in amygdale-ventrolateral PFC circuitry. As reviewed in chapter 
2.2.3.1.3, the amygdala is proposed to be hyperactive in anxiety, while the PFC is proposed to exert 
insufficient regulatory control to deploy attention in a goal-related manner despite threat-interference 
(for review in adults see Bishop, 2007; for review in youth see Pine, 2007). In adolescents, only one 
neuroimaging study to date has directly investigated orienting to threats in youth with anxiety (Monk et 
al., 2006). In this study, adolescents with GAD performing a threat-dot-probe task exhibited enhanced 
activity in the ventrolateral PFC as compared to controls, and level of activation was negatively corre-
lated with anxiety levels. In addition, three brain imaging studies have shown increased amygdala 
activation in youth with an anxiety disorder while passively viewing fear faces (Killgore & Yurgelun-
Todd, 2005; McClure et al., 2007; Thomas et al., 2001). In the McClure et al. (2007) study, when en-
gaging attention in a non-emotional rating (how wide is the nose?), activity in the amygdala normalized 
to control level, suggesting that recruitment of cognitive control processes might moderate differences 
in amygdala reactivity between diagnostic groups. In light of this brief review, the current results might 
indicate enhanced amygdala activity under threat of monetary loss in the RST in anxious adolescents 
as compared to controls in particular for conditions of low cognitive control such as for prosaccade 
trials, while the overall high level of arousal observed for anxious patients and the cognitively demand-
ing nature of the task in particular for antisaccade trials might have prevented to detect more strong 
differences between diagnostic groups. 
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7.3 Limitations and Implications for Future Work 
These results need to be considered in the light of some limitations. First, the sample sizes in 
the clinical study were small, particularly with respect to patients with MDD. However, sample size was 
sufficiently large to detect differences between groups. In addition, effect sizes - a measure on the 
strength of an effect independent of sample size - were at levels that can be considered practically 
relevant. The mean effect size for all independent-sample t-tests reported in this thesis following up 
significant effects or trends on age-related differences in the Analysis of Variance was 0.86 (range: 
0.40-1.45, with the very high effect size of 1.45 being observed for latency of corrective saccades), 
and those on diagnosis-related differences 0.59 (range: 0.43-0.81). The mean effect size for all de-
pendant-sample t-tests investigating within-group differences in the Analysis of Variance was for 
adults 0.76 (range: 0.35-1.16), for adolescents 0.51 (range: 0.33–0.94), for patients with MDD 0.59 
(range: 0.43–0.84), and for patients with an anxiety disorder 0.49 (range: 0.39–0.64). For comparison, 
the effect size of the significant improvement in proportion of correct antisaccades under incentives 
reported by Duka and Lupp (1997) in adults was 0.39 as calculated based on their reports on pre- and 
post means and standard deviations. In the study by Henriques and Davidson (2000) who compared 
responses of adults with MDD and controls on a verbal memory task under monetary reward, mone-
tary punishment and non-incentive trials, effect sizes of significant within-group differences in modula-
tion of responses by incentive conditions was of 0.30 for the comparison between the reward – neutral 
condition, and 0.11 for the comparison between the punishment and neutral condition. Nevertheless, 
although there was sufficient power to detect meaningful effects and interactions, replication in a larger 
patient sample might reveal additional results.  
Second, both clinical groups were heterogeneous in terms of their specific diagnoses. For ex-
ample, subjects in the anxiety groups suffered from different types of anxiety disorders, and in addi-
tion, four subjects in the anxiety group and two subjects in the MDD group suffered from mild ADHD. 
Analysis of Variance repeated after exclusion of those patients with ADHD (results not reported) did 
not change the conclusions of this study. Nevertheless, it is difficult to clearly evaluate the potential 
impact of such comorbidity on the performance of the RST. In addition, for the MDD group adoles-
cents with MDD and comorbid anxiety disorders were combined with adolescents with only MDD. Al-
though the primary diagnosis in these adolescents was MDD, the inclusion of subjects with comorbid 
anxiety may have diminished potential differences between the anxiety only and MDD groups. Indeed, 
Analysis of Variance performed after excluding the four subjects with comorbid diagnoses generated 
identical conclusions, however, significance level of the diagnosis-by-reward(-by-type) interactions 
observed for dynamic performance measures of correct responses reached higher levels of signifi-
cance (compare results in Table 9-15 with those in Table 9-16).  
Third, an important open question that is not addressed by the current data is whether the ob-
served differences in reward-related behavior in the patient groups are state or trait-related. This ques-
tion is important in order to evaluate the utility of reward sensitivity and reward-related behavior in 
adolescents with MDD and anxiety disorders as a risk marker or endophenotype for the development 
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and/or maintenance of affective disorders later in life. As recently reviewed by Hasler et al. (2004), one 
of the main challenges in biological psychiatry in the next future will be to improve the phenotypic defi-
nition of depression so that a better understanding of the genetic and neurobiological underpinnings of 
this debilitating disease can be achieved and better and earlier intervention strategies designed. To 
evaluate the state versus trait character of the present results, it would be useful to test a group of 
patients with current and remitted symptoms. Similarly, it would be interesting to test the RST under 
medication with antidepressants.  
Fourth, it is possible that motivation to do well on the task was different in patients as com-
pared to healthy subjects because of their seeking treatment. However, it was made clear to these 
participants that they did not have to complete this task to be included in the subsequent treatment 
study (investigating the effect of medication with fluoxetine versus placebo). In addition, seeking 
treatment was initiated by the parents rather than by the adolescents. These circumstances mitigate 
the possibility of different sources of motivation to do the task between patients and healthy volun-
teers. 
Fifth, interpretation of the present findings should be moderated by some methodological limi-
tations. First, the eye-tracking device had a sampling rate of about 60Hz. Thus, measurement error 
was ± 8 milliseconds, and may have prevented from detecting differences between groups or condi-
tions. As comparison, the studies investigating the development of different types of saccadic eye 
movements in children and adolescents have been using devices with sampling rates of 1000Hz 
(Fischer, Biscaldi et al., 1997), 500Hz (Munoz et al., 1998) or 250 Hz (Kramer et al., 2005), although 
some researchers also have been using devices with sampling rates similar to the one used in this 
study (e.g. Fukushima et al., 2000; Karatekin, 2004). Thus, although a rate of 60Hz is sufficient to 
detect differences in RST accuracy, replication of the study with a device with higher sampling rate 
would provide better information on the dynamic performance measures of the RST. Second, the na-
ture of the RST was quite complex, targeting several cognitive abilities such as inhibitory control, at-
tentional set shifting, working memory, and processes of associative learning. From the results ob-
tained, it can be concluded that incentives interfere with some of these processes more strongly in 
youth and adolescents mood and anxiety disorders as compared to adulthood and psychological well-
being. However, which of these cognitive functions specifically is disrupted by incentives remains to be 
investigated. It may be that patients with MDD showed less modulation by incentives because they 
were not able to differentiate between the significance of specific cues, to associate the significance of 
a cue with a behavioral action or outcome, or if they were not able to switch between different condi-
tions as fast as were healthy adolescents. In the future, it could be helpful to simplify the RST, for ex-
ample be looking at blocks of antisaccade and prosaccade trials, and blocks of trials with incentives 
only, punishments only, and neutral trials only instead of the randomized nature of trial presentation 
used in the current version. On the other hand, results obtained by Hardin et al. (2007) suggest that it 
may be exactly the complex nature of the RST that produces the differences observed between diag-
nostic states, possibly through its higher working memory load or its demand for attentional set shift-
ing. With a modified version of the RST only presenting antisaccade trials under monetary rewards, 
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punishments and no incentives, Hardin et al. (2007) found differences between groups only for accu-
racy, but not dynamic performance measures. Finally, monetary rewards and incentives were the 
same monetary amounts. However, according to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the 
impact of a loss is proposed to exceed the impact of a gain of equal magnitude. If so, larger gains than 
losses should be used in future studies so as to compensate for the asymmetry in emotional re-
sponses. In addition, it might be helpful to include a truly neutral condition, i.e. a condition in which 
there would be no monetary implications and no feedback on performance accuracy. 
Finally, although specific saccadic eye movement parameters have been mapped onto spe-
cific neural circuits based on extensive research in non-human primates and humans, sound conclu-
sions about differences in activity of neural circuits underlying reward-related information processing in 
healthy adolescents versus adults and versus adolescents with either MDD or anxiety can not be 
drawn, calling for replication of the RST in a neuroimaging environment.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Adolescence is increasingly recognized by neuroscientists as a model for understanding the 
development of affect and its regulation in humans, being a period of heightened emotional turmoil, or 
“storm and stress”. While most adolescents navigate through adolescence without great difficulty, or 
even experience a period of great strive and passion to achieve adaptive goals, for some it marks the 
beginning of a life-long battle with affective disturbances. From this background, in an attempt to better 
understand affect (dys-)regulation during adolescence, this thesis compared cognitive control under 
incentives in adults, healthy adolescents and adolescents with a major depressive or anxiety disorder. 
From a developmental perspective, results indicate that incentives influence behavior in adolescence 
in particular under conditions of decreased cognitive control, whereas from a clinical perspective, re-
sults indicate that biases in emotion-attention interactions and perturbation of motivated behaviors 
reported for adults with depression or an anxiety disorder can already be observed in adolescents 
afflicted by these disorders. 
On a neuroscience-based level, these findings highlight the importance of considering the as-
pect of interaction between affect and cognition when interested in the pathophysiology of mood and 
anxiety disorders, and moreover the eligibility of reward-related information processing to probe such 
interactions. In order to refine the understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying the observed 
findings, the RST needs to be replicated in conjunction with functional neuroimaging methods. In addi-
tion, to answer the question whether the observed biases in emotion-attention and perturbation of 
motivated behaviors in patients precede the manifestation of symptoms and thus constitute vulnerabil-
ity factors, or contribute to symptom expressions, the RST would need to be replicated in greater pa-
tient samples, spanning a greater age range from early childhood to late adolescence and under tight 
control of a subject’s pubertal status. 
Keeping in mind the pitfalls of inconsiderately generalizing findings obtained in a laboratory 
setting, there nevertheless can be drawn some conclusions from the results of this thesis for every-day 
living with adolescents and treatment of adolescents with mood and anxiety disorders. On one hand, 
the results obtained from the clinical study certainly support the calling for an earlier identification and 
treatment of adolescents suffering from an affective disorder, and moreover support the use of strate-
gies aimed to increase emotion regulation skills in this patient population. Such an earlier identification 
and treatment of affected youth is not only important in light of the subjective distress associated with 
suffering from a depressive or anxiety disorder, but also in light of the great, yet transitory, plasticity in 
brain systems underlying regulatory cognitive control and their integration with affective systems dur-
ing this age span, as well as in light of the negative implications a dysfunction at this age may have for 
later psychosocial functioning. In terms of “normative” adolescence, the notion of increased reward 
sensitivity under low cognitive control asks for caution with use of only cognition or insight-based pre-
vention strategies for drug abuse, safer sex methods or careful driving. There indeed seems to be an 
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innate inclination of adolescents to explore their borders and respond to temptations offered in the 
outside world. This has lead some developmental neuroscientists to ask for policies that are oriented 
towards avoidance of harms coming from risky decisions in addition to educational interventions de-
signed to increase adolescent’s knowledge on risky behaviors (e.g. Pechmann et al., 2005; Steinberg, 
2004). For example, according to Steinberg (2004, pg. 57) “strategies such as raising the price of ciga-
rettes, more vigilantly enforcing laws governing the sale of alcohol, expanding access to mental health 
and contraceptive services, and raising the driving age would likely be more effective in limiting ado-
lescent smoking, substance abuse, suicide, pregnancy, and automobile fatalities than strategies aimed 
at making adolescents wiser, less impulsive, or less short-sighted.“ On the other hand, simply restrict-
ing the world of adolescents will not make their curiosity and seeking of “new territories” and borders 
disappear. Thus, as important may be to offer adolescents more safe spaces in which they have a 
right to explore their borders and to be imprudent, and to disclose aims for which to invest their tre-
mendous energies. At the least, the now available knowledge of the vast transformation occurring in 
an adolescent brain and its functional implications as also evidenced in the current thesis, in conjunc-
tion with the physical and social challenges faced by this age group may help adults to better under-
stand adolescent problems and inner turmoil. 
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8.  Appendix I: Debriefing Questionnaire 
  
Figure 8-1: Exemplar of Antisaccade Debriefing  Questionnaire administered after completion of the task.  
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9.   Appendix II: Tables 
9.1 Data selection 
Table 9-1: Saccadic responses after target onset (in %; mean, std, N) per subject group (adults, adolescents, adolescents with 
anxiety disorders, adolescents with MDD). Saccadic responses are listed by the latency of their onset after target presentation 
(anticipatory = 0-79ms, express = 80-134ms, regular = 135-700ms, true = 80-700ms, and late responses = > 700ms), by in-
struction type (antisaccades AS, prosaccades PS), and by accuracy (correct responses, direction errors, corrective saccades).  
 
 
Table 9-2: Fixations after feedback onset (in %; mean, std, N) per subject group (adults, adolescents, adolescents with anxiety 
disorders, adolescents with MDD). 
 
 
 Adults Adolescents Anxious Patients MDD Patients 
Population Proportion of Responses mean std N mean std N mean std N mean std N 
all trials  % responses recorded 98.43 2.05 30 97.27 2.98 32 98.20 1.57 16 97.64 2.28 12 
% anticipatory 1.30 1.74 30 1.48 1.62 32 2.30 2.51 16 1.82 2.28 12 
% express 9.69 12.05 30 8.79 10.48 32 12.67 9.99 16 14.46 20.32 12 
% regular  88.51 12.49 30 88.68 10.76 32 83.75 10.89 16 82.85 21.04 12 
% true  98.20 2.08 30 97.47 2.03 32 96.42 3.85 16 97.31 3.53 12 
all re-
sponses 
recorded 
 
 
% late  0.51 0.99 30 1.05 1.34 32 1.27 1.86 16 0.87 1.76 12 
% all responses 50.48 1.34 30 48.47 3.65 32 49.82 1.80 16 50.65 1.04 12 
% correct 77.69 13.84 30 63.80 18.81 32 62.60 18.88 16 59.18 23.01 12 
% direction errors 22.31 13.84 30 36.20 18.81 32 37.40 18.88 16 40.82 23.01 12 
AS 
 % corrected  80.46 24.05 30 71.63 20.16 32 83.22 11.18 16 82.80 17.70 12 
% all responses 49.52 1.34 30 51.53 3.65 32 50.18 1.80 16 49.35 1.04 12 
% correct 97.54 2.81 30 95.39 6.19 32 97.34 2.39 16 95.97 3.58 12 
% direction errors 2.46 2.81 30 4.61 6.19 32 2.66 2.39 16 4.03 3.58 12 
all true 
responses 
PS 
 % corrected 41.03 42.29 19 52.81 40.26 27 38.61 35.09 14 74.40 35.31 10 
 Adults Adolescents Anxious Patients MDD Patients 
Population Proportion of Responses mean std N mean mean std N mean mean std N mean 
all trials  % fixations recorded 92.09 7.24 30 89.58 8.24 32 88.92 10.86 16 89.96 6.25 12 
all fixations 
recorded 
 
 
% fixations directed at 
feedback  91.87 8.24 30 94.22 6.26 32 94.96 3.94 16 92.69 5.82 12 
% positive feedback 83.80 7.72 30 73.04 11.00 32 70.52 12.24 16 74.94 15.36 12 All fixations 
directed at 
feedback 
 
 
 % negative feedback 16.20 7.72 30 26.96 11.00 32 29.48 12.24 16 25.06 15.36 12 
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9.2 Descriptives 
Table 9-3: Descriptives (mean, std, N) of saccadic responses analyzed during the performance period of the RST per subject 
group (adults, control adolescents, adolescents with anxiety disorders, adolescents with MDD). 
 
Adults Adolescents Anxious Patients MDD Patients Dependant Variable per Saccade Type and Incentive Condition mean std N mean std N mean std N mean std N 
punishment 31.54 3.03 30 30.97 3.17 32 31.29 1.89 16 30.23 3.65 12 
reward 33.69 1.95 30 32.91 2.10 32 33.65 2.38 16 32.91 1.87 12 Frequency (%) 
neutral  32.31 1.79 30 31.51 3.22 32 32.39 1.56 16 32.82 1.77 12 
punishment 181.18 22.45 30 192.06 30.91 32 178.16 22.32 16 184.12 42.78 12 
reward 180.24 23.14 30 186.16 26.71 32 174.89 26.12 16 176.46 28.30 12 Latency (ms) 
neutral  181.09 26.22 30 188.20 33.43 32 179.67 24.52 16 184.38 41.89 12 
punishment 89.84 10.43 30 92.94 13.26 32 93.14 11.77 16 90.63 7.91 12 
reward 92.64 12.18 30 91.16 10.22 32 93.79 15.25 16 91.05 5.45 12 Peak Velocity (°vis ang/s) 
neutral  90.67 13.23 30 88.62 11.03 32 94.46 14.97 16 89.77 6.53 12 
punishment 105.80 12.09 30 104.66 8.01 32 106.23 10.63 16 110.67 9.94 12 
reward 106.21 8.61 30 104.79 8.06 32 105.72 9.30 16 109.43 11.62 12 Saccade Dura-tion (ms) 
neutral  106.19 10.37 30 105.93 7.06 32 107.33 9.06 16 110.01 14.81 12 
punishment 4.88 0.42 30 4.94 0.47 32 5.12 0.51 16 5.30 0.68 12 
reward 4.97 0.35 30 4.99 0.39 32 5.14 0.41 16 5.28 0.56 12 
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Saccade Am-plitude  
(° vis angle) neutral  4.85 0.45 30 4.86 0.39 32 5.11 0.43 16 5.13 0.56 12 
punishment 27.33 5.10 30 23.15 8.11 32 21.30 6.08 16 19.91 9.58 12 
reward 26.83 5.22 30 22.25 5.32 32 21.28 6.29 16 20.56 7.39 12 Frequency (%) 
neutral  23.54 5.54 30 18.41 7.91 32 20.02 8.92 16 18.71 7.50 12 
punishment 260.94 27.63 30 293.67 51.89 32 282.95 41.08 16 247.87 88.37 12 
reward 258.31 28.53 30 284.96 39.54 32 277.78 48.71 16 276.26 53.28 12 Latency (ms) 
neutral  263.30 30.32 30 293.94 49.67 32 291.76 43.35 16 313.25 93.68 12 
punishment 95.04 16.54 30 105.19 31.57 32 108.83 31.10 16 135.66 93.53 12 
reward 96.57 18.11 30 107.64 23.40 32 112.25 25.84 16 101.74 12.14 12 Peak Velocity (°vis ang/s) 
neutral  94.03 19.77 30 102.40 23.99 32 114.68 23.72 16 113.15 24.97 12 
punishment 119.11 15.17 30 117.07 16.79 32 124.86 26.33 16 125.27 56.28 12 
reward 120.23 19.01 30 121.34 19.53 32 118.22 24.39 16 119.59 17.29 12 Saccade Dura-tion (ms) 
neutral  120.58 16.61 30 118.66 23.32 32 111.59 13.49 16 117.09 11.89 12 
punishment 5.71 1.03 30 5.92 1.42 32 6.61 1.56 16 7.03 2.45 12 
reward 5.87 1.16 30 6.16 1.70 32 6.50 1.71 16 6.14 0.73 12 
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Saccade Am-plitude  
(° vis angle) neutral  5.61 0.83 30 6.12 1.98 32 6.41 1.32 16 6.89 1.64 12 
punishment 6.20 4.92 30 10.67 7.64 32 12.23 6.19 16 13.14 9.03 12 
reward 6.38 5.28 30 11.05 5.62 32 11.83 6.04 16 13.45 8.16 12 Frequency (%) 
neutral  9.73 5.50 30 14.48 7.77 32 13.34 8.69 16 14.23 6.81 12 
punishment 187.47 40.80 28 186.60 37.43 31 184.22 40.89 16 178.65 33.83 12 
reward 182.74 42.70 25 206.79 59.22 32 189.08 34.48 16 175.26 30.47 12 Latency (ms) 
neutral  181.00 31.12 29 183.73 36.58 32 173.10 26.50 16 176.87 31.33 12 
punishment 81.75 13.03 28 86.33 16.01 31 90.55 18.96 16 86.02 11.02 12 
reward 91.45 47.78 25 104.37 48.60 32 86.52 12.22 16 88.50 12.62 12 Peak Velocity (°vis ang/s) 
neutral  84.89 29.76 29 82.49 10.46 32 86.63 17.80 16 86.75 12.78 12 
punishment 107.27 8.68 28 104.66 14.59 31 106.12 16.55 16 109.17 8.77 12 
reward 107.29 21.14 25 105.80 17.93 32 107.35 8.33 16 116.27 14.28 12 Saccade Dura-tion (ms) 
neutral  106.65 7.93 29 107.11 11.80 32 103.87 13.91 16 117.74 30.79 12 
punishment 4.51 0.54 28 4.60 0.75 31 4.65 0.62 16 4.87 0.49 12 
reward 4.55 0.64 25 5.11 1.99 32 4.74 0.59 16 5.41 1.24 12 
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Saccade Am-plitude (° vis angle) neutral  4.52 0.81 29 4.66 0.51 32 4.56 0.58 16 5.02 0.85 12 
punishment 82.90 28.56 28 74.48 24.53 31 88.57 12.38 16 78.53 22.24 12 
reward 85.96 20.17 25 73.30 28.16 32 84.12 18.73 16 82.55 18.62 12 Frequency (%) 
neutral  79.30 28.48 29 70.17 27.18 32 75.10 27.62 16 86.04 19.03 12 
punishment 111.77 67.13 26 209.39 150.95 30 236.54 177.70 16 269.01 140.72 12 
reward 154.10 107.35 25 198.65 112.27 30 158.62 120.49 16 190.74 110.74 12 Latency (ms) 
neutral  108.75 64.92 28 280.85 154.47 31 204.21 113.93 15 211.92 164.81 12 
punishment 172.61 66.51 26 157.98 23.39 30 195.98 106.54 16 158.35 26.58 12 
reward 175.37 44.93 25 165.78 45.23 30 173.85 63.91 16 166.25 25.47 12 Peak Velocity (°vis ang/s) 
neutral  153.91 29.72 28 151.01 32.43 31 170.86 55.11 15 165.32 23.63 12 
punishment 117.94 24.16 26 116.54 26.19 30 115.33 29.44 16 120.88 16.49 12 
reward 128.18 36.12 25 119.57 38.54 30 108.33 17.11 16 123.75 27.72 12 Saccade Dura-tion (ms) 
neutral  141.32 108.86 28 131.34 49.44 31 131.29 65.31 15 115.80 17.05 12 
punishment 9.38 1.75 26 9.26 1.46 30 9.40 1.49 16 9.77 1.87 12 
reward 10.86 2.18 25 9.52 2.04 30 8.96 2.07 16 10.18 1.22 12 
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Saccade Am-plitude  
(° vis angle) neutral  10.66 7.92 28 9.30 1.65 31 10.83 4.18 15 9.81 1.54 12 
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Table 9-4: Descriptives (mean, std, N) of fixation parameters analyzed during the feedback notification period of the RST per 
subject group (adults, control adolescents, adolescents with anxiety disorders, adolescents with MDD). 
 
 
 
 
Adults Adolescents Anxious Patients MDD Patients Dependant Variable per Feedback Type and 
Incentive Condition mean std N mean std N mean std N mean std N 
punishment 0.52 0.09 30 0.52 0.10 32 0.56 0.10 16 0.57 0.11 12 
reward 0.54 0.09 30 0.54 0.09 32 0.54 0.07 16 0.55 0.09 12 
Positive 
Feedback neutral  0.53 0.09 30 0.54 0.11 32 0.51 0.11 16 0.56 0.12 12 
punishment 0.51 0.16 28 0.51 0.16 32 0.48 0.14 16 0.63 0.22 12 
reward 0.45 0.18 28 0.49 0.15 32 0.50 0.17 16 0.50 0.18 12 
Negative 
Feedback neutral  0.47 0.23 30 0.49 0.14 32 0.47 0.10 16 0.49 0.17 12 
punishment 0.52 0.08 30 0.52 0.10 32 0.53 0.08 16 0.57 0.12 12 
reward 0.52 0.10 30 0.52 0.09 32 0.51 0.05 16 0.54 0.10 12 
Fixation 
Duration 
(s) 
Feedback 
Combined neutral  0.51 0.09 30 0.53 0.10 32 0.50 0.09 16 0.54 0.12 12 
punishment 5.55 1.19 30 7.26 1.56 32 6.70 0.90 16 6.24 0.99 12 
reward 5.56 1.16 30 7.28 1.55 32 6.70 0.86 16 6.27 0.98 12 
Positive 
Feedback neutral  5.47 1.24 30 7.22 1.54 32 6.62 0.88 16 6.21 0.94 12 
punishment 5.78 1.23 28 7.40 1.52 32 6.87 0.85 16 6.42 0.95 12 
reward 5.71 1.11 28 7.41 1.51 32 6.87 0.84 16 6.45 0.85 12 
Negative 
Feedback neutral  5.62 1.23 30 7.33 1.50 32 6.80 0.87 16 6.41 0.93 12 
punishment 5.58 1.18 30 7.30 1.54 32 6.75 0.87 16 6.30 0.97 12 
reward 5.59 1.16 30 7.31 1.53 32 6.74 0.86 16 6.32 0.94 12 
Pupil 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Feedback 
Combined neutral  5.49 1.23 30 7.24 1.53 32 6.68 0.87 16 6.26 0.93 12 
punishment 0.002 0.074 30 -0.014 0.081 32 -0.017 0.063 16 -0.053 0.076 12 
reward 0.010 0.101 30 0.000 0.075 32 -0.004 0.057 16 -0.041 0.064 12 
Positive 
Feedback neutral  0.012 0.084 30 0.012 0.053 32 -0.012 0.034 16 -0.037 0.090 12 
punishment 0.078 0.147 28 0.032 0.084 32 0.030 0.062 16 0.019 0.089 12 
reward 0.096 0.090 28 0.034 0.077 32 0.077 0.113 16 0.020 0.084 12 
Negative 
Feedback neutral  0.037 0.081 30 0.021 0.064 32 0.025 0.065 16 -0.028 0.081 12 
punishment 0.011 0.072 30 0.001 0.058 32 -0.005 0.044 16 -0.035 0.069 12 
reward 0.021 0.103 30 0.009 0.070 32 0.022 0.072 16 -0.031 0.049 12 
Pupil 
Dilation 
(mm) 
Feedback 
Combined neutral  0.015 0.073 30 0.014 0.049 32 0.001 0.036 16 -0.036 0.079 12 
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9.3 Normality of data distribution 
Table 9-5: Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test to normal distribution (K-S Z, p) for each dependant variable of the per-
formance period per subject group. Significant differences (p ≤ 0.05) are printed in red, p = 2-tailed. 
 
Adults Adolescents Anxious Patients MDD Patients Dependant Variable per Saccade Type and 
Incentive Condition K-S Z p K-S Z p K-S Z p K-S Z p 
punishment 0.95 0.333 1.00 0.271 0.60 0.864 0.39 0.998 
reward 0.94 0.339 1.35 0.051 0.54 0.937 0.64 0.802 Frequency  
neutral  1.10 0.181 1.10 0.180 0.91 0.380 0.68 0.743 
punishment 0.60 0.869 0.79 0.559 0.63 0.824 0.74 0.643 
reward 0.61 0.857 0.79 0.556 0.94 0.338 0.57 0.896 Latency  
neutral  0.63 0.817 1.06 0.211 0.79 0.555 0.73 0.654 
punishment 1.14 0.149 1.29 0.072 0.84 0.486 0.92 0.367 
reward 1.12 0.162 1.21 0.110 0.80 0.541 0.73 0.654 Peak Ve-locity  neutral  1.07 0.202 1.18 0.125 0.62 0.832 0.86 0.457 
punishment 1.14 0.146 0.86 0.445 0.84 0.485 0.78 0.569 
reward 0.92 0.370 0.74 0.636 0.65 0.799 0.97 0.308 Saccade Duration  neutral  0.97 0.300 0.86 0.449 0.55 0.919 0.77 0.599 
punishment 0.79 0.559 1.00 0.275 0.85 0.461 0.78 0.575 
reward 0.67 0.762 0.69 0.726 0.71 0.692 0.47 0.980 
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Saccade 
Amplitude  neutral  0.61 0.847 0.66 0.783 0.67 0.766 0.62 0.833 
punishment 0.70 0.717 0.56 0.911 1.07 0.199 0.83 0.494 
reward 0.91 0.376 0.71 0.691 0.74 0.647 0.83 0.503 Frequency  
neutral  0.57 0.899 0.46 0.984 0.65 0.787 0.50 0.961 
punishment 0.73 0.667 0.96 0.311 0.83 0.504 0.76 0.610 
reward 0.66 0.781 0.66 0.781 0.54 0.929 0.68 0.739 Latency  
neutral  0.74 0.640 0.95 0.332 0.88 0.423 1.05 0.218 
punishment 0.77 0.601 1.14 0.150 0.73 0.653 1.03 0.243 
reward 0.62 0.842 0.93 0.354 0.90 0.387 0.73 0.667 Peak Ve-locity  neutral  1.04 0.226 0.58 0.884 0.50 0.965 0.68 0.744 
punishment 0.90 0.392 0.68 0.736 0.70 0.719 1.35 0.052 
reward 1.29 0.070 0.90 0.396 0.68 0.740 0.96 0.319 Saccade Duration  neutral  0.77 0.587 0.93 0.356 0.56 0.917 0.78 0.583 
punishment 0.81 0.535 0.69 0.730 0.84 0.486 0.96 0.311 
reward 0.88 0.423 0.76 0.614 0.81 0.528 0.49 0.968 
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Saccade 
Amplitude  neutral  0.56 0.908 0.95 0.324 0.77 0.592 0.76 0.616 
punishment 0.58 0.891 0.65 0.798 0.95 0.324 0.65 0.795 
reward 0.73 0.655 0.66 0.780 0.86 0.455 0.52 0.947 Frequency  
neutral  0.54 0.929 0.40 0.998 0.71 0.699 0.61 0.855 
punishment 0.74 0.648 0.78 0.583 1.03 0.244 0.62 0.841 
reward 0.46 0.983 1.12 0.165 0.68 0.743 0.74 0.644 Latency  
neutral  0.81 0.532 0.83 0.492 0.55 0.923 0.37 0.999 
punishment 0.49 0.969 0.93 0.353 0.96 0.320 0.73 0.665 
reward 1.81 0.003 1.68 0.007 0.61 0.844 0.65 0.798 Peak Ve-locity  neutral  1.54 0.018 0.87 0.430 0.84 0.488 0.50 0.967 
punishment 0.78 0.574 0.83 0.497 0.84 0.483 0.68 0.748 
reward 0.99 0.285 0.80 0.547 0.70 0.708 0.65 0.791 Saccade Duration  neutral  0.80 0.548 0.79 0.554 0.70 0.712 1.36 0.049 
punishment 0.48 0.973 0.59 0.883 0.40 0.997 0.57 0.903 
reward 0.40 0.997 1.66 0.008 0.36 1.000 0.91 0.378 
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Saccade 
Amplitude  neutral  1.03 0.236 0.65 0.796 0.50 0.962 0.38 0.999 
punishment 1.76 0.004 1.03 0.235 1.04 0.231 0.73 0.666 
reward 1.58 0.013 0.97 0.304 0.93 0.349 0.84 0.481 Frequency  
neutral  1.26 0.084 0.77 0.593 0.73 0.653 0.84 0.477 
punishment 0.60 0.866 1.24 0.090 0.82 0.510 0.40 0.997 
reward 0.71 0.692 0.76 0.602 1.00 0.270 0.76 0.604 Latency  
neutral  0.68 0.748 0.91 0.376 0.56 0.912 0.72 0.673 
punishment 1.30 0.068 0.61 0.845 1.19 0.118 0.32 1.000 
reward 1.26 0.083 1.70 0.006 0.67 0.756 1.01 0.257 Peak Ve-locity  neutral  0.89 0.413 0.85 0.460 0.70 0.709 0.46 0.983 
punishment 1.25 0.089 1.52 0.020 0.70 0.703 0.58 0.895 
reward 1.59 0.013 1.49 0.024 0.77 0.601 1.02 0.246 Saccade Duration  neutral  2.14 0.000 1.61 0.011 1.38 0.044 0.65 0.792 
punishment 0.76 0.607 0.55 0.925 0.52 0.952 0.49 0.969 
reward 0.78 0.577 1.05 0.220 0.68 0.748 0.67 0.767 
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Saccade 
Amplitude  neutral  2.15 0.000 0.69 0.725 1.11 0.170 0.48 0.975 
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Table 9-6: Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test to normal distribution (K-S Z, p) for each dependant variable of the out-
come notification period per subject group. Significant differences (p ≤ 0.05) are printed in red, p = 2-tailed. 
 
 
 
Adults Adolescents Anxious Patients MDD Patients Dependant Variable per Feedback Type and 
Incentive Condition K-S Z p K-S Z p K-S Z p K-S Z p 
punishment 0.87 0.442 0.53 0.940 0.53 0.945 0.69 0.721 
reward 0.80 0.536 0.66 0.777 0.46 0.983 0.41 0.996 
Positive 
Feedback neutral  0.46 0.983 0.60 0.869 0.56 0.915 0.50 0.964 
punishment 0.51 0.959 0.56 0.910 0.50 0.962 0.39 0.998 
reward 0.80 0.540 0.80 0.546 0.51 0.955 0.75 0.625 
Negative 
Feedback neutral  0.92 0.370 0.51 0.955 0.43 0.993 0.44 0.989 
punishment 0.66 0.770 0.47 0.980 0.38 0.999 0.46 0.986 
reward 0.68 0.752 0.62 0.835 0.41 0.996 0.55 0.923 
Fixation 
Duration 
Feedback 
Combined neutral  0.66 0.779 0.69 0.734 0.53 0.939 0.53 0.943 
punishment 0.49 0.970 0.49 0.968 0.54 0.931 0.57 0.906 
reward 0.36 0.999 0.52 0.952 0.50 0.963 0.57 0.905 
Positive 
Feedback neutral  0.49 0.973 0.49 0.967 0.41 0.995 0.61 0.852 
punishment 0.33 1.000 0.63 0.819 0.55 0.919 0.50 0.961 
reward 0.51 0.958 0.64 0.813 0.41 0.996 0.43 0.993 
Negative 
Feedback neutral  0.41 0.996 0.62 0.839 0.49 0.972 0.49 0.969 
punishment 0.45 0.987 0.47 0.982 0.54 0.933 0.53 0.943 
reward 0.43 0.993 0.48 0.975 0.53 0.940 0.53 0.942 
Pupil 
Diameter  
Feedback 
Combined neutral  0.48 0.977 0.53 0.943 0.51 0.956 0.60 0.869 
punishment 0.34 1.000 0.99 0.282 0.72 0.677 0.40 0.997 
reward 1.21 0.107 0.59 0.871 0.48 0.977 0.70 0.707 
Positive 
Feedback neutral  0.78 0.578 0.76 0.615 0.57 0.906 0.46 0.984 
punishment 0.88 0.421 0.89 0.409 0.54 0.932 0.55 0.922 
reward 0.73 0.657 0.92 0.367 0.99 0.280 0.50 0.962 
Negative 
Feedback neutral  0.59 0.881 0.49 0.968 0.59 0.876 0.37 0.999 
punishment 0.44 0.990 0.47 0.981 0.50 0.965 0.39 0.998 
reward 1.07 0.199 0.38 0.999 0.92 0.363 0.49 0.972 
Pupil 
Dilation 
Feedback 
Combined neutral  0.52 0.952 0.58 0.896 0.74 0.652 0.51 0.959 
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9.4 Homogeneity of variance 
Table 9-7: Levene test for homogeneity of variance (Fdf1/df2, p) for dependant variables of the performance period, per study 
sample investigated. Significant differences (p ≤ 0.05) are printed in red, p = 2-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developmental study Clinical study 
Dependant Variable per Saccade Type and 
Incentive Condition 
 
F p F p 
punishm nt F1,60 = 7.39 0.009 F2,57 = 2.41 0.099 
reward F1,60 = 0.18 0.674 F2,57 = 0.39 0.677 Frequency 
neutral F1,60 = 4.75 0.033 F2,57 = 1.93 0.155 
punishment F1,60 = 15.44 0.000 F2,57 = 1.83 0.170 
reward F1,60 = 5.91 0.018 F2,57 = 0.24 0.789 Latency 
neutral F1,60 = 8.24 0.006 F2,57 = 2.08 0.134 
punishment F1,60 = 2.54 0.116 F2,57 = 2.64 0.080 
reward F1,60 = 4.69 0.034 F2,57 = 1.87 0.164 Peak Velocity neutral F1,60 = 3.11 0.083 F2,57 = 2.53 0.088 
punishment F1,60 = 0.09 0.770 F2,57 = 1.22 0.302 
reward F1,60 = 0.09 0.759 F2,57 = 0.65 0.524 Saccade Duration neutral F1,60 = 0.06 0.803 F2,57 = 4.05 0.023 
punishment F1,60 = 2.79 0.100 F2,57 = 0.75 0.477 
reward F1,60 = 2.05 0.157 F2,57 = 2.10 0.131 
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Saccade 
Amplitude neutral F1,60 = 6.03 0.017 F2,57 = 0.94 0.396 
punishment F1,60 = 0.00 0.985 F2,57 = 0.62 0.543 
reward F1,60 = 0.00 0.948 F2,57 = 0.13 0.874 Frequency 
neutral F1,60 = 4.13 0.047 F2,57 = 0.81 0.451 
punishment F1,60 = 3.62 0.062 F2,57 = 2.64 0.080 
reward F1,60 = 0.18 0.674 F2,57 = 0.25 0.783 Latency 
neutral F1,60 = 0.70 0.406 F2,57 = 1.23 0.301 
punishment F1,60 = 1.78 0.187 F2,57 = 3.41 0.040 
reward F1,60 = 1.82 0.182 F2,57 = 4.20 0.020 Peak Velocity neutral F1,60 = 0.84 0.363 F2,57 = 0.00 0.996 
punishment F1,60 = 0.68 0.412 F2,57 = 1.71 0.190 
reward F1,60 = 0.01 0.916 F2,57 = 0.30 0.745 Saccade Duration neutral F1,60 = 0.87 0.354 F2,57 = 1.11 0.336 
punishment F1,60 = 0.28 0.597 F2,57 = 0.49 0.617 
reward F1,60 = 0.42 0.517 F2,57 = 1.90 0.159 
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Saccade 
Amplitude neutral F1,60 = 0.20 0.655 F2,57 = 0.18 0.836 
punishment F1,60 = 5.84 0.019 F2,57 = 0.33 0.723 
reward F1,60 = 1.13 0.292 F2,57 = 0.71 0.496 Frequency 
neutral F1,60 = 3.68 0.060 F2,57 = 1.16 0.319 
punishment F1,53 = 0.57 0.453 F2,56 = 0.25 0.779 
reward F1,53 = 0.72 0.399 F2,56 = 1.74 0.185 Latency 
neutral F1,53 = 0.02 0.889 F2,56 = 0.30 0.743 
punishment F1,53 = 0.50 0.483 F2,56 = 0.48 0.620 
reward F1,53 = 1.43 0.237 F2,56 = 7.77 0.001 Peak Velocity neutral F1,53 = 2.30 0.135 F2,56 = 2.49 0.092 
punishment F1,53 = 2.58 0.114 F2,56 = 1.04 0.361 
reward F1,53 = 0.10 0.752 F2,56 = 1.76 0.182 Saccade Duration neutral F1,53 = 0.47 0.494 F2,56 = 1.66 0.200 
punishment F1,53 = 3.34 0.073 F2,56 = 1.71 0.191 
reward F1,53 = 0.85 0.359 F2,56 = 0.63 0.534 
an
tisa
cca
de
 dir
ect
ion
 er
ror
s
an
tisa
cca
de
 dir
ect
ion
 er
ror
s
an
tisa
cca
de
 dir
ect
ion
 er
ror
s
an
tisa
cca
de
 dir
ect
ion
 er
ror
s     
Saccade 
Amplitude neutral F1,53 = 1.53 0.221 F2,56 = 3.67 0.032 
punishment F1,53 = 0.37 0.547 F2,56 = 3.38 0.041 
reward F1,53 = 0.66 0.419 F2,56 = 1.01 0.370 Frequency 
neutral F1,53 = 0.55 0.462 F2,56 = 1.39 0.257 
punishment F1,48 = 5.73 0.021 F2,52 = 0.06 0.946 
reward F1,48 = 3.17 0.081 F2,52 = 0.05 0.956 Latency 
neutral F1,48 = 6.10 0.017 F2,52 = 0.39 0.678 
punishment F1,48 = 7.32 0.009 F2,52 = 4.72 0.013 
reward F1,48 = 0.00 0.979 F2,52 = 2.52 0.090 Peak Velocity neutral F1,48 = 0.04 0.849 F2,52 = 2.31 0.109 
punishment F1,48 = 0.05 0.831 F2,52 = 0.57 0.567 
reward F1,48 = 1.26 0.267 F2,52 = 0.32 0.729 Saccade Duration neutral F1,48 = 0.40 0.532 F2,52 = 2.20 0.121 
punishment F1,48 = 0.14 0.713 F2,52 = 0.75 0.478 
reward F1,48 = 0.25 0.621 F2,52 = 1.61 0.209 
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Saccade 
Amplitude neutral F1,48 = 2.87 0.097 F2,52 = 2.22 0.119 
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Table 9-8: Levene test for homogeneity of variance (Fdf1/df2, p) for dependant variables of the outcome notification period, per 
study sample investigated. Significant differences (p ≤ 0.05) are printed in red, p = 2-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developmental study Clinical study Dependant Variable per Feedback Type and 
Incentive Condition F p F p 
punishment F1,60 = 0.65 0.422 F2,57 = 0.25 0.781 
reward F1,60 = 0.40 0.530 F2,57 = 0.12 0.885 
Positive 
Feedback neutral  F1,60 = 0.77 0.384 F2,57 = 0.31 0.738 
punishment F1,57 = 0.04 0.846 F2,57 = 1.81 0.174 
reward F1,57 = 0.63 0.430 F2,57 = 0.76 0.473 
Negative 
Feedback neutral  F1,57 = 0.62 0.434 F2,57 = 2.26 0.113 
punishment F1,60 = 0.52 0.472 F2,57 = 0.53 0.589 
reward F1,60 = 0.18 0.674 F2,57 = 3.32 0.043 
Fixation 
Duration 
Feedback 
Combined neutral  F1,60 = 0.38 0.539 F2,57 =0.98 0.383 
punishment F1,60 = 1.27 0.265 F2,57 = 2.56 0.086 
reward F1,60 = 1.59 0.212 F2,57 = 2.75 0.072 
Positive 
Feedback neutral  F1,60 = 0.92 0.341 F2,57 = 2.70 0.076 
punishment F1,57 = 1.18 0.282 F2,57 = 2.85 0.066 
reward F1,57 = 1.33 0.254 F2,57 = 3.12 0.052 
Negative 
Feedback neutral  F1,57 = 0.91 0.345 F2,57 = 2.91 0.063 
punishment F1,60 = 1.22 0.274 F2,57 = 2.66 0.079 
reward F1,60 = 1.57 0.215 F2,57 = 2.95 0.061 
Pupil 
Diameter  
Feedback 
Combined neutral  F1,60 = 0.94 0.337 F2,57 = 2.95 0.060 
punishment F1,60 = 0.04 0.847 F2,57 = 0.39 0.679 
reward F1,60 = 0.15 0.698 F2,57 = 0.85 0.434 
Positive 
Feedback neutral  F1,60 = 2.80 0.099 F2,57 = 7.80 0.001 
punishment F1,57 = 1.99 0.164 F2,57 = 0.36 0.698 
reward F1,57 = 0.66 0.419 F2,57 = 0.28 0.757 
Negative 
Feedback neutral  F1,57 = 0.04 0.848 F2,57 = 0.32 0.728 
punishment F1,60 = 1.55 0.218 F2,57 = 1.39 0.256 
reward F1,60 = 0.34 0.564 F2,57 = 0.73 0.488 
Pupil 
Dilation 
Feedback 
Combined neutral  F1,60 = 3.58 0.063 F2,57 = 4.55 0.015 
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9.5 Results Developmental Study 
9.5.1 Self-reports 
Table 9-9: Proportion of responses per answer category for each question of the Debriefing Questionnaire performed after 
completion of the RST per group (1 = “not at all”; 2 = “a little”; 3 = “very”; 4 = “extremely”); and results of the Mann-Whitney test 
(Z-value, p) for each item of the Debriefing Questionnaire. Significant group differences (p ≤ 0.05) are printed in red, p =2-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Rating Adults (%) Rating Adolescents (%) Mann-Whitney 
Item on Questionnaire 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Z p 
Were you able to distinguish between gray and 
white? 0 10 50 40 0 13 44 44 -0.09 0.931 
How difficult was the task for you? 30 65 4 0 22 70 9 0 -0.80 0.423 
How much did you enjoy doing the task? 4 22 52 22 4 13 52 30 -0.82 0.414 
How excited did you get when you won money? 4 22 52 22 4 26 39 30 -0.20 0.842 
How nervous were you? 67 25 8 0 57 30 9 4 -0.77 0.444 
How bored were you? 71 29 0 0 35 48 9 9 -2.71 0.007 
Did you want to play more? 17 46 13 25 26 35 17 22 -0.38 0.704 
Did you get upset when you lost 1$? 25 63 8 4 52 26 9 13 -1.02 0.305 
Did you get upset when you received negative 
feedback? 40 40 20 0 67 13 20 0 -0.99 0.322 
Did you try to guess where the star would be? 48 43 4 4 22 39 22 17 -2.44 0.015 
Did the computer make mistakes? 38 46 13 4 35 39 17 9 -0.54 0.592 
Was the task too slow for you? 87 9 4 0 87 13 0 0 -0.06 0.955 
Was the task too fast for you? 96 4 0 0 77 18 5 0 -1.81 0.070 
Did you have trouble looking at the opposite side 
of the star? 21 79 0 0 26 57 9 9 -0.61 0.542 
How hard was it for you to stay focused? 67 29 4 0 30 48 22 0 -2.62 0.009 
How tired did you get during the task? 57 39 4 0 32 55 9 5 -1.78 0.075 
How angry did the task make you feel? 79 21 0 0 91 4 0 4 -1.07 0.286 
How sad/depressed did the task made you feel? 96 4 0 0 96 4 0 0 -0.03 0.976 
How frustrated did the task make you feel? 75 25 0 0 78 17 0 4 -0.17 0.862 
Did you have trouble sitting still? 74 22 0 4 39 43 17 0 -2.36 0.018 
Do you think the game was rigged?  96 4 0 0 70 17 0 13 -2.35 0.019 
Did your eyes hurt? 46 54 0 0 39 26 22 13 -1.62 0.105 
Did the computer say you were wrong when you 
were right? 38 42 17 4 45 36 5 14 -0.37 0.714 
Did the computer say you were right when you 
were wrong? 80 20 0 0 100 0 0 0 -1.71 0.087 
Did you care about the meaning of the central 
sign? 17 42 38 4 22 17 35 26 -1.31 0.190 
Were you excited when it was a +? 8 29 50 13 13 39 13 35 -0.03 0.973 
How rewarding is money to you? 0 0 60 40 8 15 46 31 -1.03 0.303 
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9.5.2 Performance period 
 
Table 9-10: Summary of main effects and interactions (Fdf/dferror, p) of the Analysis of Variance for each dependant variable per 
saccade type. Significant differences (p ≤ 0.05 resp. ≤ 0.025 for variables with inhomogeneous variances) are printed in red.  
 
Dependant Variable per Saccade Type  
Type Type by Age Incentives Incentives by 
Age 
Incentives by 
Type 
Incentives by 
Type by Age 
Age 
F1,60 = 166.39 F1,60 = 8.68 F2,59 = 18.99 F2,59 = 0.21 F2,59 = 18.43 F2,59 = 0.10 F1,60 = 11.32 Frequency p = 0.000 p = 0.005 p = 0.000 p = 0.809 p = 0.000 p = 0.907 p = 0.001 
F1,60 = 450.61 F1,60 = 6.60 F2,59 = 2.71 F2,59 = 1.09 F2,59 = 0.58 F2,59 = 0.04 F1,60 = 8.48 Latency p = 0.000 p = 0.013 p = 0.075 p = 0.345 p = 0.563 p = 0.964 p = 0.005 
F1,60 = 21.24 F1,60 = 6.33 F2,59 = 2.38 F2,59 = 0.55 F2,59 = 0.23 F2,59 = 0.56 F1,60 = 2.02 Peak Velocity p = 0.000 p = 0.015 p = 0.102 p = 0.581 p = 0.792 p = 0.576 p = 0.160 
F1,60 = 61.23 F1,60 = 0.00 F2,59 = 0.59 F2,59 = 0.16 F2,59 = 0.38 F2,59 = 0.32 F1,60 = 0.18 Saccade Duration p = 0.000 p = 0.997 p = 0.556 p = 0.851 p = 0.686 p = 0.727 p = 0.674 
F1,60 = 45.50 F1,60 = 1.12 F2,59 = 2.48 F2,59 = 0.18 F2,59 = 0.44 F2,59 = 0.36 F1,60 = 1.20 
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Saccade Amplitude p = 0.000 p = 0.294 p = 0.092 p = 0.833 p = 0.647 p = 0.702 p = 0.278 
  F2,59 = 14.17 F2,59 = 0.03   F1,60 = 10.85 Frequency   p = 0.000 p = 0.970   p = 0.002 
  F2,52 = 1.92 F2,52 = 0.63   F1,53 = 1.51 Latency   p = 0.157 p = 0.535   p = 0.224 
  F2,52 = 3.44 F2,52 = 0.26   F1,53 = 1.50 Peak Velocity   p = 0.040 p = 0.772   p = 0.226 
  F2,52 = 0.01 F2,52 = 0.23   F1,53 = 0.43 Saccade Duration   p = 0.992 p = 0.794   p = 0.512 
  F2,52 = 0.76 F2,52 = 0.68   F1,53 = 2.26 a
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Saccade Amplitude   p = 0.474 p = 0.509   p = 0.139 
  F2,52 = 0.94 F2,52 = 0.42   F1,53 = 3.10 Frequency   p = 0.398 p = 0.658   p = 0.084 
  F2,47 = 0.85 F2,47 = 4.85   F1,48 = 22.05 Latency   p = 0.435 p = 0.015   p = 0.000 
  F2,47 = 4.34 F2,47 = 0.43   F1,48 = 1.71 Peak Velocity   p = 0.019 p = 0.656   p = 0.197 
  F2,47 = 1.46 F2,47 = 0.10   F1,48 = 0.21 Saccade Duration   p = 0.243 p = 0.907   p = 0.653 
  F2,47 = 4.55 F2,47 = 3.40   F1,48 = 2.00 
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Saccade Amplitude   p = 0.016 p = 0.042   p = 0.164 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX  135 
Table 9-11: Post-hoc within-group analysis (paired-sample t-test Tdf or Wilcoxon Z; significance p; effect size dz for t-tests) for all 
dependant variables per saccade type showing an incentive-related modulation in the Analysis of Variance, per within-group 
comparison, and subject group. Significant differences (p ≤ 0.05/3 = 0.0167) are printed in red, p =1-tailed. rew = reward condi-
tion, pun = punishment condition; neu = neutral condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All subjects Adults Adolescents Comparison between two Incentive Conditions 
per Saccade Type and Dependant Variable T or Z p dz T or Z p dz T or Z p dz 
rew - pun T61 = -2.68 0.005 -0.34 T29 = -1.56 0.065 -0.28 T31 = -2.23 0.017 -0.39 
rew - neu T61 = -0.36 0.360 -0.05 T29 = -0.27 0.393 -0.05 T31 = -0.24 0.406 -0.04 Latency 
pun - neu T61 = 2.46 0.008 0.31 T29 = 0.95 0.175 0.17 T31 = 2.37 0.012 0.42 
rew - pun T61 = 1.36 0.090 0.17 T29 = 1.47 0.076 0.27 T31 = 0.43 0.337 0.08 
rew - neu T61 = 2.91 0.003 0.37 T29 = 1.35 0.094 0.25 T31 = 2.67 0.006 0.47 cor
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Peak velocity 
pun - neu T61 = 1.54 0.065 0.20 T29 = -0.10 0.460 -0.02 T31 = 2.34 0.013 0.41 
rew - pun T61 = 4.03 0.000 0.51 T29 = 2.69 0.006 0.49 T31 = 3.00 0.003 0.53 
rew - neu T61 = 3.62 0.000 0.46 T29 = 2.59 0.007 0.47 T31 = 2.50 0.009 0.44 Frequency 
pun - neu T61 = -1.46 0.075 -0.19 T29 = -1.18 0.124 -0.21 T31 = -0.87 0.195 -0.15 
rew - pun T61 = -2.10 0.020 -0.27 T29 = -0.42 0.337 -0.08 T31 = -2.42 0.011 -0.43 
rew - neu T61 = -0.68 0.251 -0.09 T29 = -0.24 0.405 -0.04 T31 = -0.76 0.226 -0.13 Latency 
pun - neu T61 = 0.94 0.177 0.12 T29 = 0.03 0.489 0.01 T31 = 1.29 0.103 0.23 
rew - pun T61 = 0.38 0.351 0.05 T29 = 1.57 0.064 0.29 T31 = -1.31 0.100 -0.23 
rew - neu T61 = 2.33 0.011 0.30 T29 = 1.58 0.063 0.29 T31 = 1.71 0.049 0.30 
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Peak velocity 
pun - neu T61 = 1.48 0.072 0.19 T29 = -0.47 0.322 -0.09 T31 = 2.65 0.006 0.47 
rew - pun T61 = -1.20 0.117 -0.15 T29 = -0.85 0.201 -0.16 T31 = -0.89 0.189 -0.16 
rew - neu T61 = 4.85 0.000 0.62 T29 = 3.45 0.001 0.63 T31 = 3.40 0.001 0.60 Frequency 
pun - neu T61 = 5.88 0.000 0.75 T29 = 4.33 0.000 0.79 T31 = 4.10 0.000 0.72 
rew - pun T61 = -1.72 0.045 -0.22 T29 = -0.79 0.217 -0.14 T31 = -1.52 0.069 -0.27 
rew - neu T61 = -1.47 0.074 -0.19 T29 = -1.41 0.085 -0.26 T31 = -1.02 0.157 -0.18 Latency 
pun - neu T61 = -0.33 0.372 -0.04 T29 = -0.80 0.214 -0.15 T31 = -0.04 0.485 -0.01 
rew - pun T61 = 0.88 0.191 0.11 T29 = 0.77 0.222 0.14 T31 = 0.61 0.274 0.11 
rew - neu T61 = 1.43 0.079 0.18 T29 = 0.80 0.214 0.15 T31 = 1.18 0.124 0.21 
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Peak velocity 
pun - neu T61 = 0.63 0.265 0.08 T29 = 0.33 0.373 0.06 T31 = 0.54 0.298 0.09 
rew - pun T61 = 0.59 0.278 0.08 T29 = 0.30 0.383 0.05 T31 = 0.51 0.307 0.09 
rew - neu T61 = -4.71 0.000 -0.60 T29 = -3.64 0.001 -0.66 T31 = -3.09 0.002 -0.55 Frequency 
pun - neu T61 = -5.33 0.000 -0.68 T29 = -4.42 0.000 -0.81 T31 = -3.41 0.001 -0.60 
rew - pun T55 = 1.65 0.052 0.22 T24 = 0.15 0.441 0.03 T30 = 1.98 0.029 0.36 
rew - neu T55 = 2.35 0.011 0.31 T23 = 0.64 0.265 0.13 T31 = 2.43 0.010 0.43 Latency 
pun - neu T57 = 0.75 0.228 0.10 T26 = 0.89 0.191 0.17 T30 = 0.13 0.448 0.02 
rew - pun Z = -1.42 0.077  Z = -0.31 0.378  Z = -1.67 0.048  
rew - neu Z = -2.48 0.007  Z = -1.17 0.121  Z = -2.15 0.016  an
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Peak velocity 
pun - neu Z = -0.96 0.169  Z = -1.21 0.113  Z = -0.05 0.480  
rew - pun T51 = 0.11 0.456 0.02 T22 = 1.14 0.133 0.24 T28 = -0.40 0.347 -0.07 
rew - neu T52 = -1.29 0.101 -0.18 T23 = 1.71 0.050 0.35 T28 = -3.12 0.002 -0.58 Latency 
pun - neu T53 = -1.58 0.060 -0.22 T24 = 0.24 0.406 0.05 T28 = -1.76 0.045 -0.33 
rew - pun Z = -1.27 0.102  T22 = 0.24 0.405 0.05 Z = -0.24 0.406  
rew - neu Z = -2.91 0.002  T23 = 3.90 0.000 0.80 Z = -1.14 0.128  Peak velocity 
pun - neu Z = -1.33 0.091  T24 = 1.26 0.111 0.25 Z = -1.16 0.124  
rew - pun Z = -2.14 0.016  Z = -3.19 0.001  T28 = 0.29 0.387 0.05 
rew - neu Z = -1.53 0.063  Z = -2.71 0.003  T28 = 0.07 0.472 0.01 
cor
rec
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s 
Saccade ampli-
tude pun - neu Z = -0.31 0.380  Z = -0.17 0.431  T28 = -0.53 0.299 -0.10 
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9.5.3 Outcome notification period 
 
Table 9-12: Summary of main effects and interactions (Fdf/dferror; p) of the Analysis of Variance for each dependant variable 
analyzed during the outcome notification period. Significant differences (p ≤ 0.05) are printed in red. 
 
Dependant Variable per Condition 
Feedback Feedback by 
Age 
Incentives Incentives by 
Age 
Feedback by 
Incentives 
Feedback by 
Incentives by 
Age 
Age 
F1,57 = 19.20 F1,57 = 2.12 F2,56 = 0.28 F2,56 = 0.24 F2,56 = 2.08 F2,56 = 0.14 F1,57 = 0.79 Fixation Duration 
p = 0.000 p = 0.151 p = 0.754 p = 0.789 p = 0.134 p = 0.870 p = 0.377 
F1,57 = 79.80 F1,57 = 3.65 F2,56 = 23.41 F2,56 = 3.43 F2,56 = 4.22 F2,56 = 1.89 F1,57 = 24.57 Pupil Diameter  
p = 0.000 p = 0.061 p = 0.000 p = 0.039 p = 0.020 p = 0.160 p = 0.000 
F1,57 = 20.74 F1,57 = 0.99 F2,56 = 3.06 F2,56 = 2.40 F2,56 = 4.96 F2,56 = 0.77 F1,57 = 3.61 Pupil Dilation 
p = 0.000 p = 0.324 p = 0.055 p = 0.100 p = 0.010 p = 0.468 p = 0.063 
 
 
 
Table 9-13: Post-hoc within-group analysis (paired-sample t-test Tdf; significance p; effect size dz) for all dependant variables 
showing an incentive-related modulation in the Analysis of Variance, per feedback type, within-group comparison, and subject 
group. Significant differences (p ≤ 0.05/3 = 0.0167) are printed in red, p =1-tailed. rew = reward condition, pun = punishment 
condition; neu = neutral condition. 
 
All subjects Adults Adolescents Comparison between Incentive Conditions 
per Feedback Type and Dependant Variable T p dz T p dz T p dz 
rew - pun T61 = 1.41 0.081 0.18 T29 = 0.67 0.255 0.21 T31 = 1.37 0.091 0.04 
rew - neu T61 = 4.59 0.000 0.58 T29 = 3.66 0.000 0.85 T31 = 2.80 0.004 0.59 
Positive 
Feedback pun - neu T61 = 3.95 0.000 0.50 T29 = 3.95 0.000 0.77 T31 = 1.89 0.034 0.40 
rew - pun T58 = 0.96 0.169 0.13 T26 = 1.09 0.143 0.12 T31 = 0.22 0.413 0.24 
rew - neu T59 = 5.35 0.000 0.69 T27 = 4.47 0.000 0.67 T31 = 3.34 0.001 0.49 
Negative 
Feedback pun - neu T59 = 4.47 0.000 0.58 T27 = 4.06 0.000 0.72 T31 = 2.29 0.014 0.33 
rew - pun T61 = 0.95 0.173 0.12 T29 = 0.66 0.258 0.12 T31 = 0.69 0.246 0.12 
rew - neu T61 = 5.29 0.000 0.67 T29 = 4.17 0.000 0.76 T31 = 3.29 0.001 0.58 
Pupil Di-
ameter 
Feedback 
Combined 
pun - neu T61 = 5.21 0.000 0.66 T29 = 5.17 0.000 0.94 T31 = 2.63 0.007 0.47 
rew - pun T61 = 1.44 0.077 0.18 T29 = 0.73 0.235 0.13 T31 = 1.30 0.101 0.23 
rew - neu T61 = -0.84 0.201 -0.11 T29 = -0.10 0.461 -0.02 T31 = -1.29 0.104 -0.23 
Positive 
Feedback pun - neu T61 = -2.31 0.012 -0.29 T29 = -1.07 0.147 -0.20 T31 = -2.07 0.024 -0.37 
rew - pun T58 = 1.22 0.114 0.16 T26 = 1.84 0.038 0.35 T31 = 0.10 0.462 0.02 
rew - neu T59 = 2.99 0.002 0.39 T27 = 3.19 0.002 0.60 T31 = 0.96 0.173 0.17 
Negative 
Feedback pun - neu T59 = 1.46 0.074 0.19 T27 = 1.28 0.105 0.24 T31 = 0.70 0.244 0.12 
rew - pun T61 = 1.23 0.112 0.16 T29 = 0.83 0.208 0.15 T31 = 0.91 0.184 0.16 
rew - neu T61 = 0.00 0.499 0.00 T29 = 0.40 0.347 0.07 T31 = -0.56 0.290 -0.10 
Pupil Dila-
tion 
Feedback 
Combined 
pun - neu T61 = -1.36 0.089 -0.17 T29 = -0.43 0.336 -0.08 T31 = -1.44 0.079 -0.26 
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9.6 Results Clinical Study 
9.6.1 Self-reports 
 
Table 9-14: Proportion of responses per answer category for each question of the Debriefing Questionnaire performed after 
completion of the RST per group (1 = “not at all”; 2 = “a little”; 3 = “very”; 4 = “extremely”); and results of the Kruskal-Wallis test 
(χ2-value, df, p) for each item of the Debriefing Questionnaire. Significant group differences (p ≤ 0.05) are printed in red. 
 
Rating Adolescents (%) Rating Anxiety (%) Rating MDD (%) Kruskal Wallis-test 
Item on Questionnaire 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 χ2 df p 
Were you able to distinguish between gray and 
white? 0  13 44 44 0  11 44 44 10 20 50 20 2.57 2 0.276 
How difficult was the task for you? 22 70 9 0 25 67 8  0 30 50 20 0 0.05 2 0.976 
How much did you enjoy doing the task? 4 13 52 30 0 17 42 42 0  30 50 20 1.31 2 0.520 
How excited did you get when you won money? 4 26 39 30 0 25 33 42 0  20 30 50 1.20 2 0.549 
How nervous were you? 57 30 9 4 33 58 8 0 30 50 10 10 2.06 2 0.357 
How bored were you during the task? 35 48 9 9 73 27 0 0 40 60 0  0 5.20 2 0.074 
Did you want to play more? 26 35 17 22 17 17 33 33 40 20 10 30 1.64 2 0.440 
Did you get upset when you lost 1$? 52 26 9 13 42 25 33 0  20 70 10 0 0.72 2 0.696 
Did you get upset when you received negative 
feedback? 67 13 20 0 22 44 33 0 10 80 10 0 4.79 2 0.091 
Did you try to guess where the star would be? 22 39 22 17 25 33 33 8 20 40 10 30 0.20 2 0.905 
Did the computer make mistakes? 35 39 17 9 42 42 8 8 40 40 10 10 0.32 2 0.853 
Was the task too slow for you? 87 13 0 0 83 17 0 0 80 20 0 0 0.27 2 0.875 
Was the task too fast for you? 77 18 5 0 67 33 0 0 70 30 0 0 0.34 2 0.843 
Did you have trouble looking at the opposite side 
of the star? 26 57 9 9 17 67 17 0 30 50 20 0 0.16 2 0.922 
How hard was it for you to stay focused? 30 48 22 0 42 50 8 0 40 40 10 10 0.84 2 0.656 
How tired did you get during the task? 32 55 9 5 0 100 0 0 40 60  0 0 3.16 2 0.206 
How angry did the task make you feel? 91 4 0 4 67 25 8 0 70 30 0 0 3.35 2 0.187 
How sad did the task made you feel? 96 4 0 0  75 25 0 0 70 20 10 0 4.63 2 0.099 
How frustrated did the task make you feel? 78 17 0 4 58 33 8 0 60 30 10 0 1.81 2 0.405 
Did you have trouble sitting still? 39 43 17 0  33 67  0 0 30 70 0  0 0.11 2 0.948 
Do you think the game was rigged?  70 17 0  13 67 25 8 0 70 20 0  10 0.01 2 0.996 
Did your eyes hurt? 39 26 22 13 17 42 33 8 20 70 0  10 1.04 2 0.594 
Did the computer say you were wrong when you 
were right? 45 36 5 14 42 42 8 8 30 40 20 10 0.73 2 0.693 
Did the computer say you were right when you 
were wrong? 100 0 0 0 75 25 0 0 80 20 0 0 3.54 2 0.170 
Did you care about the meaning of the central 
sign? 22 17 35 26 42 8 25 25 10 50 30 10 0.80 2 0.670 
Were you excited when it was a plus? 13 39 13 35 0 33 42 25 0 22 44 33 1.15 2 0.562 
How rewarding is money to you? 8 15 46 31 0 13 88 0 0 30 40 30 0.36 2 0.834 
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9.6.2 Performance period 
 
Table 9-15: Summary of main effects and interactions (Fdf/dferror, p) of the Analysis of Variance for each dependant variable per 
saccade type. Significant differences (p ≤ 0.05 resp. ≤ 0.025 for variables with inhomogeneous variances) are printed in red. 
 
 
Dependant Variable per Saccade Type and 
Condition 
Type Type by 
Diagnosis 
Incentives Incentives by 
Diagnosis 
Incentives by 
Type 
Incentives by 
Type by 
Diagnosis 
Diagnosis 
F1,57 = 157.19 F2,57 = 0.35 F2,56 = 7.24 F2,57 = 3.34 F2,56 = 7.20 F2,57 = 1.11 F2,57 = 0.21 Frequency p = 0.000 p = 0.703 p = 0.002 p = 0.043 p = 0.002 p = 0.338 p = 0.815 
F1,57 = 440.75 F2,57 = 0.24 F2,56 = 3.59 F2,57 = 3.14 F2,56 = 3.58 F2,57 = 4.13 F2,57 = 0.63 Latency p = 0.000 p = 0.788 p = 0.034 p = 0.051 p = 0.034 p = 0.021 p = 0.538 
F1,57 = 38.46 F2,57 = 1.29 F2,56 = 0.92 F2,57 = 2.94 F2,56 = 1.04 F2,57 = 3.33 F2,57 = 0.78 Peak Velocity p = 0.000 p = 0.284 p = 0.405 p = 0.061 p = 0.361 p = 0.043 p = 0.462 
F1,57 = 26.10 F2,57 = 0.19 F2,56 = 0.79 F2,57 = 1.10 F2,56 = 1.38 F2,57 = 1.01 F2,57 = 0.46 Saccade Duration p = 0.000 0.824 p = 0.461 p = 0.340 p = 0.259 p = 0.372 p = 0.633 
F1,57 = 45.76 F2,57 = 0.29 F2,56 = 0.76 F2,57 = 3.67 F2,56 = 1.90 F2,57 = 3.91 F2,57 = 1.99 
cor
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Saccade Amplitude p = 0.000 p = 0.746 p = 0.470 p = 0.027 p = 0.160 p = 0.026 p = 0.146 
  F2,55 = 3.24 F2,57 = 1.61   F2,57 = 0.24 Frequency   p = 0.046 p = 0.209   p = 0.787 
  F2,55 = 1.99 F2,56 = 1.21   F2,56 = 1.25 Latency   p = 0.161 p = 0.306   p = 0.295 
  F2,55 = 1.31 F2,56 = 2.70   F2,56 = 0.40 Peak Velocity   p = 0.279 p = 0.076   p = 0.671 
  F2,55 = 1.15 F2,56 = 1.29   F2,56 = 2.83 Saccade Duration   p = 0.325 p = 0.284   p = 0.068 
  F2,55 = 1.39 F2,56 = 0.76   F2,56 = 1.26 a
ntis
acc
ad
e d
ire
ctio
n e
rro
rs
an
tisa
cca
de
 dir
ect
ion
 er
ror
s
an
tisa
cca
de
 dir
ect
ion
 er
ror
s
an
tisa
cca
de
 dir
ect
ion
 er
ror
s     
Saccade Amplitude   p = 0.259 p = 0.472   p = 0.292 
  F2,55 = 0.62 F2,56 = 1.99   F2,56 = 2.03 Frequency   p = 0.544 p = 0.147   p = 0.141 
  F2,51 = 3.50 F2,52 = 1.75   F2,52 = 0.82 Latency   p = 0.038 p = 0.185   p = 0.446 
  F2,51 = 1.20 F2,52 = 2.18   F2,52 = 1.70 Peak Velocity   p = 0.311 p = 0.123   p = 0.192 
  F2,51 = 0.81 F2,52 = 1.07   F2,52 = 0.17 Saccade Duration   p = 0.449 p = 0.349   p = 0.843 
  F2,51 = 0.82 F2,52 = 2.64   F2,52 = 0.78 
cor
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Saccade Amplitude   p = 0.447 p = 0.081   p = 0.465 
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Table 9-16: Summary of main effects and interactions (Fdf/dferror, p) of the Analysis of Variance for each dependant variable 
per saccade type when excluding the patients with MDD with a comorbid anxiety disorder. Significant differences (p ≤ 0.05 resp. 
≤ 0.025 for variables with inhomogeneous variances) are printed in red. 
 
 
Dependant Variable per Saccade Type and 
Condition 
Type Type by 
Diagnosis 
Incentives Incentives by 
Diagnosis 
Incentives by 
Type 
Incentives by 
Type by 
Diagnosis 
Diagnosis 
F1,53 = 122.62 F2,53 = 0.35 F2,52 = 5.46 F2,53 = 2.87 F2,52 = 4.97 F2,53 = 1.12 F2,53 = 0.07 Frequency 0.000 0.703 0.007 0.066 0.011 0.334 0.936 
F1,53 = 348.49 F2,53 = 0.21 F2,52 = 4.73 F2,53 = 6.92 F2,52 = 4.86 F2,53 = 5.83 F2,53 = 1.74 Latency 0.000 0.813 0.013 0.002 0.012 0.005 0.185 
F1,53 = 40.76 F2,53 = 2.69 F2,52 = 1.99 F2,53 = 4.98 F2,52 = 1.95 F2,53 = 4.46 F2,53 = 1.13 Peak Velocity 0.000 0.077 0.148 0.010 0.153 0.016 0.330 
F1,53 = 21.99 F2,53 = 0.09 F2,52 = 0.84 F2,53 = 1.06 F2,52 = 1.13 F2,53 = 0.90 F2,53 = 0.57 Saccade Duration 0.000 0.919 0.438 0.353 0.330 0.411 0.570 
F1,53 = 44.24 F2,53 = 0.88 F2,52 = 2.10 F2,53 = 6.28 F2,52 = 2.67 F2,53 = 4.42 F2,53 = 2.18 
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Saccade Amplitude 0.000 0.423 0.133 0.004 0.078 0.017 0.123 
  F2,52 = 2.58 F2,53 = 1.50   F2,53 = 0.15 Frequency   0.085 0.232   0.859 
  F2,51 = 1.12 F2,52 = 1.09   F2,53 = 2.45 Latency   0.334 0.343   0.097 
  F2,51 = 0.92 F2,52 = 2.55   F2,53 = 0.51 Peak Velocity   0.404 0.088   0.606 
  F2,51 = 0.89 F2,52 = 0.89   F2,53 = 1.11 Saccade Duration   0.417 0.415   0.336 
  F2,51 = 1.63 F2,52 = 1.09   F2,53 = 0.33 a
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Saccade Amplitude   0.206 0.342   0.721 
  F2,51 = 0.75 F2,52 = 2.13   F2,52 = 2.17 Frequency   0.480 0.130   0.125 
  F2,47 = 2.10 F2,48 = 2.93   F2,48 = 0.84 Latency   0.134 0.063   0.436 
  F2,47 = 1.16 F2,48 = 1.63   F2,48 = 1.54 Peak Velocity   0.322 0.207   0.225 
  F2,47 = 0.63 F2,48 = 1.02   F2,48 = 0.19 Saccade Duration   0.536 0.368   0.825 
  F2,47 = 0.59 F2,48 = 2.41   F2,48 = 0.69 
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Saccade Amplitude   0.556 0.101   0.508 
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Table 9-17: Post-hoc within group-analysis (paired-sample t-test Tdf or Wilcoxon Z; significance p; effect size dz for t-tests) for all 
dependant variables per saccade type showing an incentive-related modulation in the Analysis of Variance, per within-group 
comparison, and subject group. Significant differences (p ≤ 0.05/3 = 0.0167) are printed in red, p =1-tailed. rew = reward condi-
tion, pun = punishment condition; neu = neutral condition. 
 
All subjects Adolescents Patients with Anxiety Patients with MDD Comparison between Incentive Conditions per 
Saccade Type and Dependant Variable T or Z p dz T or Z p dz T or Z p dz T or Z p dz 
rew - pun T66 = 4.35 0.000 0.53 T31 = 3.00 0.003 0.53 T15 = 2.56 0.011 0.64 T11 = 1.80 0.049 0.52 
rew - neu T66 = 2.89 0.003 0.35 T31 = 2.50 0.009 0.44 T15 = 1.84 0.043 0.46 T11 = 0.11 0.457 0.03 Frequency 
pun - neu T66 = -2.55 0.007 -0.31 T31 = -0.87 0.195 -0.15 T15 = -1.56 0.070 -0.39 T11 = -2.50 0.015 -0.72 
rew - pun T66 = -2.97 0.002 -0.36 T31 = -2.42 0.011 -0.43 T15 = -0.75 0.233 -0.19 T11 = -1.35 0.103 -0.39 
rew - neu T66 = -1.90 0.031 -0.23 T31 = -0.76 0.226 -0.13 T15 = -1.06 0.153 -0.27 T11 = -1.06 0.156 -0.31 Latency 
pun - neu T66 = 0.59 0.278 0.07 T31 = 1.29 0.103 0.23 T15 = -0.32 0.377 -0.08 T11 = -0.03 0.489 -0.01 
rew - pun T66 = -0.40 0.347 -0.05 T31 = -1.31 0.100 -0.23 T15 = 0.22 0.413 0.06 T11 = 0.19 0.428 0.05 
rew - neu T66 = 1.41 0.082 0.17 T31 = 1.71 0.049 0.30 T15 = -0.18 0.429 -0.05 T11 = 0.74 0.236 0.22 Peak velocity 
pun - neu T66 = 1.85 0.034 0.23 T31 = 2.65 0.006 0.47 T15 = -0.54 0.300 -0.13 T11 = 0.32 0.376 0.09 
rew - pun T66 = 0.59 0.280 0.07 T31 = 1.05 0.151 0.19 T15 = 0.17 0.433 0.04 T11 = -0.15 0.442 -0.04 
rew - neu T66 = 2.66 0.005 0.32 T31 = 2.88 0.004 0.51 T15 = 0.38 0.353 0.10 T11 = 1.48 0.084 0.43 
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Saccade 
amplitude pun - neu T66 = 1.55 0.063 0.19 T31 = 1.75 0.045 0.31 T15 = 0.11 0.457 0.03 T11 = 1.12 0.144 0.32 
rew - pun T66 = -0.43 0.333 -0.05 T31 = -0.89 0.189 -0.16 T15 = -0.01 0.495 0.00 T11 = 0.43 0.339 0.12 
rew - neu T66 = 3.63 0.000 0.44 T31 = 3.40 0.001 0.60 T15 = 0.90 0.190 0.23 T11 = 1.45 0.088 0.42 Frequency 
pun - neu T66 = 3.72 0.000 0.45 T31 = 4.10 0.000 0.72 T15 = 0.76 0.228 0.19 T11 = 0.76 0.233 0.22 
rew - pun T66 = -0.15 0.440 -0.02 T31 = -1.52 0.069 -0.27 T15 = -0.71 0.243 -0.18 T11 = 1.07 0.153 0.31 
rew - neu T66 = -2.15 0.018 -0.26 T31 = -1.02 0.157 -0.18 T15 = -1.45 0.084 -0.36 T11 = -1.49 0.082 -0.43 Latency 
pun - neu T66 = -1.48 0.072 -0.18 T31 = -0.04 0.485 -0.01 T15 = -1.19 0.125 -0.30 T11 = -1.52 0.078 -0.44 
rew - pun T66 = -0.81 0.209 -0.10 T31 = 0.61 0.274 0.11 T15 = 0.81 0.214 0.20 T11 = -1.19 0.130 -0.34 
rew - neu T66 = 0.00 0.499 0.00 T31 = 1.18 0.124 0.21 T15 = -0.47 0.322 -0.12 T11 = -1.45 0.087 -0.42 Peak velocity 
pun - neu T66 = 0.92 0.179 0.11 T31 = 0.54 0.298 0.09 T15 = -1.58 0.067 -0.40 T11 = 0.97 0.177 0.28 
rew - pun T66 = -0.31 0.378 -0.04 T31 = 1.28 0.104 0.23 T15 = -0.70 0.247 -0.18 T11 = -1.40 0.094 -0.40 
rew - neu T66 = -0.45 0.329 -0.05 T31 = 0.14 0.446 0.02 T15 = 0.45 0.330 0.11 T11 = -1.58 0.072 -0.45 
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Saccade 
amplitude pun - neu T66 = -0.14 0.445 -0.02 T31 = -0.55 0.293 -0.10 T15 = 1.53 0.073 0.38 T11 = 0.19 0.425 0.06 
rew - pun T66 = 0.21 0.417 0.03 T31 = 0.51 0.307 0.09 T15 = -0.30 0.385 -0.07 T11 = 0.30 0.385 0.09 
rew - neu T66 = -3.35 0.001 -0.41 T31 = -3.09 0.002 -0.55 T15 = -1.05 0.155 -0.26 T11 = -0.68 0.257 -0.19 Frequency 
pun - neu T66 = -3.47 0.000 -0.42 T31 = -3.41 0.001 -0.60 T15 = -0.77 0.227 -0.19 T11 = -0.75 0.236 -0.22 
rew - pun T61 = 1.79 0.039 0.23 T30 = 1.98 0.029 0.36 T15 = 0.43 0.335 0.11 T11 = -0.47 0.323 -0.14 
rew - neu T64 = 3.07 0.002 0.38 T31 = 2.43 0.010 0.43 T15 = 1.70 0.055 0.42 T11 = -0.27 0.397 -0.08 Latency 
pun - neu T62 = 0.79 0.216 0.10 T30 = 0.13 0.448 0.02 T15 = 1.09 0.146 0.27 T11 = 0.33 0.375 0.09 
rew - pun Z = -0.82 0.207  Z = -1.67 0.048  T15 = -1.04 0.157 -0.26 T11 = 0.84 0.208 0.24 
rew - neu Z = -2.18 0.015  Z = -2.15 0.016  T15 = -0.02 0.492 -0.01 T11 = 0.62 0.275 0.18 an
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Peak velocity 
pun - neu Z = -0.30 0.383  Z = -0.05 0.480  T15 = 0.68 0.252 0.17 T11 = -0.29 0.390 -0.08 
rew - pun T61 = -0.05 0.480 -0.01 T30 = 0.28 0.391 0.05 T15 = -0.75 0.234 -0.19 T11 = 0.66 0.261 0.19 
rew - neu T64 = 0.62 0.268 0.08 T31 = 0.50 0.310 0.09 T15 = 1.27 0.112 0.32 T11 = -1.30 0.110 -0.38 Frequency 
pun - neu T62 = 1.30 0.099 0.16 T30 = 0.92 0.181 0.17 T15 = 2.18 0.023 0.55 T11 = -1.50 0.081 -0.43 
rew - pun T59 = -1.77 0.041 -0.23 T28 = -0.40 0.347 -0.07 T15 = -1.72 0.053 -0.43 T11 = -1.62 0.067 -0.47 
rew - neu T59 = -2.23 0.015 -0.29 T28 = -3.12 0.002 -0.58 T14 = -1.60 0.066 -0.41 T11 = -0.40 0.348 -0.12 c
orr
ect
ive
 
cor
rec
tive
 
cor
rec
tive
 
cor
rec
tive
 
sac
cad
es
sac
cad
es
sac
cad
es
sac
cad
es     
Latency 
pun - neu T59 = -0.99 0.164 -0.13 T28 = -1.76 0.045 -0.33 T14 = 0.15 0.443 0.04 T11 = 1.12 0.144 0.32 
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Table 9-18: Post-hoc between-group analyses (independent-sample t-test Tdf or Mann-Whitney-U test Z; significance p; effect 
size d for t-tests or θ for Mann-Whitney-U tests) for all dependant variables per saccade type explored for group differences in 
incentive-related modulation, per variable, incentive condition, and subject group. Significant differences (p ≤ 0.05/3 = 0.0167) 
are printed in red, p =1-tailed. 
 
Adolescents – Patients with Anxiety Adolescents – Patients with MDD Patients with Anxiety – Patients with MDD Dependant Variable per Saccade Type and 
Incentive Condition T or Z p d or θ T or Z p d or θ T or Z p d or θ 
punishment T46 = -0.38 0.354 -0.12 T42 = 0.66 0.257 0.22 T15.41 = 0.92 0.187 0.36 
reward T46 = -1.10 0.138 -0.33 T42 = 0.00 0.500 0.00 T26 = 0.89 0.190 0.35 Frequency 
neutral T46 = -1.03 0.155 -0.35 T42 = -1.33 0.095 -0.50 T26 = -0.69 0.249 -0.26 
punishment T46 = 1.60 0.058 0.52 T42 = 0.68 0.250 0.21 T26 = -0.48 0.318 -0.17 
reward T46 = 1.39 0.086 0.43 T42 = 1.06 0.148 0.35 T26 = -0.15 0.440 -0.06 Latency 
neutral T46 = 0.90 0.185 0.29 T42 = 0.31 0.377 0.10 T16.58 = -0.35 0.366 -0.14 
punishment T46 = -0.05 0.480 -0.02 T33.29 = 0.70 0.243 0.21 T25.76 = 0.67 0.254 0.25 
reward T46 = -0.71 0.241 -0.20 T42 = 0.03 0.487 0.01 T26 = 0.59 0.280 0.24 Peak Velocity 
neutral T46 = -1.53 0.066 -0.44 T42 = -0.34 0.368 -0.13 T21.67 = 1.12 0.138 0.41 
punishment T46 = -1.21 0.116 -0.37 T42 = -2.01 0.026 -0.62 T26 = -0.81 0.212 -0.30 
reward T46 = -1.26 0.106 -0.37 T42 = -1.96 0.028 -0.60 T26 = -0.76 0.226 -0.29 
cor
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Saccade 
Amplitude neutral T46 = -2.04 0.024 -0.61 T42 = -1.83 0.037 -0.56 T26 = -0.12 0.452 -0.04 
punishment T46 = 0.81 0.212 0.26 T42 = 1.12 0.134 0.37 T26 = 0.47 0.322 0.17 
reward T46 = 0.56 0.290 0.17 T42 = 0.84 0.203 0.26 T26 = 0.28 0.392 0.10 Frequency 
neutral T46 = -0.64 0.264 -0.19 T42 = -0.11 0.456 -0.04 T26 = 0.41 0.342 0.16 
punishment T46 = 0.72 0.238 0.23 T42 = 2.13 0.020 0.63 T26 = 1.40 0.086 0.51 
reward T45 = 0.55 0.293 0.16 T42 = 0.59 0.279 0.19 T26 = 0.08 0.469 0.03 Latency 
neutral T46 = 0.15 0.441 0.05 T42 = -0.89 0.190 -0.26 T26 = -0.81 0.212 -0.29 
punishment T46 = -0.38 0.353 -0.12 T11.95 = -1.11 0.145 -0.44 T26 = -1.08 0.146 -0.38 
reward T30.08 = -0.62 0.269 -0.19 T37.70 = 1.09 0.142 0.32 T22.48 = 1.43 0.083 0.52 Peak Velocity 
neutral T46 = -1.68 0.050 -0.51 T42 = -1.31 0.099 -0.44 T26 = 0.17 0.435 0.06 
punishment T45 = -1.55 0.064 -0.46 T42 = -1.88 0.033 -0.55 T26 = -0.55 0.293 -0.20 
reward T46 = -0.64 0.262 -0.20 T42 = 0.05 0.479 0.02 T21.46 = 0.76 0.227 0.27 
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Saccade 
Amplitude neutral T46 = -0.53 0.299 -0.17 T42 = -1.20 0.119 -0.42 T26 = -0.86 0.200 -0.32 
punishment T46 = -0.71 0.241 -0.22 T42 = -0.91 0.184 -0.30 T26 = -0.32 0.377 -0.12 
reward T46 = -0.44 0.330 -0.13 T42 = -1.11 0.137 -0.34 T26 = -0.60 0.276 -0.23 Frequency 
neutral T46 = 0.46 0.324 0.14 T42 = 0.10 0.462 0.03 T26 = -0.29 0.386 -0.11 
punishment T45 = 0.20 0.421 0.06 T41 = 0.64 0.263 0.22 T26 = 0.38 0.352 0.15 
reward T46 = 1.10 0.138 0.37 T42 = 1.75 0.044 0.67 T26 = 1.10 0.140 0.42 Latency 
neutral T46 = 1.03 0.154 0.33 T42 = 0.57 0.284 0.20 T26 = -0.34 0.367 -0.13 
punishment Z = -0.82 0.206 0.43 Z = -0.07 0.473 0.49 T26 = 0.74 0.234 0.29 
reward Z = -0.51 0.304 0.45 Z = -0.08 0.468 0.49 T26 = -0.42 0.339 -0.16 Peak Velocity 
neutral Z = -0.46 0.323 0.46 Z = -0.95 0.171 0.41 T26 = -0.02 0.492 -0.01 
punishment Z = -0.09 0.464 0.49 Z = -1.07 0.142 0.39 T26 = -1.05 0.153 -0.39 
reward Z = -0.43 0.335 0.46 Z = -1.17 0.120 0.38 T14.68 = -1.71 0.054 -0.69 
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Saccade 
Amplitude neutral Z = -0.67 0.252 0.44 Z = -1.12 0.131 0.39 T26 = -1.70 0.051 -0.63 
punishment T45 = -2.62 0.006 -0.73 T41 = -0.50 0.311 -0.17 T16.1 = 1.41 0.086 0.56 
reward T46 = -1.39 0.086 -0.45 T42 = -1.05 0.149 -0.39 T26 = 0.22 0.414 0.08 Frequency 
neutral T46 = -0.59 0.279 -0.18 T42 = -1.85 0.035 -0.68 T26 = -1.18 0.125 -0.46 
punishment T44 = -0.46 0.325 -0.16 T40 = -1.18 0.123 -0.41 T26 = -0.57 0.285 -0.20 
reward T44 = 1.12 0.134 0.34 T40 = 0.33 0.372 0.07 T26 = -0.60 0.278 -0.28 Latency 
neutral T44 = 1.61 0.057 0.56 T41 = 1.18 0.123 0.43 T26 = -0.19 0.427 -0.05 
punishment Z = -0.85 0.109 0.42 Z = -0.21 0.417 0.48 T26 = 1.19 0.122 0.48 
reward Z = -0.21 0.418 0.48 Z = -0.33 0.369 0.47 T26 = 0.43 0.335 0.16 Peak Velocity 
neutral Z = -1.11 0.133 0.40 Z = -1.68 0.047 0.33 T20.76 = 0.32 0.374 0.13 
punishment T44 = -0.31 0.379 -0.09 T40 = -0.94 0.176 -0.30 T26 = -0.58 0.283 -0.22 
reward T44 = 0.87 0.194 0.27 T40 = -1.04 0.151 -0.39 T26 = -1.94 0.032 -0.72 
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Saccade 
Amplitude neutral T44 = -1.78 0.041 -0.48 T41 = -0.91 0.184 -0.32 T26 = 0.80 0.215 0.32 
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9.6.3 Outcome notification period 
 
Table 9-19: Summary of main effects and interactions (Fdf/dferror, p) of the Analysis of Variance for each dependant variable 
analyzed during the outcome notification period. Significant differences (p ≤ 0.05) are printed in red. 
 
Dependant Variable per Condition 
 
Feedback Feedback by 
Diagnosis 
Incentives Incentives by 
Diagnosis 
Feedback by 
Incentives 
Feedback by 
Incentives by 
Diagnosis 
Diagnosis 
F1,57 = 6.49 F2,57 = 0.42 F2,56 = 2.77 F2,57 = 2.19 F2,56 = 1.74 F2,57 = 3.11 F2,57 = 0.95 Fixation Duration 
p = 0.014 p = 0.657 p = 0.071 p = 0.121 p = 0.186 p = 0.052 p = 0.392 
F1,57 = 80.63 F2,57 = 1.04 F2,56 = 10.68 F2,57 = 0.87 F2,56 = 0.01 F2,57 = 0.89 F2,57 = 2.87 Pupil Diameter  
p = 0.000 p = 0.360 p = 0.000 p = 0.423 p = 0.988 p = 0.417 p = 0.065 
F1,57 = 26.38 F2,57 = 1.02 F2,56 = 2.55 F2,57 = 1.85 F2,56 = 6.27 F2,57 = 0.89 F2,57 = 2.44 Pupil Dilation 
p = 0.000 p = 0.368 p = 0.087 p = 0.166 p = 0.003 p = 0.416 p = 0.096 
 
 
 
Table 9-20: Post-hoc within-group analysis (paired-sample t-test Tdf; significance p; effect size dz) for all dependant variables 
showing an incentive-related modulation in the Analysis of Variance, per feedback type, within-group comparison, and subject 
group. Significant differences (p ≤ 0.05/3 = 0.0167) are printed in red, p =1-tailed. rew = reward condition, pun = punishment 
condition; neu = neutral condition. 
 
All subjects Adolescents Patients with Anxiety Patients with MDD Comparison between Incentive Conditions per 
Feedback Type and Dependant Variable T p dz T p dz T p dz T p dz 
rew - pun T66 = -0.07 0.470 -0.01 T31 = 0.99 0.166 0.17 T15 = -0.64 0.265 -0.16 T11 = -0.69 0.253 -0.20 
rew - neu T66 = 0.60 0.276 0.07 T31 = -0.20 0.421 -0.04 T15 = 1.17 0.130 0.29 T11 = -0.40 0.349 -0.12 
Positive 
Feedback pun - neu T66 = 0.66 0.257 0.08 T31 = -1.33 0.097 -0.23 T15 = 1.31 0.105 0.33 T11 = 0.55 0.297 0.16 
rew - pun T66 = -1.31 0.097 -0.16 T31 = -0.72 0.238 -0.13 T15 = 0.21 0.417 0.05 T11 = -1.94 0.039 -0.56 
rew - neu T66 = 0.85 0.200 0.10 T31 = -0.09 0.463 -0.02 T15 = 0.67 0.258 0.17 T11 = 0.16 0.436 0.05 
Negative 
Feedback pun - neu T66 = 2.43 0.009 0.30 T31 = 0.84 0.205 0.15 T15 = 0.34 0.369 0.09 T11 = 2.93 0.007 0.84 
rew - pun T66 = -0.88 0.190 -0.11 T31 = 0.36 0.362 0.06 T15 = -0.96 0.177 -0.24 T11 = -1.04 0.159 -0.30 
rew - neu T66 = 0.73 0.234 0.09 T31 = -0.11 0.458 -0.02 T15 = 0.78 0.225 0.19 T11 = 0.11 0.458 0.03 
Fixation 
Duration 
Feedback 
Combined 
pun - neu T66 = 1.54 0.064 0.19 T31 = -0.47 0.321 -0.08 T15 = 1.16 0.133 0.29 T11 = 2.08 0.031 0.60 
rew - pun T66 = 1.92 0.029 0.23 T31 = 1.37 0.091 0.24 T15 = 0.17 0.433 0.04 T11 = 1.58 0.071 0.46 
rew - neu T66 = 4.83 0.000 0.59 T31 = 2.80 0.004 0.49 T15 = 4.57 0.000 1.14 T11 = 1.76 0.053 0.51 
Positive 
Feedback pun - neu T66 = 3.53 0.000 0.43 T31 = 1.89 0.034 0.33 T15 = 3.39 0.002 0.85 T11 = 0.89 0.197 0.26 
rew - pun T66 = 0.45 0.327 0.05 T31 = 0.22 0.413 0.04 T15 = 0.06 0.475 0.02 T11 = 0.76 0.233 0.22 
rew - neu T66 = 4.34 0.000 0.53 T31 = 3.34 0.001 0.59 T15 = 1.96 0.035 0.49 T11 = 1.16 0.136 0.33 
Negative 
Feedback pun - neu T66 = 3.51 0.000 0.43 T31 = 2.29 0.014 0.40 T15 = 2.60 0.010 0.65 T11 = 0.14 0.444 0.04 
rew - pun T66 = 0.72 0.237 0.09 T31 = 0.69 0.246 0.12 T15 = -0.55 0.295 -0.14 T11 = 0.87 0.201 0.25 
rew - neu T66 = 5.41 0.000 0.66 T31 = 3.29 0.001 0.58 T15 = 4.28 0.000 1.07 T11 = 2.09 0.031 0.60 
Pupil 
Diameter  
Feedback 
Combined 
pun - neu T66 = 4.44 0.000 0.54 T31 = 2.63 0.007 0.47 T15 = 3.82 0.001 0.96 T11 = 1.19 0.130 0.34 
rew - pun T66 = 2.20 0.016 0.27 T31 = 1.30 0.101 0.23 T15 = 1.14 0.137 0.28 T11 = 0.75 0.236 0.22 
rew - neu T66 = -0.26 0.396 -0.03 T31 = -1.29 0.104 -0.23 T15 = 0.56 0.290 0.14 T11 = -0.25 0.404 -0.07 
Positive 
Feedback pun - neu T66 = -1.89 0.032 -0.23 T31 = -2.07 0.024 -0.37 T15 = -0.24 0.407 -0.06 T11 = -0.79 0.222 -0.23 
rew - pun T66 = 0.78 0.218 0.10 T31 = 0.10 0.462 0.02 T15 = 2.20 0.022 0.55 T11 = 0.05 0.481 0.01 
rew - neu T66 = 2.44 0.009 0.30 T31 = 0.96 0.173 0.17 T15 = 2.25 0.020 0.56 T11 = 1.74 0.055 0.50 
Negative 
Feedback pun - neu T66 = 1.44 0.078 0.18 T31 = 0.70 0.244 0.12 T15 = 0.49 0.317 0.12 T11 = 1.42 0.091 0.41 
rew - pun T66 = 2.21 0.015 0.27 T31 = 0.91 0.184 0.16 T15 = 2.29 0.018 0.57 T11 = 0.34 0.371 0.10 
rew - neu T66 = 0.73 0.233 0.09 T31 = -0.56 0.290 -0.10 T15 = 1.39 0.093 0.35 T11 = 0.38 0.357 0.11 
Pupil 
Dilation 
Feedback 
Combined 
pun - neu T66 = -1.26 0.106 -0.15 T31 = -1.44 0.079 -0.26 T15 = -0.66 0.260 -0.16 T11 = 0.07 0.472 0.02 
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10.  Appendix III: Figures 
 
10.1 Accuracy Scenarios 
 
Figure 10-1: A) Correct antisaccade: Subject gazed at the correct location with a latency of 352ms after target onset. B) Cor-
rected direction error: Subject looked at the target instead of its mirror location within 180ms after target onset and re-located its 
gaze to the correct position within 382ms after target onset. While this trial was considered a direction error in the analysis, it 
was considered a correct outcome during the task since the gaze was located at the correct position within 500ms after target 
onset. C) Direction error: Subject looked at the target instead of its mirror location within 215ms after target onset and remained 
there until appearance of feedback (2.082s after target onset). D) Correct prosaccade: Subject gazed at the place where the 
target appeared within 184ms after target onset The size of the blue dot represents fixation duration; yellow circles demark the 
area in which a gaze was considered correct by the task computer. 
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10.2 Saccadic Reaction Time Distributions 
 
Figure 10-2: Saccade reaction time distributions of all saccades with amplitudes between 1.5° and 17° visual angle that were 
directed either to the left or right side of the screen, during the antisaccade instruction for all diagnostic groups: Top panel 
shows latencies of adults, the upper middle panel control of adolescents, the lower middle panel of adolescents with anxiety 
disorders, and the bottom panel of adolescents with MDD. The left hand side row shows all responses recorded, the middle row 
all correct responses recorded, and the right hand side row all direction errors recorded. Of note there were fewer subjects in 
the two clinical groups and thus overall less data available. 
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Figure 10-3: Saccade reaction time distributions of all saccades with amplitudes between 1.5° and 17° visual angle that were 
directed either to the left or right side of the screen, during the prosaccade instruction for all diagnostic groups: Top panel shows 
latencies of adults, the upper middle panel control of adolescents, the lower middle panel of adolescents with anxiety disorders, 
and the bottom panel of adolescents with MDD. The left hand side row shows all responses recorded, the middle row all correct 
responses recorded, and the right hand side row all direction errors recorded. Of note there were fewer subjects in the two 
clinical groups and thus overall less data available.  
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10.3 Figures Developmental Study 
10.3.1 Self-Reports 
 
 Figure 10-4: Summary scores (mean ± SE) of self –reports administered before eye movement testing (stai state = Spielberg 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory state form; stai trait = Spielberg State-Trait Anxiety Inventory trait from; bdi = Beck Depression 
Inventory (administered to adults) and cdi = Children Depression Inventory (administered to adolescents)) per age group (red = 
adolescents; blue = adults).  
 
 
 Figure 10-5: Ratings on items of the Debriefing Questionnaire for which there were significant differences between age groups 
(red = adolescents; blue = adults). 
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10.3.2 Performance Period 
 
Figure 10-6: Incentive-related modulation of dependant variables (mean ± SE) during the performance period of the RST per 
condition (“-“ = punishment condition; “+” = reward condition; “o” = neutral condition), per saccade type analyzed, and per age 
group (red = adolescents, blue = adults). 
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10.3.3 Outcome Notification Period 
 Figure 10-7: Incentive-related modulation of dependant variables (mean ± SE) during the outcome notification period of the RST 
per incentive condition (“-“ = punishment condition; “+” = reward condition; “o” = neutral condition), per feedback type (positive = 
win money for the reward condition, avoid losing money for the punishment condition, or feedback of correct performance for 
the neutral condition; negative = not winning money for the reward condition, losing money for the punishment condition, or 
feedback of incorrect performance for the neutral condition), and per age group (red = adolescents, blue = adults). 
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10.4 Figures Clinical Study 
10.4.1 Self-Reports 
 
 
Figure 10-8: Summary scores (mean ± SE) of self –reports administered before eye movement testing (stai state = Spielberg 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory state form; stai trait = Spielberg State-Trait Anxiety Inventory trait from; cdi = Children Depression 
Inventory) per diagnostic group (red = adolescent controls; green = adolescents with an anxiety disorders; light blue = adoles-
cents with MDD).  
 
 
Figure 10-9: Ratings on items of the Debriefing Questionnaire for which there were trends for differences between diagnostic 
groups (red = adolescent controls; green = adolescents with an anxiety disorders; light blue = adolescents with MDD). 
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10.4.2 Performance Period 
 
Figure 10-10: Incentive-related modulation of dependant variables (mean ± SE) during the performance period of the RST per 
condition (“-“ = punishment condition; “+” = reward condition; “o” = neutral condition), per saccade type analyzed, and per diag-
nostic group (red = adolescents, green = adolescents with Anxiety; light blue = adolescents with MDD). 
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10.4.3 Outcome Notification Period 
 
Figure 10-11: Incentive-related modulation of dependant variables (mean ± SE) during the outcome notification period of the 
RST per incentive condition (“-“ = punishment condition; “+” = reward condition; “o” = neutral condition), per feedback type 
(positive = win money for the reward condition, avoid losing money for the punishment condition, or feedback of correct per-
formance for the neutral condition; negative = not winning money for the reward condition, losing money for the punishment 
condition, or feedback of incorrect performance for the neutral condition), and per diagnostic group (red = adolescents, green = 
adolescents with Anxiety; light blue = adolescents with MDD). 
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